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I 
A RISK AND FELMILITY MANACEIENT 
APPRAISAL OF COMNY FAILURE 
An application of risk and reliability management 
methodology to the analysis and identification of: 
pattern, causes and symptoms of company failure, 
including formation of a Data Bank for failed 
companies. 
The principal objective of the research is to diagnose the causes 
and symptoms of company failure and to investigate whether a pattern 
of failure could be determined to enable management and other interested 
parties to identify the risks threatening the survival of the company. 
The ciirrent research divides into three main areas 
1. Development of a Data Bank and a study of the age structure of 
failed companies. 
2. An application of reliability management techniques to the analysib 
of company failure data. 
3. Identification of causes and symptoms of company failure based on 
risk management methodology. 
Data were collected and analysed for approximately 2000 manufacturing 
companies which had undergone either compulsory or creditors' voluntary 
liquidation during the period 1970 to 1977. A Data Bank was established 
with classified information for 16 different groups of companies making 
up the manufacturing industry. The classification was based on the Standard 
Industrial Classification. A study of the age structure of each group was 
carried out and compared with previous studies. 
Reliability methodology was applied to the analysis of company 
failure data for the identification of the failure pattern. Best distri- 
butions describing failure behaviour of companies were also determined 
and the validity and application of various statistical distiibutions were 
examined. A detailed examination of the histories of some large companies 
which failed during the period 1970-1977 was carried out. Risks, weaknesses 
and possible causes and symptoms of failure were investigated and discussed. 
A list of the causes of failure emerged from the analysis is drawn and the 
non-financial symptoms are highlighted in a tabular form. Illustrative 
models for the appraisal of change and identification of causes and 
symptoms are developed and critical factors discussed. 
Finally, general conclusions arising out of the research are-presented, 
along with-r ecommendations for further research and study. 
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INTR0DUCT10N 
CHAPTER I 
BUSIIESS FAILURE 
1.1 Introduction 
The study of business failure, is important both from the standpoint 
of internal management and from the standpoint of creditors with amounts 
owing from a company in distress. Some major company failures in recent 
years such as Rolls Royce, Court Line, Vehicle and General Insurance, 
Handley Page and Mitchell C6nstruction have raised questions of improprieties 
in the management of these companies. The instabilities of the 1970s, 
with increased numbers of failures in all sectors of business has generated 
a renewed interest as to the occurrence and practical importance of 
company failure. In the past few years many large and well known companies 
with properly established systems and qualified executives of the highest 
calibre have encountered difficulties which have resulted in liquidation, 
take-over or massive and traumatic rescue 6perations and reconstruction. 
inability of management to understand its organisation problems, resulted 
in development of crisis situations and final collapse, 
The thesis. of European psychologists is that "individual behaviour 
is determined primarily by previous events and experiences, not what lies 
ahead", which analogous to the companies where the problems and crisis 
of firms are rooted mostly in the past decisions and events rather than in 
present circumstances. Most of the management studies are often directed 
towards how things should be done, but there is also much to be learnt 
from a study of failed companies which shows how things should not be done 
and what happens when they go wrong. 
Today, society is an environment which is changing more rapidly than 
ever before in history. These rapid changes of environment possess particular 
problems for companies, businesses and other similar institutions. To 
cope with these changes it is necessary for a company to objectively 
look at the direction in which it is actually going and compare with the 
direction it should be going. This is what the failed companies did not 
recognise in time. The threat of failure confronts many small, and 
particularly young, companies. As-most businessmen come to realise the 
environment in which new firms are born is unfriendly and unconducive to 
to business survival, the result is a high mortality rate. 
This study pays attention to failure pattern of companies, the 
increasing rate of business failure and deals with the period in the life 
r 
of a company between the points where it is ailing and potentially failing 
and where its-difficiilties have not been diagnosed and it has finally 
collapsed. I 
1.2 objectives 
The aims of the present study are: 
1. To develop a Data Bank consisting of approximately 2000 companies which 
went into liquidation, either voluntarily by creditors' or compulsorily 
by courts. Thi, s can provide information with regard to age distribution 
of companies for further analysis in the present study and more information 
for other studies in the field of bpsiness failurei 
2. To analyse company failure data by application of the reliability 
management techniques to identify the time to failure distribution of data 
and pattern of failure in companies. 
3. To examine the histories of failed companies in order to identify the 
causes and symptoms of failure and to find a common thread of failure which 
can outline a set of guidelines that will keep management abreast of the 
risks and avoid the misconception, errors and omissions committed by some 
failed companies. 
j. 
1.3 methodology 
The methodology of the research is based on risk and reliability 
management which permits a step by step process of definition, data collec- 
tion, analysis, interpretation, identification, description and finally 
allows conclusions to be formulated and presented regarding the manufacturing 
companies which failed during the period 1970-1977 in England and Wales. 
Application of the methodology has resulted in a comprehensive classified 
Data Bank of failed companies with tabulated data which is subjected to 
statistical analysis later in the present study. 
In additiorL to quantitative data, case studies and histories of large 
company failures are given and discussed in qualitative terms. 
This methodblbgy has proved useful in that it enables a precise and 
logical research to be established and followed.. The first stage in the 
research was to arrive at an acceptable definition of failure- This was 
critical for following other stages, because it was essential to know what 
an event is before it can be analysed and predicted. 
1.4 Definition 
Many definitions of 'failure' are encountered in the general literature. 
Failure as defined in the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary 3, s "lack of 
success - state of not being adequate; non-performance of what is normal, 
expected or required. " The definition of failure in management studies is 
vague, partly because there are varying degrees of failure. It has been 
defined in several ways according to the particular applications being 
stddied. This term id often used loosely in the literature of business 
and economics. Dewing 
(54 ) 
distinguishes between economic and legal failure 
and writes "Broadly speaking, a business is an economic failure when the 
net return on the capital invested, after an allowance has been made for risk 
4. 
involved, is distinctly less than the prevailing interest rate on capital. 
A business is a legal failure when there is not available sufficient money 
to meet the legally forcible demands of creditors. In one case we are 
measuring business success and failure in terms of the earnings on invested 
capital; in the other case we are measuring the corporation's success and 
failure in terms of the ability bf the corporation to meet its just 
liabilities. " 
Altman 
( 4) 
defines failure by economic criteria as "the situation where 
the realised rate of return on invested capital, with allowance for risk, 
is significantly and ýontinually*lower than prevailing rates on similar 
investments. " He also comments that "somewhat different economic criteria 
have also been cited, including insufficient revenues to cover costs and 
situations where the average return on investment is below the firm's cost 
of capital. " Altman suggested when the company can no longer meet the 
enforceable demands of its creditors, it is called a legal failure. 
Weston and Brigham 
(158) 
differentiate between economic and financial 
failure, i. e. "Economic failure usually signifies that a firm's revenues do 
not cover costs or a firm has failed if the rate of earnings on the historical 
cost of investment is less than the firm's cost of capital. " They-also 
describe the financial failure as: Technical Insolvency, when a firm cannot 
meet its current obligations as they fall due, even though its total 
assets may exceed its total liabilities, and Bankruptcy when the firm's 
. 
total liabilities exceed a fair valuation of its total assets. The 'real' 
net-worth of the firm is negative. Dunn and Bradstreet(58) - a-Adiding 
supplier of relevant statistics on unsuccessful enterprises defines 
business failure as "those businesses that ceased operations following 
assignment or bankruptcy; ceased with loss to creditors after such actions 
as execution, foreclosure, or attachment; voluntarily-, Withdrew leaving unpaid 
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6. 
obligations, were involved in court actions sýich as receivership, re- 
organisation, or arrangement; or voluntarily compromised with creditors'. '. 
Argenti describes the most common words which are generally 
used in the study of business failure such as: insolvent, liquidation,. 
receivership and bankruptcy. He writes "Irf Britain, companies do not 
go bankrupt (that is a term reserved for people only), they become 
'insolvent' which means they cannot pay their debts as they fall due or 
that their net assets are of negative value. In this case the bank 
usually calls in a 'receiver' who takes over the management of the company 
and then does one of two things. He either continues trading with the 
permission of the creditors and others, in the hope of bringing the company 
or part of it round to profitability again, or he puts it into 'liquidation' 
which means the company stops trading and all its assets are sold for the 
benefit of the creditors. " 
The definitions adopted in the literature can be broadly classified as 
f ollows: 
1. Economic Failure: This will be ddemed to occur if one or more of the 
following conditions apply: 
a. the rate of earnings on the historical cost of investment is 
less than the firm's cost of capital 
b. Annual returns have fallen below expected returns 
c. Revenue does not cover costs. 
d. The net return on the capital invested, after allowance for risk, 
is distinctly less than the prevailing interest rate on capital. 
2. Financial Failure: Two coumon terms used with respect to financial 
failure are: 
a. Technical Insolvency. This refers to a state in which a firm 
finds itself unable to meet its current obligations even though its total 
7. 
assets exceed its total liabilities. This signifies lack of liquidity. 
Technical insolvency may be a temporary condition and is easily detectaIlle. 
b. Bankruptcy. A firm has failed in this sense when its total 
liabilities exceed a fair valuation of its total assets. This is a more 
critical conditioný and indicates a chronic rather than a temporary illness. 
The real net worth of the firm is negative. 
3. Business Failure: This type of failure is the most common one which 
represents the inability of a firm to make a profit. 
4. Legal Failure: When the company can no longer meet the legally 
enforceable demands of its creditors. This type of failure usually precedds 
such a comprehensive recapitalisation that the whole procedure may be called 
re-organisation. Legal failure ends up either through liquidation or 
re-organisation. The companies which go into receivership can be named 
as this type df failure when the reteiver attempts to sell their assets as 
a going concern. This does not mean that the business itself will be 
destroyed. 
There are different types of liquidation, of which the following are 
the principal ones: 
1. Compulsory liquidation (winding up by court) 
2. Voluntary liquidation 
2.1 Creditors' voluntary liquidation 
2.2 Members' voluntary liquidation 
3. Liquidation or winding up subject to supervision of court. 
These are described in detail in Chapter 3. 
The definition of failure adopted for the present study is that of 
insolvency when the company has appointed a liquidator either by creditors' 
voluntary liquidation or by court and compulsory liquidation. Exhibit 1.1 
shows various types of failure. 
8. 
1.5 Scope of Businesg Failure 
Chart 1.2 gives a clear conceptual picture of the scope 6f business 
and company failure studies. These include: 
1.5.1 Identification of causes and symptoms 
An essential part of any study is to define and identify the problems, 
the underlying causes of trouble and the signs of weaknesses in advance 
of failure. The importance of this stage of analysis is illustrated by 
the adage "A problem identified is half-solved, and a danger foreseen is 
half-avoided". The analysis can be divided into financial and non-financial. 
1.5.2 Prediction of failure 
Application of statistical techniques, such as multivariate discriminate 
analysis and probabilistic models in the analysis of financial behaviour 
of companies has provided valuable prediction models. The models have been 
developed by different authors in attempts to identify the companies at 
risk up to four or five years prior to bankruptcy. - The accuracy of these 
models, which are often called Z models, diminishes substantially as the 
lead time increases, e. g Altman 
(4 ) 
model has proved 95% successful in 
prediction of failure one year before the company actually fails, 72% for 
the second year, and only 36% with five years of the forecast. Taffler 
(144) 
claimed 98% accuracy in identifying the companies at risk for the first 
(149) 
year before failure. Townsend claims 92% accuracy in the first year 
for his model whilst Hawkins 
(84 ) 
demonstrated an 87% accuracy for an initial 
sample and 82% for his secondary sample in the year before failure. The 
range of accuracy differs in some degree with each model. These appear 
reasonably accurate for short-term forecasting. 
Other prediction models have been developed based on financial 
information of companies and causal analysis which can be used in conjunction 
with Z models to provide a more effective prediction tool. The main purpose 
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of prediction models is to identify the companies which are prone to 
failure in advance. These can be used by management, bankers, creditors, 
investment analysts, stock brokers arid, other interested groups. 
One striking point relating to the prediction models is that they do 
not predict the time to failure of a company, hut classify companies at 
risk on the basis of resemblance bB their financial characteristics with 
those of previously failed ones. This means they are not predictive 
in a conventi; nal sense. One can also predict the probability of failure 
or survival of companies at different stages in their life cycle and identify 
the pattern of high risk phases. This appraisal-is explained in Chapter 4 
of the present study. 
Finally, it is of interest to recall Altman "A prediction model will 
not under normal circumstances be the physician and panacea to the sick 
pati6nt. It merely serves as objective quantification of the patient's 
illness,, but it cannot point directly towards the areas of most pressing need". 
1.5.3 Prevention of failure 
Having identified the causes and symptoms of failure and assessed the 
propensity of a company t-o fail the next step from the'point-of view of 
management is t9 prevent the failure. This is often confronted by two 
important questions which are the 'Will' and the 'Ability'. The first 
questions should-always be asked since the concept of capitalism includes 
Darwin's rule of 'survival of the fittest'. In a capitalist system the 
resources of society are transferred from one application to another deemed 
to be more useful by the decline and failure of companies that are not 
using resources usefully and by the rise and success of companies that are. 
The question is whether one damages the efficiency of capitalism if he or 
she attempts to reduce the number of failures. Argenti suggests that 
"one has not to prevent all failures blindly, nor mindlessly.,, to increase the'm-, 
ii. 
but to 'regulate' failure in order to improve the efficiency of capitalism 
as a means of allocating the resources of society but with due attention to 
possible consequential hardship and harm to vulnerable members of society. " 
Voluntary re-organisation and corrective actions and control on time can 
prevent the company to go into the hands of the receivers and liquidators. 
Although 're-organisation' in its legal form is used when the company is 
insolvent, the author believes that re-organisation in this part means a 
radical change and severe actions to avoid disaster and correct the defects 
in systems. This needs a proper monitoring and control in all departments 
with standard c riteria for measurement and responsible body to do the job 
adequately. Preventive actions vary in different companies according to 
their size, type and severity of problems. An im portant point in the 
prevention of failure is that it must be planned, the main objectives and 
their alternatives should be clearly Identified and not consist-of a series 
of impromptu reactions to the emergencies as they, arise. Allsopp 
3) 
quotes "External assistance from bankers or additional investment by 
proprietors, either in the form of temporary loans or permanent capitals 
is much more likely to be forthcoming where they see management has grasped 
the situation and knows how it is going to regain viability. " He also 
suggests a plan including identification and assessment of the following: 
a. the cause and history of difficulty 
b. the present situation 
c. the proposed remedy and objectives to be attained and the foreseen 
programme of events 
d. the capital, revenue and expenditure budgets for the period of recovery. 
e. the effect of repayment or serviaing of any additional capital needed. - 
The author believes the difference between prevention and re-organisation 
is that in the former there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the company 
12. 
and some tactical re-arrangements are appropriate d. g. the implementation 
of tighter planning and control system, the introduction of improved or 
supplementary products, while in the latter case the company needs both 
strategic and tactical responses, for example in the area of strategic 
responses one should consider: 
a. a major change in activity 
b. the sale of company operations 
C. liquidation at an early date 
and for tactical responses: 
a. changing the image or name 
b. sale of a. *minor activity or acquisition of minor or additional 
activities by purchase or take-Over. 
1.5.4 Rescue operations 
Having recognised some or all of the warning symptoms and realising 
the existence of the problems, it is necessary to consider alternatives 
available: rescue, receivership or liquidation. In the general sense, 
re-organisation, turn-around and receivership are considered as an extreme 
and ultimate group of remedies. For any rescue operation to succeed, it is 
essential that a'capable management is introduced to the firm. In the 
financial sense, re-organisation is a process involving a recasting of the 
capital structure which the corporation is compelled to indergo either 
because insolvency has been evidenced by a default on an obligation or 
because such a default is imminent. The process is ordinarily carried out 
during receivership or bankruptcy. It may result in the formation of a 
new corporation. 
Cuthmann and Dougall 
(72 
outline the purposes of re-organis 
. 
ation as: 
a. to find and, if possible, to eliminate the operating and managerial 
causes of the difficulty 
13. 
b. to reduce fixed charges 
c. to reduce or eliminate floating debt 
d. to simplify the capital structure and facilitate future finan6ing 
e. to raise new funds for working capital or property rehabilitation. 
The first question to be answered is whether the company is better off 
'dead or aliiVe' - whether it should be liquidated and sold off piecemeal 
or be rehabilitated. "When a business becomes insolvent, a decision must 
be made whether to dissolve the firm through liquidation or to keep it 
alive through re-organisation. This decision depends upon a determination 
of the valud of-the firm if it is to be rehabilitated versus the value of 
the sum of the parts if it is dismembered. " 
Rescue operations vary greatly with the circumstances of the individual 
companies which may require a mild or drastic treatment. If a voluntary 
rescue operation and turn-around is not possible or is not desirable, then 
the next alternative to be considered is receivership. Receivers, in general, 
-either continue trading with the permission of the creditors and others, 
in the hope of bringing*the company, or parts of it, round to profitability 
through drastic changes and re-organisation, or he puts the company into 
liquidation which means the company stops, trading and all its assets are 
sold for the benefit of the creditors. Adkins( 
1 )suggests 
that in a 
rescue operation one has to find the right answers for the following items: 
a. is it really the best choice ? 
b. is it possible to achieve ? 
C. Will it simply put off the evil day 7 
d. What part does pride play ? 
e. what is the quality of management, employees, equipment and products 7 
f. the continuity of the company 
14. 
1.5.4.1 Liquidation 
The term 'liquidation' is applied when the business is wound up and 
the assets are converted into cash which is distributed to the owners and 
creditors. This is usually the result of a condition in which no treatment, 
mild or drastic, can remedy. Although "solvent corporations are liquidated 
merely because profits are unsatisfactory, the majority of companies which 
reach the liquidation stage are discontinued because of inability to meet 
4 
maturing debts . If there is no debenture and therefore no means of 
appointing a receiver, and it has been decided that the company cannot 
continue then the only alternative is liquidai'--ion. If the directors will 
not act, it is likely that a creditor or creditors will themselves take 
action and will petition the court for the compulsory liquidation of the 
company. This should not. be necessary and, if the directors recognise 
the position, they themselves should take the necessary steps to place the 
company into creditors' Voluntary liquidation. The details df vaiious 
types of liquidation are given in Chapter 3 of this study. 
The essential factor in a rescue operation is 'timing'. A company 
must not be put into liquidation if it is possible to avoid failureq but 
at the same time, to delay this most difficult decision is, as some experts 
believe, tantamount to fraud. Fraud is used here in the broad sense of 
the word and it refers to management's having the necessary knowledge of 
its precarious situation but refusing to admit failure. 
Another important point is that financial re-adjustments could not 
by themselves, rehabilitate the company. This is often overlooked in 
rescue and re-organisation of ailing companies. - A large number of previously 
re-organised companies which have failed after a short period give evidence 
of the ignorance of the conditions and requirements for this process. 
15. 
_1.5.5 
Impact and consequences of company*failure 
It is a common belief that every company like every product has a 
life cycle - it is born, it grows and some day it dies:; or even gets killed - 
some are short and btutal but most are long and lingering. However, as 
Cork 
( 46) 
points out "we have learnt that a capitalist business must not 
be a ruthless business; that the art of earning money is to earn it for a 
service to the community and not for holding the community to ransom. " 
Failure of a company is as an.; asset lost to the community, an asset 
that has cost a lot of money and a lot of skill to build up. The loss of 
a business and the failure of a company is a misfortune to lts owners, 
creditors, employees, and even customers. "Investors place their funds 
in a business with the expectation that the value of the funds will not 
only be preserved but enhanced. ,( 
46 )A 
business failure destroys these 
expectations. The extent of failure consequences vary depending upon-:: -'. -. '-. 
various factors such as size and type of company, type of failure and type 
of industry. Broom et al 
(30 ) 
believe that "business mortality is a personal 
tragedy to the entrepreneurs who fail and, at the same time, a source of 
social waste. " They also state "there are a number of reasons why business 
failure constitutes a tragedy. " Among these are the following: 
1. Loss of dapital on the part of the entrepreneur and creditors. 
2. Psychological effect on the individual 
3. Elimination of a source of goods and services 
4. Reduction of employment 
5. Decreased tax payments 
Argenti expresses his view as "Corporate collapse has always 
brought fearful mental pain to proprietor, entrepreneurs, managers and their 
families. It has always meant that employees lose their jobs, shareholders 
lose their savings, creditors lose cash and future business, the customer 
16. 
t1 
H 
bj 
H 
W 
1-4 0 
0.8 H 1-4 w 
C: M 
m 
M W 
0 
I-h 
10 
P) 
1: 41 
Ei 
17. 
is deprived of the product. It ruins lives and pushes its victims to the 
edge of suicide and beyond. "' Allsopp 
(3) 
describes the impact of failure 
and its consequences to the manager and executive, empl6yee, suppliers, 
customers and community and concludes "In an ideal world a business that is 
no longer viable would be run down and eventually cease trading with the 
minimum of consequential loss to the subscribers, creditors, and employees. " 
Having considered the views of a few authors on the impact of 
company failure, the author concluded that one can possibly divide the 
consequences of failure into two categories as follows: 
1.5.5.1 Direct impacts 
This means the result of failure on all interested parties to the 
company in a direct, f as t and early apparent term. As can be observed from 
the chart, the parties involved in this category are those quite close to 
the company's day to day running in one way or another and are affected by 
the failure of company almost immediately: they are in danger of losing 
their job, savings, holdings, reputation, investment, customers, market 
demand, product, service and even business. The impact and the degree of 
consequences vary depending upon their ability to manage the risks and crisis 
and also their dependency on the failed company. 
1.5.5.2 Indirect impacts 
. 
This category is refýrred to circumstances when the consequences of 
a company failure are slow, late and not specifically apparent in the short 
term. The examples are the impact of business failure on national production, 
loss of exports, number of new businesses, tax payments and unemployment 
figures. The main difference, the author believes, is that in the former 
category the consequences and impact, -tcan be individually identified and 
even measured while in the latter case this is often impossible. Finally, 
whatever the category one might accept, the country loses, when thexate 
18. 
of failure rises, through its balance of payments. 
Exhibit 1.3 gives a clear picture of direct and indirect impact and 
consequences of company failure. 
1.6 Plan of Thesis 
Chapter 2 of the thesis contains a review of the existing literature 
and relevant works on business and company failure. It includes the 
financial and non-financial studies which have been presented in the** 
following order: 
a. Financial studies 
This part of the chapter describes the prediction models, based on 
univariate and multivariate analysis of financial ratios, which have been 
developed by different authors in order to spot'the companies at risk in 
advance and predict the bankruptcy before it actually occurs. The strength 
and weakness of these models have been assessed in the end of this section. 
b. Non-financial studies 
The second part of Chapter 2 presents the views of experts, summary 
of wokks and conclusions drawn from the previous researches with regard to 
analysis of causes and symptoms of failure in small and large companies, 
business mortality, patterns and cycles of company failure, turnaround and 
rescue operations. A general assessment of these works is given at the 
end of this chapter. 
Chapter 3 describes the process of development of a Data Bank consisting 
of approximately 2000 manufacturing companies which went into liquidation 
either voluntarily (by creditors) ot compulsorily (by court) during the 
period 1970-1977. An analysis of birth and death statistics of companies 
in the UK in the above period and the methodology of this study are also 
given in detail. The final part of this chapter is devoted to the inter- 
19. 
pretation of the tables drawn from the computerised list of Data Bank 
regarding the age structure of failed companies according to their group 
of industry and year of failure. The results and conclusions have been 
comparedwith the previous studies in this area. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to the application of reliability management 
methodology to the analysis of company failure data and identification 
of the pattern of failure. A brief review of reliability concepts and 
statistical distributions is made. The distributions used for the analysis 
of data are: 
Log-normal 
Weibull 
Gamma 
Exponential 
Ifixed-Weibull 
The chapter describes the analysis of failure data, the application and 
validity of distributions and presents the best distribution which can 
describe different failure patterns. The plots of the empirical data 
fitted into the above distributions are also given. 
Chapter 5 of the present study has been devoted to the application 
of risk management methodology to the identification of causes and symptoms 
of company failure data. It provides a review of the functions and scope of 
risk management and compares its concept with company failure studies. 
The companies selected for this analysis are some of the major companies 
which have failed in recent years and have been investigated, by the inspectors 
appointed by the Department of Trade, or the experts. This chapter 
discusses the development arid. evolution of firms, the problems and 
difficulties of small businesses and examines the individual cases to 
identify their causes and symptoms of failure. A list of 'causes of failure 
2o. 
which is derived from the companies studied and a categorical table and 
chart of non-financial symptoms of failure are also given. The final part 
of this chapter is the description of processes of failure, discussion of 
the most critical factors, development of an illustrative model for change 
appraisal and the conclusions drawn from this study. 
Chapter 6 brings together the main conclusions drawn from the previous 
chapters and presents recommendations for further researches in this field. 
It should be noted that the data analysed in this research refers to 
a. period (1970 to 1977) when the British economy was highly unstable. 
Care, therefore, needs to be exercised when interpreting results. As it 
must not necessarily be assumed that investigation over a different period 
or in a different economy will produce the same findings. However, the 
author is of the opinion that notwithstanding the differences in time or 
conditions (e. g. other countries), -one can still apply the methodology 
I developed, in the present study to identify those companies in actual or 
potential trouble. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A REVIEW OF BUSINESS FAILURE STUDIES 
2.1 Introduction 
is The main objectivt--, of- this-chapter to approach the subject of business 
failure via a survey of existing literature and the tentative - 
conclusions based on what has been found about the concept and scope 
of company failure and business mortality. 
This review was deemed essential to exploit research findings and to 
spotlight weaknesses. This proved an invaluable aid to designing the 
present research. Although a certain amount of British studies have 
appeared in this field of management, their Volume is small in comparison 
with those inspired by the US. In order to judge the individual usefulness 
and type of study the author classified all these works into the following 
categories: 
1. Financial Analysis - 
1.1 Univariate analysis 
1.2 Multivariate analysis 
2. Non-Financial Analysis 
2.1 Causes and symptoms of failure 
2.2 Other areas of company failure 
22. 
2.2 Financial Analysis 
2.2.1 Univariate Studies 
Univariate analysis is an approach 6f prediction of company failure 
which uses financial ratios taken one at a time in order to predict whether 
or not a given company is a member of some predetermined class of companies. 
This approach was used by many researchers in Ameiica as early as 1931, 
(64) (134) (112) 
Fitzpatrick (1931,1932), Winakor and Smith (1935) and 'Merwin (1942)-, to 
indicate that failing firms have different ratio patterns to continuing 
firms. 
One of the most useful essays on the subject of univariate studies in 
(53) 
relation to impending failure is that of Dev (Dev, S., 1974) which provided 
a summary of ratios and bes't discriminators of previous researchers. 
(146) Tamari (1964) Compared ten ratios calculated from the accounts 
of 28 industrial firms with those'of all Israeli industry between 1950 and 
1960 and found that the financial ratios may be predictors of faililre up to 
5 years before bankruptcy. He also found that the failed company ratios 
were significantly worse than the all-industry ratios in the-year prior to 
failure and most had been deteriorating for up to five years prior. This 
study gave support to the current ratio and the ratio of net worth to total 
debt as a means of forecasting bankruptcy by including them with four 
other ratios to compose an index as a signal for solvency and risk. He 
concluded that the analyst cannot rely on one ratio alone in measuring P 
the degree of risk'% and therefore attempted to develop a linear discrimiuant 
function for better risk measurement.. 
Although the Tamari study was the only major univariate study in this 
field to have been undertaken outside the United States, it inspired other. 
researchers in the USA and UK to investigate the predictive power of financial 
ratios using statistical techniques and empirical data. 
23. 
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IERWIN (Merwin, C L, 1942) 
(112) 
one of the early works on the predictive power of financial ratios 
carried out by Merwin (1942) who tested a set of selected ratios for a 
sample of 939 small firms in five manufacturing industries in the USA over 
a period of 11 years. He concluded that three of the ratios prov6d'to be 
indicators of the discontinuance of a firm in business. These ratios 
were the-current ratio, net worth of total debt, and net working capital 
to total assets. 
The predictive power of these ratios may reveal signs of weakness in 
discontinuing firms as clearly as 4 or 5 years before the date of 
discontinuance. 
Merwin classified a firm as 'failed' when it failed to have filed-a 
tax return for six consecutive years and then to have failed to file a 
return in one of the subsequent years. There are a few critics who comment 
that not all firms which stop filling tax returns are in financial diffi- 
culties, reasons could be li4uidation of a profitable business, merger of 
6ne firm to another or change in name. He compared various aggregate mean 
ratios of the failed firms with the aggregate mean ratios of non-failed firms, 
BEAVER (Beaver, W H, 1966) 
(I- T) 
Beaver's study was based on the analysis of 30 ratios that are popular 
in the financial literature to test the predictive power of these ratios 
as prddictors of company failure in the USA. The ratios were classified 
into six groups and the best performing ratios in terms of overall predictive 
accuracy in each group ranked, as among themselves, in the order shown in 
Table 2.2. 
Cash flow to total debit was the best ratio with 87% accuracy in 
predicting failure for 79 failed firms and non-failure for 79 non-failed 
firms at the first year before failure (the failed and non-failed firms were 
26. 
TABLE 2.2 
Ratios 
* (1) Prediction. 
Cash flow to total debt 
*(2) 
Non-failed > failed 
Net income to total assets Non-failed > failed 
Total debt to total assets Failed > Non-failed 
working capital to total assets Non-failed > failed 
Current ratio Non-failed > failed 
No-credit interval Non-failed > failed 
*(l) Non-failed > failed is a prediction that the mean value of the 
non-failed firms will be greater that that of the failed firms 
*(2) Debt is -. defined as current plus long term liabilities plus 
preferred stock. 
t 
Source: Beaver, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 4 
27. 
similar in terms of size as measured by total assets value). The predictive 
accuracy of this ratio was also high for the second through fifth years 
before failure ranging from 75% to 80%. The Beaver study is the major 
srudy of a univariate nature and is regarded as a classic in the study of 
predictiveness of financial ratios. He views the firm as a reservoir of 
liquid assets which is supplied by inflows and drained by outflows. The 
solvency of the firm is defined in terms of the probability that the 
reservoir will be emptied. 
Beaver suggests that there are four important concepts in drawing 
the relationships between the liquid assets flow model and the ratios, namely.: 
1. The size of the reservoir 
2. Debt of the firm 
3. Net liquid flow from operations 
4. Fund expenditure for operations 
Given these concepts, he states: 
"a. The larger the reservoir, the smaller the probability of failure.. 
b. The larger the net-liquid asset flow from operations (i. e. cash flow), 
the smaller the probability of failure. 
C. The larger the amount of debt held, the greater the probability of 
failure. 
d. The larger the fund expenditure for openations the greater the 
probability of failure. ý" 
FITZPATRICK (Fitzpatrick, P J, 1931 and 1932)(64 
)(65) 
The Fitzpatrick studies of 1931 and 1932 were among the earliest works 
in this field which compared the certain selected ratios between 19 failed 
and 19 non-failed firms during the period 1920-1929. He employed a paired 
sample in terms of asset size, financial statement dat e and industrial 
classificatioa, The second study constituted the comparison of 13 ratios for 
28. 
each df 19 failed companies with those of 19 successful companies. Afialysis 
of the trends of 13 ratios for-3-5 years prior to the failure showed that 
although all ratios predicted failure through declining trends, the best 
predictors among the above ratios were: 
Net profit/Net worth 
Net worth/Total debt 
The main criticisms of these studies include the limited sample size and 
lacjr- of a clear definition of failure. 
SMITE AND WINAKOR (Smith, RF& Winakor, A H, 1935) 
(135) 
This study was an extensuon of an earlier work by Smith and examined 
the changes and trends of the mean value of 21 ratios for a sample of 183 
firms which had failed by 1931 over a period of 4 to 10 years prior to 
failure. They defined failure if a firm: 
1. Enttred into receivership - 
2. Defaulted on its bonds 
3. Underwent a financial readjustment which resulted in material changes 
in the right or equities of the owners and creditors. 
The mean asset size of the sample%. which was mainly chosen from Moody's 
Industrial Manual was $12,200,000.1 
They concluded that the overall results were similar to those of 
Smith's earlier research. There were certain ratios whose trends 
resulted in an uninterrupted indication or symptoms of weakness for the 
majority of companies in at least the last 8 years before failure. (Smith, 
R F, 1930). They concluded that the ratio of working capital/total assets 
was the best indicator of future failure where decline began 10 years before 
the occurrance of financial difficulties. The main weakness Of this study 
is the lack of a matched sample of continuing firms dr a control sample. 
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2.2.2 Multivariate Discriminant Analysis 
This is a statistical technique used to classify an observation into 
one of several groupings dependent upon the observation's characteristics. 
The first step is to establish explicit group classification. The number 
of original groups can be two or more. It is used primarily to classify 
and/or make predictions in problems where the dependent variable appears 
in qualitative form, e. g. male or female, bankrupt or non-bankrupt. This 
technique has the advantage of considering an entire profile of character-;.. 
istics common to the relevant firms, as well as the interaction of these 
properties. A univariate study, on the other hand, can only consider the 
measurement used for group assignmýntlone at a time. This technique, using 
financial ratios, has been employed by many authors in the field of 
management and finance in dealing with the forecasting of failure for 
manufacturing companies (Tamari, 1966; Altman, 1968; Blum, 1974; Taffler, 
1977; Townsend, 1978 and. 'Hawkins, 1978), for companies in general (Deakin, 
1972), small firms (Edmioster, 1972), for banks (Meyer and Pifer, 1971), 
for railroads (Altman, 1973), for insurance companies (Freischmann and 
Pinches, 1973,1974). 
ALTMAN (Altman, E L, 1968) 
(4 
This is the first study undettaken to investigate the discriminatory 
I 
power of financial ratios utilising multiple discriminant analysis. The 
initial sample was composed of 66 corporations with 33 firms in each of the 
two groups. The bankrupt group were manufacturers that filed a bankruptcy 
petition during the period 1946-65. The man asset size of these firms was 
$6.4 million with a range of between $0.7 million to $25.9 million. Group 
2, which were still in existence in 1966, consisted of a paired sample of 
manufacturing fir chosen on a stratified random basis by industry and by 
size. The next stage was to compile a list of 22 potentially helpful 
3o. 
variables (ratios) for evaluation. These ratios were classified into 
5 standard raýio categories as: 
a. Liquidity ratios 
b. Profitability ratios 
c. Leverage ratios 
d. Solvency ratios 
e. Activity ratios. 
The selection of ratios was based on 
1. Popularity in the literature 
2. Potential relevancy to the study 
3. A few new ratios initiated in this study 
From the original 22 ratios, 5 ratios or variables were selected as 
best glolyal'indicatOrs- in the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. The 
final discriminant function was as follows: 
Z= . 012X, + . 014X2 + . 033X3 + . 066X4 + '999X5 
where 
X1= Working capital/Total assets , 
X2 = Retained earnings/Total assets 
X3 = Earnings before interest and tax/Total assets 
X4 = Market value equity/Book value of total debt 
X5 = Saleshotal assets. 
Z. = Overall Index. 
Altman, in this study'which has been described in detail in his book 
'Corporate Bankruptcy in America', calculated that there is an area of 
uncertainty between 1.81 and 2.99 which is defined as a grey area or 
zone of ignorance because of the susceptibility to error classification. 
He concludeis that all firms having aZ score of greater than 2.99 clearly 
31. 
fall into the non-bankrupt sector, while those firms having aZ below 1.81 
are all bankrupt. 
The predictive accuracy of this model was 95% one year prior to 
bankruptcy, 72% for 2 years, 48% for three years, 29% for four years and 
36% for five years ptior to bankruptcy. It is realised that the accuracy 
of the model falls off consistently with the one exception of the fourth and 
fifth years. The most logical reason, Altman comments, for this occurrence 
is that after the second year, the discriminant model becomes unreliable 
in its predictive ability. One would expect that as the lead time increases, 
the relative predictive ability of any model would decrease. This was 
true in univariate studies cited earlier, and it is also quite true for 
multivariate discriminant analysis and models. 
Based on results, Altman suggests, that "the bankruptcy prediction model 
is an accurate forecaster of failure up to two years prior to bankruptcy 
and that the accuracy diminishes substantially as the lead time increases. " 
TAMER (Taffler, R, 1977)(144) 
The Taffler study is the first comprebensive work in the development of 
Z models specially to analyse UK manufacturing concerns. He has employed 
multivariate discriminant analysis technique for the identification of 
potentially bankrupt manufacturing companies in advance of failure. 
Taffler believes that his final statistical model using a stepwise 
discriminant approach and financial ratio data is able to identify subse- 
quently failing companies with 98% success rate. 
This study consisted of failure as insolvency and those situations in 
which companies were unable to continue in business through inability to 
meet outstanding financial obligations as a result of factors under the 
control of the company and where loss to creditors and shareholders conse- 
quently results or would have resulted without action by the government. 
32. 
Taffler considered a sample of 46 failing and 46 non-failing companies, 
matched by size and industry. From 80 potentially discriminatory ratios, 
four were shown to be able to predict with 98% accuracy the classification 
of his initial sample one year prior to failure. The final function: 
was derived in the form: 
Z=C0+C1R1+c2R2+C3 R3 + C4 R4 
where 
overall index 
R1= Profit before tax/Current liabilities_ 
R2 = Current assets/Total liabilities 
R3ý Current liabilities/Total assets 
R42, No-credit interval: this calculates the time for which the 
company can finance its continuing operation from its immediate 
assets if all sources of short term finance are cut off 
Co =a constant 
Cl-C 4= ratio weights or coefficient. 
Although the relative importance of each ratio was given, the actual 
coefficients and the constant corrective were not which makes further 
comment difficult. 
Taffler calculates a cut-off point and suggests a danger and a solvent 
region. Any firm with a Z-score in the 'danger' region can be considered 
a potential failure and the more negative the rating and the more years f6r 
which it is below zero the more likely the firm is to go bankrupt. On the 
other hand any company with a score lying anywhere in the solvent region 
can be considered a virtually 100% safe bet. 
It should be noted that the presence of a company in danger region 
only indicates, strictly speaking, that it financially resembles previous 
It 
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bankrupt firms, not that it will necessarily fail. However, it is a stimulus 
for further investigation of company performance. 
EDMINSTER (Edminster, R ., 1971) 
( 60 ) 
Edminster took a sample from firms which had either received loans or 
loan guarantees from the Small Business Administration (BSA) in the USA, and 
used multiple discriminant analysis to discriminate between failed and non- 
failed businesses. He examined the ratios of 21 loss borrowers and a similar 
number of non-loss borrowers. The mean asset size of the firms was $116,700 
for failed and $213,000 for the non-failed ones which, indicates that the 
study was towards the small corporations. He concluded that his linear 
discriminant function, containing Aeven variables, predicted failure more 
successfully than did any single ratio. The final function obtained was 
of the form: i 
Z=0.951 - 0.423X 1-0.293X2 - 0.482X3 + 0.277X4 - 0.452X5 - 
0.352X 6-0.924X 7 
Z=1 for a successful (non-loss) business 
The function was able to predict with 92% accuracy on the original sample. 
This study, suffers from a number of drawbacks which Townsend and Cru 
referred to as: 
1. Small sample size 
2. Lack of hold out sample 
3. BiAsed population - apparently to receive a. loan from the SBA, the 
borrower must have been refused credit by at least one bank, hence a higher 
likelihood of failure. 
4. Exclusive use of zero-one dummy variables. Gru points out that by the 
use of such variables to describe continuous quantitative variables is an 
inefficient use of data. 
34. 
Edminster is, however, vague as to how he defines business failure, 
his research design states: "Multiple discriminant analysis is employed to 
select a set of ratios which best discriminate between loss and non-loss 
borrowers and guarantee recipients". It would mean if the Small Business 
Administration had written off a loan as a loss the business was considered 
a failure otherwise a success. 
GRU (Gru, L G, 1973) 
(71) 
This is another study on small businesses and was designed to develop 
a model capable of predicting the failure of small businesses in the US. 
The purpose was to assess whether financial ratio analyses together with 
the use of multivariate discriminant analysis could be useful in this type 
of business, with a view to its usefulness to crddit analysts in assessing 
credit worthiness of potential debtors. i 
A small business was defined as one with total assets less than 
$2,200,000. Failure was considered when a firm declared itself bankrupt 
(US usage). The sample consisted of 34 failed and 34 non-failed firms 
as a primary sample and a secondary sample of 15 non-failed and 13-failed 
firms. The model contained five variables or ratios which showed a good 
result for both primary and secondary samples. This model predicted the 
failure for small businesses with 94% accuracy for the primary sample, 
and 86% accuracy for the secondary sample. The best function obtained was: 
Z=0.07877XI + o. o2256x 2+o. 01643X3 + 0.0718OX4 " 0.04144X5 
where 
X earnings before taxes plus depreciation/Total debt 
X2 Working capital/Total assets 
X3 Net sales/Total assets 
X4 Operating profit/Total assets 
-35. 
X. 5 = Total debt/Total assets 
Discriminant score 
Z2' X3 and X4 are the same ratios that Altman, had previously used in 
prediction of large manufacturing companies. 
One of the major drawbacks of this study is the period. for collecting 
data which was only 16 months before the date of failure and is not a 
significant duration for prddiction. 
LIS (Lis, 1972) 
(102) 
This study is the first*one in the UK which was published in an article 
by Bolitho in the Investor's Chronicle (1973, March). Lis took a sample of 
30 listed companies which had failed between 1964 and 1972, and 30 non-failed 
companies matched by size, year and industry. He claimed to be able to 
predict to within 90% of accuracy whether a-company is financially insolvent. 
He based his claim on the use of four ratios which could be calculated from 
information contained in the latest published balance sheet of a company. 
These four ratios. were: 
X Working capital/Total assets 
X2 = Earnings before interest and tax/Total assets 
X3 = Tot4l retained earnings/Total assets 
X4= Total net worth/Total debts 
where 
Working capital = current assets - current liabilities 
Total assets = current assets + fixdd assets - goodwill 
Earnings before interest aiid tax = Trading profits minus such items 
as depreciation, auditorstremune- 
ration, hire Of plant and directors' 
emoluments. 
Total retained earnings = retained profits after all scrip issues 
made from revenue reserves have been included 
36. 
Total net worth = All ffinds directly attributable to ordinary share- 
holders. 
Total debt = All short and long term borrowings plus redeemable 
preference shares 
These ratios were drawn from an analysis of certain previous literature 
particularly Altman's 1968 study. The final function was- 
z=0.06289X 1+0.09241X 2+0.05739X3 + 0.0143X4 
Z= Overall Index - 
The cut-off point was 0.027 and in general terms, the higher the value 
above this, the greater the certainty that a company is financially sound. 
(24 
BLUM (Blum, M P, 1974) 
The focus of . this study was to construct a theoretical model, based on 
accounting and market data, which can distinguish failing from non-failing 
firms. Data were collected fou. -. 115 failed and for 115 non-failed firms. 
The unfailed firms were paired with the failed firms by criteria of industry 
and size. Failure was predicted with an accuracy of 80% when it occurred 
two years into the future. It was predicted with an accuracy of 70% when 
it o-curs three, four and five years in the future. Failure in this study 
was based on the following criteria with three common denominators: 
profitability, liquidity and variability. 
1. Inability to pay debts as they came due 
2. Entrance into a bankruptcy proceeding 
3. Meplicit agreement with creditors to reduce debts. 
The period of study was during 1954-58. The failing company model was 
constructed from the following ratios; 
1. The 'quick-flow' ratio 
2. Net quick assets/Inventory 
37. 
3. Cash flow/Total liabilities 
4. Net worth at fair market value/Total liabilities 
Net worth at book value/Total liabilities 
6. Rate of return on common stockh6lders who invest for a'minimum of 
three years 
7. Standard deviation of net income over a period 
8. Trend breaks for net income 
9. Slope for net income 
10-12 Standard deviation, trend breaks and slope of the ratio, net quick 
assets to-inventory: 
Variable 10,11 and 12 are only used at the first and second year before 
failure. The coefficients of ratios were calculated for various previous 
years data. Discrimination was not found to be statistically significant 
at the sixth year prior to failure. 
This model exhibited better long term predictive accuracy, but its use 
is more difficult due to the information required. The principal hypothesis 
to be tested in this study was that the failing company model could 
discriminate failed from nonfailed firms by means of the quantitative profile 
provided by the, twelve. variables. 
TOWNSEND (Townsend, T c, 1978) 
(149) 
Townsend in an investigation into the use of models in predicting failure 
or-acquisition, and their use to the business policy maker in determining 
the characteristics of impending failure, comprised a primary sample of 
25 failed companies, 25 acquired companies and 25 non-failed companies. 
The companies being matched for industrial classification, approximate asset 
size and for the same accounting period. Financial data was collected for 
a period of three years prior to failure or acquisition. For each of the 
firms and for each year the following ratios were calculated: 
38. 
X, - Working capital/Total assets I 
X2 - Retained earnings/Total assets 
X3 - Earnings before interest and tax/TotAl assets 
X4 - Market value of equity/Book value of-total debt 
x5 - Sales/Total assets 
From these values two separate discriminant scores were calculated: 
Z 0.012X 1+0.014X2 + O., 003X3 + 0.006X4 + 0.0099X5 
z2 ý- 0.012X I+0.014X2 + 0.003X3 + 0.006X 4 
It was found for all-the above measures, save in two instances, out of 42 
companies made,, that: 
Performance of non-failed > performance of, acquired > performance of failed 
The models were developed based on the Altman model to predict acquisition or 
failure of UK companies, using the technique of multiple discriminant analysis. 
The model was not able to satisfactorily discriminate between acquired and 
non-failed companies and did not seek to attempt to diýcriminate between 
failed and acquired companies. 
The best aýquisition model could accurately predict 88% of the 
acquisition whilst the best failure model 92% of the failure. 
Townsend also used a secondary sample of failed and acquired companies. 
HAWKINS (Hawkins, JW 1978) 
(84)-. 
Hawkins used the technique of multiple discriminant analysis in 
analysing 25 potentially discriminating ratios and developdd a model 
ultimately utilising 6 of these ratios. He concluded that the model for 
his data which was collected for 51 pairs of failed and non-failed companies 
in the UK, could accurately classify 62% of the companies in the year prior 
to bankruptcy, 88% two years prior, 76% three years prior and 62% four years 
39. 
prior. The four models developed were: 
ZT-1 ý 4.493X 10 + 3.126X 11 + 4.041X16 - 13.087X18 + 462X 19 + 0.23 'X23 
-2.576 
z T-2 'ý 
4.865X 
10 + 0.025X 15 + 1.485X 16 - 11.15ix 18 + 5.662X 21 + 3.608X23 - 
- 1.413 
z T-3 ý 1.813X 9-0.075X4 + 3.329X14 - 2.116X17 - 2.435X, g - 0*0001X24 
- 1.073 
ZT-4 ý 3.508X 13 0.009X 15 - 
3.536X 
17 + 
0.752X 20 + 
2.538X23 - 0'0001X24 
2.252 
z T-N 
indicates the year to which they refer. 
It is felt that the empirical results obtained in the course of study 
by different authors strongly suggest that it is possible to predict the 
occurrence of company failure prior to the event with some level of accuracy 
(Altman, Taffler, Hawkins, Townsend, etc. ). Table 2.3 shows the comparative 
predictive ability of models developed by the authors. Table 2.4 shows 
the ratios which are good discriminators between failed and non-failed 
companies in multivariate studies. 
Since it is clearly possible to predict with a good degree of accuracy 
the failure of a company purely from an analysis of its published and equity 
data up to four years prior to the event, it is perhaps surprising that more 
firms do not take appropriate remedial actions in good time, or conversely 
are still predicting recovery even one-year before their entry into 
liquidation. This is further evident from the study of the causes and 
symptoms of failure by the author which showed in almost all the cases 
the chairman's statements and annual reports were misleading and grossly 
incorrect based on manipulated accounts and window-dressed balance sheets tcý 
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conceal the facts. 
The financial analysis of companies has been carridd out to develop 
failure prediction models to spot potential failure. There are many 
arguments that these models do not project the intervgning economic s6nditions 
(90) 
(Johnson, 1970). The authors defend their models by argiling that all these 
econom1c conditions are projected through the financial ratios as variables 
(4) 
(Altman). They believe that the models do not contain information about the 
alternative strategies, but one has to bear-in mind that models Vyere not 
intended to do so. They were for the purpose of finding.:: those companies 
(144) 
at risk (Taffler) by an appropriate combination of certain ratios. Briefly, 
they do not analyse, they just simplify the job of analysts and those 
interested groups to pay more attention and time in identifying the under- 
lying causes and problems whose outcome is a low Z score. 
These models are particularly advantageous to bankers, investment 
analysts, creditorsp stockbrokers and other corporate interest groups. It- 
is also useful to the management of the cqmPany. 
The term 'prediction' does not mean when a company will fail in a 
particular time in the future. The prediction models in the field of 
business are more definitional rather than predictive in a conventional 
form as they measure the propensity of failure and not thý actual failure 
date. They classify companies accoeding to their financial characteristics 
resemblance to the previously failed companies to identify whether they 
are in danger area and risk or not.. The actual failure depends on the 
severity of difficulties, management ability and will to recognise the 
weaknesses and take the corrective actions or otherwise, and many other 
factors including those outside management controi e. g. external factors. 
Ratios are constructed from accounting data which are subject to 
different interpretations and even manipulation. For example, tw6 firms 
44. 
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may use different depreciation methods or inventory valuation methods; 
depending on the procedures followdd, reported profit can be raised or 
lowered. Similar differences can be encountered in the treatment of research 
and development expenditures. Ratios are extremely useful tools, but as 
with other analytical methods, theymUst be used with judgement and caution. 
Nevertheless, even with the selection of right ratios and supplementary 
information one cannot place abs&lute relialice upon the results of financial 
ratio analysis and do not take the positiori that predictive models based on 
these ratios are the answer to evaluating the performance of a firm, but 
they are a powerful tool to provide a basis for raising questions and further 
investigation and analysis. They can be used as indicators and warning 
systems to management and analysts in order to develop first hand knowledge 
of the operations of the company and a sense, a touch, a smell, and a feel 
of What is going on in the firm. Sometimes it is this sixth sense kind of 
business judgement that untangles the causes of failure and xincovers the 
weaknesses in the firm. 
Although it is believed that models predicting failure can be self- 
fulfilling(149), the question is whether or not users of such models are 
able to accurately interpret any information the models may provide. Both 
Kennedy (Kennedy, H A, 1975) and Libby (Libby, R, 1975) have described 
experiments designed to test the ability of analysts to correctly. interpret 
accounting information. Their conclusions were that the usefulness of 
accounting information is a function of the predictive ability of the 
information, and the ability of users to interpret the data. 
Finally, the author believes that although. 'Age' has been hamed as 
an important variable in failure prediction models and almost all the authors 
are shared with Altman that "Age variable, or a proxy for age, would be a 
prime measure to utilise in a bankruptcy prediction model", none of them 
45. 
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indluded this variable in their models. This might be of interest to 
investigate the possibility of adding the probability of company failure based 
on their age structure in order to improve the accuracy of the models and 
their application, specially for insurance companies which are always 
interested in age characteristics of individuals and firms. 
2.3 Non-Financial Analysis 
Although the information necess ary to diagnose causes of failure varies 
from case to case and is not readily susceptible to statistical generdlisation 
(24) 
(Blum), it is important to integrate this with those proirided by the 
predictive models and financial. analysis of companies. 
A model that can be useful in the prediction of business failure must 
have a -theoretical foundation. This foundation establishes the relationship 
between the model and the event which is to be predicted. Without such a 
foundation, the model may not be fundamentally related to the event which 
is to be predicted. - business failure. If there*-is no'-rationale for a 
correlation between model and event, there is little faith that the model 
would continue to have predictive power, even though it may have worked well (24) 
on past occasions (Blum). The causes of failure could'be viewed, in part, 
I 
as dbverses. of causes of success It should be noted that 
bilsiness failure prediction models will not under normal circumstances be 
(4) 
the physician and panacea to the sick patient (Altman). It merely serves 
as objective quantification of the patient's illness but it cann6t p6int 
directly towards the areas Of most presiing need. -Once management 
is convinced 
of the immediate need for change, then it is his responsibility to 
implement these new business -policies which will either save the company, 
or hasten its death. The latter choice can be extremely important to the 
present creditors and even the owners. The corrective-ý! actions cannot be 
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Kally and Lawyer 
(94 ) 
believe that "success, failure, or merely 
average achievement in small businesses depends more on the individual 
than upon anything else. " They conclude, "Business failures are human 
failures, as are those in most other lines of activities. " 
Broom and Longenecker 
(30 ) 
state "The threat of failure confronts 
many small business enterprises, particularly those that are newcomers. " 
In the analysis 6f causes of'failure they suggest that aside from the 
relatively few failures caused by fiaud, neglect and disaster, the root 
cause is found in managerial incapacity, and other more prominent 
difficulties are the following: 
Competition 
Lack of capital 
Location i 
Premature expansion 
They also refer to the symptoms of business failure, explaining that the 
following types of change are symptoms of impending business failure: 
1. Deterioration of working capital position 
2. Declining sales 
3. Declining profits (or increasing losses) 
4.. Progressively higher debt ratio. 
(35 ) 
RD Bullock in an attempt to give the symptoms of sickness in 
small firms writes "There are the signs to watch: lack of any plan for the 
future, the company reacting to events as they occur, a chronic shortage of 
working capital, payments to suppliers or even payrolls are delayed unti- 
cheques Arrive from customers, low employee morale, frequent absenteeism, 
high turnover, low profits or none at all because sales are weak and not 
I growing, costs: higher than expected, chronic late shipments, poor work 
scheduling, lack of timely or adequate management information and poor 
48. 
intra-company communications. " He also comments on other factors and 
carries on his list as: "Executives who work overtime, guesswork pricing, 
too much reworking of products after final inspection, desks piled with 
the paperwork showing. either inefficiency or insufficient office staff. " 
The ailthor believes that, although most of the items in this list can be 
seen in a weak organisation, they are not in any particular arrangements. 
M Allsopp 
(3) 
quotes "As with ships, businesses are usually lost 
because of errors of navigation, command and control rather than through 
inherent faults in the vessel. " He further comments that any malfunction 
capable of bringing a company to grief has its counterpart in a board 
weakness and frequently in the managing director hi=elf. There is nothing 
more potentially dangerous to a company than self-satisfied leadership, 
confident that the size of the business, the established supremacy of its 
position or its name alone will ensure continued profitability. Allsopp 
believes that for the most causes of failure one must look at the board, 
its composition-balance and bias, the calibre of the board in times of 
difficulty and also the managing director and purpose of the company. He 
concludes "To summarise, the responsibility of the board is inescapable and 
that of the managing director complete. Each board must assemble a blend 
of skills that are appropriate to its activities and challenge and change 
its composition as necessary to anticipate changes in the-'demands made upon 
it. Imbalance or inadequacy in the board may produce a fatal counterpart 
in the organisation as a whole. " 
49. 
ARGENTI- (Argenti, J, 1976) 
Argenti is one of the first authors in the UK who has contributed on 
the subject of corporate failure in detail and has attempted in his book 
'Corporate Collapse' to bring together an extensive collection of knowledge 
and experience on the earlý- identification of failure and its prevention 
and cure. 
This study is based on the conclusions of previous researchers in the 
I 
United States and United Kingdom plus a few interviews which are given in 
detail to the readers in different chapters. Having presented a synopsis 
of the views of a considerAble number of writers and experts in this field, 
he reproduced a list of causes and symptoms of failure, and presents a list 
containing twelve items (in italics) -a*s-: 'his list which he believes are linked 
together in a mechanism that operates as follows: 
"If the ma; ý? agement of a company is poor, then two things will be 
neglected: the system of accounting information will be deficient and the 
company will not respond to change. (Some companies even well-managed ones, 
may be damaged because powerful constraints prevent the managers making the 
responses they wish to. make). Poor managers will also make at least one 
of three other mistakes; they will overtrade; or they will launch a big 
project that goes wrong, or they will allow the companyls gearing to rise 
so that even normal business hazards become constant threats. These are 
the chief causes, neither fraud nor bad luck deserve more than a passing 
mention. Th e following symptoms will appear: certain financial ratios 
will deteriorate but, as soon as they do, the manager will start creative 
accounting which reduces the predictive value of these ratios and so lends 
greater importance to non-financiaZ synVtoms- Finally the company enters 
a characteristic period 1A its last few months. 
5o. 
D Cohen 
(44 ) 
begins his article "Confidence comes before a crash" by 
writing "Spectacular business crashes like Rolls Royce arid Vehicle and 
General have made it uncomfortably clear that no firm is above economic 
law. They suggest that many managements are reluctant to recognise the 
increasing vulnerability of business life. " The most obvious danger signals 
given by Cohen is said to be the result of 4iscussion with many'company 
doctors which are as follows: 
1. Liquidity problems. 
They may indicate that the business as a whole is not doing well or 
that a key department is failing to pay its W-11y. 
2. Interest rates. 
Many businesses accept rates which lead to a situation where they 
have to borrow money to pay off their debts - double interest. 
3. Credit control. 
This is one of the factors contributing to liquidity problems. Three 
points are essential here: 
Do not borrow too much 
Do not lend too much 
Do not pay too much for your own credit 
4. Technological bakcground. 
Lack of product innovation and response to technological change is 
another signal for the weak companies. 
5. Prestige over profit. 
Expensive offices in central city, travelling by first class tickets, 
expensive business lunches and this kind of luxury spending are symptoms 
of companies which try to put prestige over profit. 
6. Recruitment. 
A tendency to recruit those who conf6rm to managers' own prejudices and 
51. 
hiring people in their own image is another sign of weakness. 
7. Relying on too few accounts. 
Reliance on too few accounts and customers means putting the business 
at risk. Once you lose the big customer you may find that a large part of 
your business can simply disappear. 
8. Growth 
Although one might not totally agree with the philosophy of Growth 
Stock that "if you are not growing, you are stagnating", -what is true is 
that a company that does nothing more than maintain a certain level of 
profit is exposing itself to takeover. 
9. Over-expansion 
Uncontrolled over-expansion is dangerous. 
10. Industrial Relations 
The final sign is to understand, think and treat the employees as 
individual people and not as numbers. 
PWJ Hartigan 
( 75) in an article 'Causes of Company Failure', states 
that "Many business failures are the result of surprisingly obvious human 
failings. " In this article, in which the writer draws on his own professional 
experience, an attempt is made to analyse the main causes of insolvency. 
The most coibm6n causes of failure found, based on experience of dealing 
with insolvent companies over years, were: 
Lack of capital 
Undercosting 
Lack of management control 
Lack of adequate advice 
Government restrictions 
Trade fluctuations 
Fraud 
52.. 
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Hartigan describes each factor in detail and concludes that "Most 
cases of--failure involve several of the above factors, the most common 
combination being lack of capital and inadequate management control. Some 
factors not already mentioned can be found. The human elements: greed, 
stubbornness, dishonesty have a major part to play in many failures, but 
pervading them allis inability or unwillingness to see the facts. " 
(31) 
R Brough in'a study of 100 private companies, wound up compulsorily 
under English Law in 1975, shows the principal causes of failure in the 
opinion of the Official Receivers and Directors as follows: 
A. Principal Causes of Failure in the Opinion of Official Receivers 
Mismanagement 67 
Insufficient Capital 31 
Insufficient working capital 20 
Excessive remuneration to, or 
drawing by Directors 7 
Inadequate accounting 5 
Inexperience 5 
Gross management 4 
Bad debts 4 
Under-estimating 4 
Pilfering or fraud 4 
Over-trading and expanding too 
rapidly 3 
Increasing overheads 3 
53. 
B. Principal Causes of Failure in the Opinion of Directors 
Insufficient working capital 28 
Insufficient capital 23 
Bad debts 18 
inexperience 10 
Poor labour and poor supervision 10 
Keen competition 9 
Ill-health 9 
Under-estimating 7 
Too rapid expansion 6 
-Stortage of materials 4 
Bad weather 4 
Pilfering or fraud 4 
Inadequate accounting 3 
Increasing overheads 3 
Customers dissatisfied 3 
Let down by customers 3 
As can be observed, the Directors of the failed companies offer a 
greater variety of reasons for theirlack of success than did the Official 
Receivers. 
Chris Baker 
( 12) 
,a financial analyst and specialist points to 
budgetary control, cash flow and an effective costing system as being 
major factors in ensuring whether a company surviv6s or fails. He also is 
concerned that "with decisions now having to be taken which will virtually 
affect the future of many companies, there are many boards where the skills 
possessed by directors are unbalanced, and too many smaller companies lack 
a strong finance! ý--director and possess little in the way of professional 
management below board level. " 
54. 
AJ Towlson 
(150) 
describes*. business failure as a gradual process, 
often over many years, which is preceded by a long and intense struggle 
to improve profit and/or cash performance. He quotes "The symptoms of 
existing, or impending, collapse may be obviouS. 11 The most usual and 
significant signs include: 
Total dependence on short-term finance 
Lack of liquidity identified by slow payment of accounts, excessive 
stock of debtors 
Delayed presentation of annual accounts 
Management strife and changes 
Same trade/industry failures 
Same group failure. 
He views the failure to arise from management ineptitude, inexperience, or 
lack of foresight. The main internal factors which give rise to collapse 
are: 
Poor financial planning and control 
Inadequate marketing 
Ineffective management organisation 
Inadequate, production facilities 
overtrading 
The mAin external factors are industry and social trends, economic and 
financial conditions, technological obsolescences and government policy 
and legislation. 
A Rapazzini 
(122) 
comments that "companies spotting the possibility of 
greater profits in some markets, may diversify into fields with which they 
are not familiar. A particular problem which arises here is that the 
danger signals in an unfamiliar market are that much more difficult to 
recog*nise. They are just not aware of the critical control aspects. " 
55. 
He sees companies as being weak as ever in the provision of management 
reporting systems. A simple financial reporting system should cover three 
main areas; cash flow, trading summary and balance sheet. 
JE Ross and MJ Kami(124) define the nature of the crisis in 
management and demonstrate how selected companies in a number of industries 
have managed to mismanage their affairs. Finally they include a check-off 
list for a self-audit on the management of company. The igeneral conclusion. 
of this study which is given in the first chapter of their book is named 
"The Ten Commandments of Management" as follows: 
I. Develop and communicate a strategy ..... a unified sense of direction 
to which all members of the organisation can relate. 
2. If you want to achieve plans, programs and policies, then overall 
controls and cost controls must be established., 
3. Exercise care in the selection of a board of directors and require that 
they actively participate in management. 
4. Avoid one-man rule. 
5. Provide management depth.. 
6. Keep informed of change and react-to change 
7. Do not overlook the cuýtomer and the customer's new power. 
8. Use, but do not misuse, computers. 
9. Do nqt engage in accounting manipulation 
10. Provide for an or'ganisational structure that means the need of people. 
They go through each of the above items, considering successful and 
unsuccessful companies, illustrate how these commandments were broken or 
ignored by failed firms. 
J Van Horne(154) who devotes one chapter of his book to business failure 
and re-organisation, expresses his view as "Although the causes of financial 
difficulty are numerousý many failures are attributable either directly or 
56. 
indirectly, to management. Usually non-financial problems lead to losses 
which, in turn, lead to financiAl strain and eventual failure. Very seldom 
is one bad decision the cause of the difficulty. Usually the cause is a 
series of errors, and the difficulty evolves gradually. " 
Van Horne comments that "the remedies available to save a failing company 
vary in harshness according to the degree of the financial difficulty. if 
the outlook is sufficiently hopeless, liquidation may be the only feasible 
alternative. " 
Dun and Bradstreet 
(58 ) 
which provides one of the most comprehensive 
USA business failure statistics, tabulates and reports failure causes based 
on opinions of informed creditors and information in credit reports. 
As can be observed from Table 2.5 over 90% of all failures result- 
from one type of management inefficiency or another. This table breaks 
down the causes of business failure into its components as well as percentage 
presentation of causes. It should be noted that because some failures are 
attributed to a combination of apparent causes, percentage does-MOt add 
up to 100%. The principal weaknesses of US unsuccessful businesses, given 
by Dun and Bradstreet, are 
Inadequate records 
Inaccurate costing information 
Insufficient long-term capital 
Failure td budget expenses 
Excessive operating costs 
Little or no internal control of expense 
Faulty purchasing procedure 
Faulty sales policy 
Lack of stock capital 
Lack of effective credit policy 
Excessive investment in plant 
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Dewing 
(54 ) 
who is one of the earliest authors in writing and 
analysing corporate structure, refers to failure in Chapter Two of his book. 
Commenting"'The term 'failufe' is used lossely in the writings of business 
and in the literature of economics. Broadly speaking a business is an 
economic failure when the net return on capital invested, after an allowance 
has been made for the risk involved, is distinctly less than the prevailing 
interest rate on capital. A corporation which owns a buqiness is a legal 
failure when there is not available sufficient money to meet the legally 
forcible demands of creditors. " 
Dewing believes that there are four fundamental economic causes of 
failure of large businesses. They are: 
1. Excessive competition 
2. Unprofitable expansion 
3. Change in the public demand for the commodity 
4. Distribution of capital as ostensible, profit. 
In a broad sense all of these are. different phases of the single all- 
embracing causes - lack of skill of management. It is the lack of skill 
in meeting excessive competition, lack of skill in undertaking programmes 
pf expansion likely to pruve disastrous, lack of skill in foreseeing a change 
I 
in public demand and in not adjusting the business to"this change, and the 
lack of skill in conderving the capital within the business. 
In the same chapter, Dewing states "Whatsoever the fundamental cafises 
that lie back of corporate failure, other and more superficial causes are 
usually advanced by corporate officials as plausible explanation. The 
operation of causes is obscured by many subordinate considerations. The* 
corporation struggles to avoid confessing failure. At first it sells stock 
or long time bonds, covers up the losses by accounting methods and as 
failure becomes more threatening the corporation sells short-term notes or 
59. 
increases its indebtedness to the banks and finally when the obligations 
become so great and there is no more alternative the corporation confesses 
its insolvency with a big excuse - lack of current capital? 
" 
Another study in this area is the one carried out by Dun and Bradstreet 
in 1965. Table 2.6 gives the causes of business failure based on both 
Official Recei, ýers and Directors of US failed companies which is of. great 
interest for comparison of views. Naturally, one would expect that the 
Directors' or the owners` enumeration would look quite different. The true 
answer to the question - "What was the piimary cause of failure is 
probably much closer to the creditor opinion, although even here there' 
is undoubtedly some bias built into the results. 
These causes arise from both internal and external conditions and it- 
has been estimated that nearly 90% of insolvencies are due to internal 
failures. It is interesting to note that while 67 offical receivers suggest 
mismanagement as an important cause of failure, there is no indication of 
this factor as failure by the directors. Having considered the table one 
can realise that directors, however, accept their lack of competence, ability 
and efficiency by giving their views on factor. % such as: poor labour/poor 
supervision, keen competition, bad debts, underestimating, insufficient 
capital and working capital. In actual terms what they suggest are the 
symptoms of underlying causes which is poor management, mismanagement and 
bad management, 
H LEVY and M SARNAT in an analysis of the nature of financial 
failure state: "The usual causes given for financial failure., e. g. lack of 
capital, faulty accounting, poor planning, etc., are more often not causes 
but rather rationalisati. ons or excuses for the poor performance. The under- 
lying cause of most failures can best be summarised by the term management 
incompetence. It is the lack of managerial skills which appears to be the 
Table 2.6 
Causes of Business Failure - 1965 
Causes of Failure Official 
Receivers' 
Opinion 
Directors 
Opinion 
Mismanagement 67 - 
Insufficient capital 31 23 
Insufficient wokking capital 20 28 
Poor labour/Poor supervision - 10 
Keen competitors-; 9 
III health - 9 
Excessive remuneration/drawing 7 - 
Inadequate accounting 5 3 
Inexperience 5 10 
Expansion too rapid - 6 
Crosp*management 4 - 
Bad debts 4 18 
Under-estimation 4 7 
Pilfering/Fraud 4 4 
Shortage of materials - 4 
Bad weather 4 
Overtrading/expansion too rapid 3 - 
Increasing overheads 3- 3 
Customer Dissatisfaction - 3 
Let down by customers 3 
60. 
Source: Dun and Bradstreet (1965 Survey) 
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fundamental cause of business failure, independent of the size or nature 
of the business undertaking. Ultimately, business success or failure 
depends on the quality of human management. " 
(72 ) 
HG CUTHMANN and HE DOUGLAS in an analysis of failure causes, 
stress that the causes of failure may emerge in every phase of the business 
activitYp and "since the type of remedy or treatment applied should depend 
on the diagnosis, it is important to recognise where the main difficulty 
lies. Regardless of whether the cause of failure is financial or non- 
financial in origin, failure is indicated by a financial condition which 
calls for adjustment, and the problem of cure will rest largely with 
financial management. ` 
They divide the causes of failure into two groups; internal and 
external causes and also on a functional basis - that is, according to the 
department of the business in which the troublesome weakness arise. Their 
classification of failure causes can-be summarised as: 
1. Internal Causes 
Financial 
1. Excessive funded debt 
(a) initial 
(b) Subsequent to promotion 
2. Excessive current debt 
3. Slow collections or bad debt losses 
4. Unwise divided policy 
5. Inadequate provision for maintenance and depreciation 
B. Non-Financial 
1. Unwise initial promotion 
2. Weak purchasing policies 
3. Poor production policies 
4. Unskilful marketing policies 
62. 
Inventory losses 
unwise expansion 
Fraud 
II. External Causes 
J.. Excessive competition 
2. Changes in public demand - 
3. The business cycle 
4. Political I 
(a) Excessive taxation 
(b) Hostile regulations 
(c) Adverse tariff legislation 
5. Foreign and special factors 
6. Accidents of nature (Acts of God) 
They describe the more import-ant factors and conclude that whatever the 
cause of failure may be, every effort should be made to preserve the 
company as a going concern. 
(163) 
A WYRCAN in an article "Under British Management" gives a few of 
the danger signals he spotted when he joined a small firm which was in 
trouble. He quotes "A complete disregard by practically everyone in the 
works and offices of the top man's presence. Conversation and/or inactivity 
continued quite unaffected in our presence. Many of those who were working 
stopped to appraise the'visitor'. The area in front of the stores was-like 
the Law Courts' Bear Garden, the babble among the groups gathered there was. 
extraordinary and continued unabated and unabashed. Gangways between. 
benches and machines were cluttered, filth and rubbish lay everywhere ardund 
machines, benches and the yard. There was not a production engineer in the 
firmý" These signs are more or less good evidence of the existence of some 
problem which can be Very important to those who are able to recognise 
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troubles from the symptoms and this can be obtained through a tour of the 
premises. 
EY DERAN 
(Y in a study of 333 small firms in nine communities in 
Illinois arrived at the following conclusions: "If the reasons are grouped 
into the four very broad classifications of personal qualities, financial 
policies, non-financial business p6licies and exo3enous factors, then it 
turns out that the mo8t frequent-explanation for business failure is 
various defects in personal characteristics of the owner, ranging from a 
grumpy personality through addiction to wine, women and song. Such personal 
explanations accoýinted for 36% of the factors lisied as the primary cause 
of failure. and 33% of all causes. Faulty financial policies were the 
second most important - 34% of both the primary and all causes. The three 
exogenous factors of poor location, vigorous competition add changes in 
retailing trends accounted for 20% of the primary reasons and 15% of all 
reasons. Non-financial policies ranging from poor merchandising through 
labour problems, represented only 9% of the primary causes but 18% of all 
causes. 11 
An analysis by EE BARBEE 
(13 ) 
concludes that "80 to 90% of failures 
are directly traceable to the man who fails. " 
(162) 
Woodruff-and Alexander conclude in their study of ten 'successful' 
and ten 'unsuccesifallgmall firms: 
1. None of the unsuccessful firms had already good financial records and 
nine of them had extremely poor records, so that management lacked navigatioz 
aids through the business shoals and miidbanks. All of the ten successful 
companies, in contrast, had well-informed managements, kept complete records 
and made full use of the records that were kept. 
2. All of the unsuccessful firms, with no exceptions, regarded selling 
as a nuisance. On the other hand, all of the successful firms empha'sised 
67. 
selling. 
3. Very few of the unsuccessful firms paid any recognisable attention to 
research and product development. On the other hand, nine of the ten 
successful ones emphasised the importance of such activities. 
4. All of the unsuccessful d6mpanies showed inept internal administration. 
In successful groups lines of authority were clear. 
D CHILVERS 
(40 ) 
who has investigated many companies in trouble 
expresses his view as "Bad management must be at the top of the list. If 
one is looking for another common cause of a company's downfall, it will 
be that it has over-committed itself - usually by trying toj diversify 
in an expensive or over-ambitious fashion. In such cases the basic error 
of under-capitalisation might be compounded by a chaotic approach to debt 
collection, or a reluctance to quote selling prices at an economic level, 
or a general failure to exercise discipline over the incurring of capital 
commitments. In short, little attention may have been paid to cash flow. " 
He also comments on the symptoms of trouble by "A coýnon symptom id a' 
crisis torn companu is inadequate or misleading management information at 
board level. " He believes that there has always been either a total failure 
to bring information to the attention of the board, or alternatively, failure 
on the part of the board to act on the information. 
Sir Charles Hardie 
( 74) 
,a senior partner of an accountancy firm, 
sums up his experience-of handling many receivership's as "There are certdin 
patterns of corporate behaviour which are fraught with potential dangers. " 
what is more, he believes that directors could often do more to alert 
themselves to the dangers at an early stage. The slipper y path to bankruptcy 
is not so clearly marked out, b6t often the signs are there to be seen. 
The trouble, he comments, is that "it has become such a habit that boards 
do not think as carefully as they should. " His message is to have a list of 
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all items at risk at any one time which "enables proposed projects to be 
examined in perspective against the backdrop of its total risks, otherwise 
boards tend to evaluate in isolation. " 
Kenneth Cork 
(46 ) is another expert in receiverships and company failure 
Who emphasises communication as an important cause of failure by quoting 
11... With businesses which get into difficulty, so often the key problem 
is communication. I am struck by the inability of so many companies that 
get into difficulty to communicate, even with themselves, let alone with 
their staff. "' This is agreat failure, he adds, and accountants are responsible 
for some of it. "A person can only think with the information he has in his 
head. If the management have a mass of figures coming up to them of accounts, 
costings, forecasts and everything else, things are so complicated that they 
cannot absorb them. " A lot-of trouble is due to complicated figures being 
produced. 
With regard to danger signals, he comments "The one who gets into 
difficulties is usually an optimist. As things get difficult the human mind 
cannot take bad news endlessly; so even if the information is there, he 
shuts his eyes and would not look at it. " Cork also refers to the chairman's 
statement with the optimistic comments when the company is doing badly and 
says "Ydt if you look at the balance sheet you can see that he had no more 
assets to pledge, the bank overdraft ig at the limit. So if he does tet 
the turnover, he will undoubtedly go broke. " There is an ibteresting 
reference to some symptoms of failure when Cork stresses, "Often when you 
open the top right hand drawer, there is a whole pile of unopened letters - 
unopened because the person could not read them; it made him feel ill to 
read them. Instead, he took refuge in working 14 hours a day, rather than 
think. " 
one of the recent studies which has been conducted by the Centre for 
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Interfirm. Comparison 
(38 ) identifies the factors which distinguish successful 
businesses from unsuccessful ones, and shows that managerial characteristics 
are related to s'uccess and failure. The main findings of the study are 
that. firms with better performance (measured by return on assets) can be 
distinguished by differences in a number of detailed performance measures. 
The most important of these is profit margin, which emerged as the chief 
determinant of success. Other findings are: 
1. A well-defined production pblicy is more important than new machinery. 
2. Stock and debtor control are vital in manufacturing industries. 
3. The systematic professional management is more likely to lead to 
success than haphazard management. 
This study suggests some key features associated with success of companies. 
KS Lomax 
(104) in an attempt to analyse the business 
. 
failure data draws 
attention to business mortality theory and quotes "It is fairly well 
established that with most types of business the early years are the most 
difficult. it is then that mortality is highest. The longer a business 
survives, generally, other things being equal, the smaller becomes the 
probability of failure. " 
Lomax takes the data compiled by RG and AR Hutchinson and Mabel 
Newcomer 
(86 ) 
to calculate F(t), for different values of t, where 
F(t) wt cumulative probability of failure in the interval (0,0- 
f(t) = probability density function of failure time 
He also calculated the values of Z(t) which is called the conditional density 
function of failure probability with time, in other words, the instantaneous 
probability rate of failure'at time t conditional upon non failure prior to: 
f (t) 
Z(t) = 1-F(t) 
The values are given in the tables. He concludes that "It is of interest to 
7o. 
record that a good fit to the Z(t) values can be obtained, in. each case, 
either by the exponential function. " 
-bt 
or the hyperbola 
b 
t+a 
He interprets that for manufacturing b6sinesses the exponential gives better 
fit. 
The weakness of this analysis is mainly due to the lack of data for a 
longer period and a high percentage of failure shown in the first year of 
company life which is open to question. The data cannot represent the 
industries in general as they were compiled for a small town in the period 
1844 to 1922 in America. Lomax realises the weakness and stresses "I hope 
shortly to carry out a more detailed analysis of business mortality covering 
British as well as American data. A cursory examination has already indicated 
that British experience does not always completely accord with American. " 
The author believes that a better conclusion can be made if one takes 
Table XII of thý same data source which gives the length of life of 
corporations and all forms of business enterprises. 
RG and AR Hutchinson and M Newcomer 
( 86) in a study of the length of 
I 
life of business enterprises in Roughkeepsie, New York during 1843-1936, 
provide one of the most comprehensive data for business mortality analysis. 
They present tables for the length of life for different industries and 
according to two assumptions: 
1. Not counting change in proprietorship as a New Business 
2. Counting change in proprietorship as a New Business 
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 give the percentage distributions of business life 
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based on the above assumptions. 
The striking figures in these tAles are a very high mortality in the 
first year which means 30% of business enterprises started during'the period 
of study failed to reach their second year. When the duration of a business 
enterprise is assumed to end with any change 
in proprietorship, the average ' 
length of life is som6; hat diminished. - The number of concerns that fail 
to live a second year rises from 29.8% to-31.5% and the number living beyond 
the tenth year-Jalls from . 
21.4% to 18.7%. Comparing the data in both tables 
shows that the wholesale businesses have the best record for longevity and 
the service enterprises the poorest record. 
The author concludes that Table XII of this stildy, which is given as 
Table 2.9 here, w6uld provide better information for the oomparison with 
other studies and analysis of company failures. As can be observed, the 
percentage of corporations surviving the first years exceeds that for all 
forms of organisation. The proportion of corporations that survive ten years 
is also greater than that for all cases, except manufacturers, which is 
slightly smaller than all. The fiual conclusion made is "The high mortality 
which has been found to exist among Poughkeepsie businesst-, enterprises 
unquestionably represents serious economic wastes .... The nature of the study 
prevents any adequate analysis of causes of the high mortality, but small 
capital, lack of experience, and overcrowding are all indicated - the high 
mortality is the price of a laissez-faire system. " 
A study by the University of Buffalo (1930, p. 51) of retail trades in 
Buffalo, 1918 to 1927, con6ludes that "The number surviving the first year 
, ýas only 40% of those entering the grocery 
ýusiness, 56% for shoe stoies, 
65% for hardware, 73% for drugs. " The result of this study supports the 
idea that the chances of survival are progressively improved after the 
initial year. 
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RP BROOKER and TMF SMITH 
(29 ) in a study of English insolvency 
statistics take a sample from those companies which commenced to wind up 
in 1956, comprising: 
No. in sample 
Creditors' voluntary Winding up 340 
Winding up by order of court 100 
Only five companies in the sample are not private companies. The opinion 
of Official Receivers as to the causes of failure are quoted as "Lack of 
capital and mismanagement. Mismanagement (sometimes emphasised by the 
epithet 'gross') is often particularised as a failure to control some sort 
of expense. In only two companies has competition been mentioned as a cause 
of failure. The overall impression 6onveyed by the causes of failure is 
one of inepýitude and folly on the part of the directors. " Referring to 
the'reasons of business failure in England, they comment "This implies 
that a large proportion of those businesses in the insolvency statistics 
would have failed in any economic climate; it also suggests that many 
businesses are only marginally surviving at any one time. These businesses 
may be doomed but the speed of their death should be determined by the state 
of the economy. " 
From the previous sample and 169 companies struck from the register 
without liquidation where a receiver had been appointed in 1955, they give 
an estimate of length of life of companies (Table 2.10). The length of life 
of companies wound up by order of court in the High Court and their 
cumulative percentage of companies are also given in Table 2.11 for the 
years 1896,1906,1926,1936 and 1956. As can be observed from the table 
31% of companies failed after 31 years, 43% after 51 years and only 40% 
of companies survived more than 9 years. 
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Table 2.10 Length of Life of Companies entering into 
Insolvency process in 1956 in England and Wales 
Length of Life 
in months 
Percentage of- 
Companies Failing 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
1 to 6 - 
7 to 18 12 12 
19 to 30 9 21 
31 to 42 10 31 
43 to 54 5 36 
55 to 66 7 43 
67 to 78 2 45 
78 to 108 15 60 
Longer 40 100 
TOTAL 100 
Table 2.11 Cumulative Percentage of Companies Wound Up 
Length of Life 
in months 
1896 1906 1926 1936 1956 
1 tb 0 7 1 3 4 - 
7 to 18 33 30 26 32 13 
19 to 30 55 53 43 55 25 
31 to 42 62 66 56 66 37 
43 to 54 69 73 61 75 42 
55 to 66 78 77 63 79 49 
67 to 78 85 81 68 81 50 
79 to 108 92 85 76 85 67 
Longer 100 100 100 100 
No. of companies 55 
- 
69 
1 
176 
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B Pearson(119) in an article 'How to Manage Turnarounds, quotes that 
"Managing a profitable company is one thing, turning round a business which 
has gone into loss is quite another. The key to success lies not in 
complicated systems of management control, but in swift executive action, 
accomplishing a few simple things extremely well. " 
In turnround of a ogmpany, speed is an important necessity which should 
be accompanied by a proven framework for tackling the'problems. Pearson 
describes in dýatail the job of turnround executives and the measures which 
can be initiated without delay. The next step is to understand what is 
happening in the business, before taking precilitate executive action. He 
Ir I 
also provides a "Turnround Situation Management Action Programme" which is 
shown in Figure 2.1 This gives various stages of the operation with an 
approximate time horizon. The article concludes that "A turnround situation 
must be recognised as'a unique problem. Thus ready made answers must be 
rejected as a physician would discard quahk medicine. The outcome of a 
successful turnround is defined as achieving an adequate return on the total 
funds invested in the business and not simply as the elimination of losses. " 
M Allsopp( 3. 
) in "Tactics for Survival" writes. that "Immediate 
difficulties may be overcome or deferred by short-ýterm tactical manoeuvres 
while longer-term adjustments take time to prod6ce improvements. The real 
remedy more often lies in a combination of short and long-4term adjustments 
Where there is nothing fundamentally wr6ng with a company, tactical 
re-arrangements are appropriate. " They involve: 
1. Changes in the composition of the board 
2. Re-organisation of the company while retaining its existing form 
3. The implementation of tighter systems of planning and control 
4. Changing the positions held by executives in order to increase their 
experience and bring fresh minds to key positions in the company. 
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EXHIBIT 2.1 TURNROUND SITUATION MANAGEMENT ACTI021 PROGRAMME 
lFirst 
Monthl 
Implement immediate 
start asking key qui 
Investigate sales ar 
Produce updated fin, 
rest of the currei 
Sec 
Investigate administ 
Approve objective cc 
Programmes for the i 
Thi 
Implement organisati 
Prepare and implemer 
F 
action programmes 
astions 
id marketing 
mcial forecast for the 
it year 
, ond 
Month - 
ration, manufacturing, R&D 
mmitments and action programmes 
est of the current financial year- 
rd Month 
onal and key management personnel change 
t beadcount reduction programmes . 
Prior to New Financial Yeai' 
Approve annual budget, supporting*action programmes 
and business development milestones to be achieved 
After Three Months 
Decide reposturing needed in terms of: 
A planned withdrawalfrom certain market segments 
Diversification into new markets by organic growth 
Joint venture and/or acquisition 
The possible divestment of the business by selling 
I it as a going concern 
I 
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4 
5. Revamping personnel policies and systems of rewards. 
6. The introduction of improved or supplementary prodicts 
7. The abandonment of prod6cts of declining profitability in ord er to 
release capacity for more profitable activities. 
8. The creation of new distribution network 
9. The re-organisation and revitalisation of sales function 
Allsopp explains the items in detail and gives more suggestions. 
The failure of companies seem to follow different paths 
(9 
and some 
authors have attempted to illustrate them based on their own judgement. 
one of them which is called the cycle of corporate decline is shown in 
Figure. 2.2 is given by Directors (April, 1978). 
As can be seen from the chart, the board of directors is the main source 
of inefficiency which is followed by a weak management. This poor manage- 
ment team makes mistakes and wr-ong decisions and brings the company to a 
poor financial position. Other weaknesses cause cumulative difficulties 
which put the company in one of the following alternatives: 
Nationalisation 
Acquisition by competitors 
Liquidation 
The review of previous studies shows that many of them are 
in stark 
disagreement with each other, for while one writer asserts that one element 
ia a prime cause of'failure, another will explicitlydeny this and assert 
something quite different. The divergence of vlews is so marked which 
can be explained by different types of companies studied. 
It is"common to explain company failures in terms of a list of causes 
which has been. repeated so often as to become almost classi6al in content. 
Usually several items from this list of handicaps to the successful operation 
8o. 
Ej'UIIBIT 2.2 THE CYCLE OF CORPORATE DECLIM 
Inefficient Board 
Leadership 
Weak 
Management 
Overheads Profit Targets Dividends 
too high too low too high 
Inadequate Funds 
to reinvest in 
Research and Modern New product Training and 
Development Plan Develop Motivation 
Obsolete 
-Obso 
et Obsolete Demoralisdd 
Technology Plant Product Workforce 
eclining 
CCt ompe itive 
SS trength 
Underpricing 
to maintain 
High Utilisation, Inadequate 
Tuknover and Markat Profit Marginýs 
Share 
ationalisation Acquisition by Liquidation 
Competitors 
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of a business are found in connection with a given failure, and hence these 
factor's are said to cause company failure. Common in the literature are 
such statements as "The failure was the resultý; of ...... (one of the items 
in the list), ", implying that the existence of these conditions causes 
failures. It is extremely difficult to avoid doing this sort of thing; it 
seems almost natural to expect that one event causes the other when their 
occurrence is simultaneous. 
It is, indeed, quite possible that a causal relationship does exist 
between the classical failure reasons and subsequent-failures. It is equally 
possible, however,. that the presence of'these conditions is not pie-evidence 
that a given firm is doomed to failure. It is perfectly possible that the 
so-called causes of business failure are experienced at bne time or another 
by virtually all companies. If this were the case, explanation must be 
sought elsewhere. Since this raises the possibility that the cause of 
failure is not the traditional reasons, but rather these reasons superimposed 
upon some other underlying basic weakness. 
It appears that many studies do not concur on any basis as tb, the 
underlying basic weakness and determining causes of failure. One of the 
weaknesses of many studies, the author believes, is that they are trying to 
find examples to illustrate their pre-reached condlusions'based on. experience 
instead of the other way around: e. g. Ross and Kami, Hardie, Cork, Allsopp, 
Towlson, Cohen, Another point is the confusion between causes and 
symptoms in almost all the cases. For instance, financial items such as 
working capital is often offered as the . cause. of failure, but lack of working 
capital is itself the evidence of more fundamental weakness and a sign of 
an underlying cause. It may be due to inadequate investment by the owners, 
deficit operation, overexpansion of current or fixed assets on borrowed 
funds, excessive dividend payments, poor collections, losses on inventories, 
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or some other factors which may cause the corporation to lack the cash 
necessary to meet maturing current debt. 
It seems that 'bad management' or in a few cases 'mismanagement' is a 
factor that all the authors agree, causes failure more than any other factor. 
one cannot disagree with the cause, but the problem is that they fail to 
introduce the elements or items of bad or mismanagement, generalisation 
cannot. provide a constructive conclusion. Some authors have put figures 
on this and have tried to break down in a few items, e. g. Brough, Dun and 
Bradstreet, give the number and percentage of company failure in UK and USA 
respectively, which is still open to some criticisms. In both cases$ one 
can observe an item such as working capital that, as earlier mentioned, is 
a symptom rather than a cause, also in Brough's companies, the type of 
companies, the type of industry or the size is questionable, because the 
factors of failure in construction industry do not have the same influence 
on manufacturing companies or if one considers the age and size 'Bad 
management' in small and young businesses do not construct the similar items 
and impact's as large organisations. Lack of classification of companies 
based on some criteria such as type of industry, age, size, etc. is an 
important weakness of previous studies, e. g. Hartigan, Cohen, Argenti, 
Hardie, Ross and Kamai, AllsOPP9 Cork, etc. 
The conclusions cannot be taken specifically in identification of causes 
or symptoms of particular type or group of companies, although they provide 
some useful points. 
On the basis of the studies described, it would appear that no one gives 
any procedure or method of how to identify or analyse the failure which 
must be the basis before carrying out the study. They also fail to divide 
the symptoms to even a general form which consists of financial symptoms 
and non-financial symptoms. Finally, most of these researches lack empirical 
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data in a specific area. 
Ili spite of the weaknesses and sometimes conflicts between different 
conclusions the fact remains that all the previous works have been, and the 
author believes, will be of particular importance to those interested in 
doing research in this field. 
2.4 Conclusions 
The dynamic situation of business and inter-relationship between technical,, 
economical, social, political and in general external and internal aspects 
of the firm calls for the renewal of research and study concerning the 
failure characteristics and behaviour of companies for different industries 
and various sizes over time-. 
There is a need for modification, re=structuring, new developments-and 
exploration in all areas in this field. Having reviewed the existing 
literature, the present stddy was designed. 
From the review of the literature the author concludes that 
mismanagement at board levýel is a significant factor in, failure of* 
companies ; this needs more investigation. It is'also concluded that 
the study of age structure of failed compani . es could provide some 
indication with regard to the pattern'of failures. 
f 
DEVELOPWNT OF DATA BANK- 
AND 
A STUDY OF AGE STRUCTURE OF FAIIED COMPANIES 
i 
I 
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3.1 Introduction 
Over 200 years ago, Samuel Johnson observed thatt "Knowledge is of 
two kinds. We know a subject ourselves, or we know where we can find 
information upon it". And back then, he was right. 
Since then, however, the amount of knowledge in the world has 
mushroomed in an information explobion whose tremors we constantly feel. 
We have been forced to- rely less on knowing a subject ourselves, and more 
on knowing where we cafi get our hands on relevant information. But we 
are finding that simply knowing where information is, is not enough. Most 
of us have to get our hands on the right information much more easily 
and quickly than we can now. 
This chaptik zis - co=erned with the . search for the right company failure 
information, to collect, computerise, classify and finally analyse them 
in order to provide a source of data for those who need the right infor- 
mation more 'easily and quickly than before and to present the results 
for those researchers who can use them in the analysis of their work. It 
also introdui--es a methodology which was used in the development of a Data 
Bank, by the author, consisting of approximately 2000 manufacturing companies 
which went into liquidation in the period. 1970-1977. 
It-is believed by some authors 
( 69 
that "inaccuracies in data may 
arise both in connection with- their acquisition and with their use. In 
both cases possible errors must be judged in the light of the nature of 
the data and the form of the informations required". The type of data 
required for this res. ýarch is particularly related to the failure 
characteristics oý companies. 
. 
Before the actual collection of data was accomplished, a stuýy of 
relevant factors to this study was carried out and. the questions relating 
to the definition of items used in the Data Bank clarified. 
. 85. 
3.2 Objectives 
The main'objective of this chapter Is to describe the changes 
in-the number. of companies and development of ,a Data Bank for manufacturing 
companies which went into liquidation during 1970-1977 in England and Wales. 
It is aimed to provide a basi(: ýfr; mework for the study of companies in 
, 
Great Britain, and to throw some light on the importafice of business 
mortality and corporate collapse. This study has been carried out with 
the possibility in mind of ascertaining whether ithere have been'signif icant. 
changes in the number of companies during the peridd studied. 
It is intended to examine the age structure of manufacturing failed 
companies Fith regard to their industry group, type 6f business and year 
of failure. The further- purpose of this chapter is to describe in detail 
methodology adopted for the collection of data for the present study. It 
is the belief of the author that this metholology could be applied to other 
similar studies. ihe methodology consists of the following three: 
1. Identification and definition of"items 
2t Identification of source of informati6n, 
3. Acquisition and processin, % of data. 
Each of these stages are described in detail later in the chapter. 
Finally, it is anticipated that the Data Bank will prove of some 
value to other researchers in the area of business failure. 
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3.3 Area of Study 
The manufacturing industry was*chosen for study, 'because of its 
importance to national economy and the existence of related studies with 
which to compare results. 
3.3.1 The importance of manufacturing industry to the UK economy 
Manufactured and semi-manufactured products make up over 80% of 
Britain's visible exports and the manufacturing industries account for 
27% of Britain's Gross Domestic Products. The number of employees in 
manufacturing industry (including the unemployed and those absent from 
work through sickness and other causes, but excluding employers and 
the self-employed) was 7.3 million in June 1976: 32.5% of the total 
number of employees. In 1976 fixed capital expenditure in manufacturing 
industry at current prices totalled E3957 million of which over three- 
quarters represented investment on plant and machinery. 
,0 Analysed by industry group, investment in the engineering, shipbuilding 
and metal goods industries was E813 million, in the chemical industries 
E634 million, in metal manufacture E722 million and in the food, drink, and 
1 (106) tobacco group E513 million 
The pattern of organisation and ownership in manufacturing industry 
ranges from such large-scale organisations as the General Electric Company 
(198,000 employees) and Imperial Chemical Industries (192,000 employees) 
to the many thousands of small firms, some with fewer than 25 employees 
but accounting for about one-fifth of the Gross National Product (GNP). 
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3.4 Period of Study 
It was believed by the author that a period of eight years was a 
significant period of time during which trends should be identified and 
to allow tabulation and classification of data for this and'further studies. 
The eight year interval from 1970 to 1979was selected for the following 
reasons: 
a) This period has seen a large change in the balance of the duties and 
responsibilities of corporate undertakings; these changes have significantly 
contributed to causing company financial failure. It is believed that 
"1970 wap a particularly significant year for many of today's failures. The 
government's impact on the running of businesses in the UK is possibly 
the most decisive factor affecting the wellbeing of economic activity. 
Government decisions or the lack of them have had and will continue to 
have an unprecedented effect on business activity"("'). 
Inflation, the profit crisis, increased strength of organised labour, 
decline of investment, increasing involvement of government, external factorl 
such as oil crises and recession make the period of this study a particularll 
interesting one. 
b) Business and economic cycles: Since the beginning of 1970 there have 
been approximately two cycles of activity in the economy. These cycles 
have had their impact on the companies and their finances, liquidity and 
performances. These cycles are identified with the following events: a, 
squeeze in 1970 and 1971, followed by a recovery in 1973, a further squeeze 
in 1974, 
-followed 
by a recovery in-1975 and 1976. 
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3.5 Classification Used 
The classification used in collection of data is based on the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC). SIC is based on industries and not on 
occupations or operators. 
"The classification is arranged in a list of industry headings with 
the minimum detail which are therefore called Minimum List Headings (MLS). 
The headings of related industries are grouped into orders"(141). 
For the purpose of this classification the unit taken is the 'establishment'. 
Usually the principal activities carried out in an establishment fall within 
a single heading of the classification, e. g. steel making, sugar refining. 
Frequently, distinct activities characteristic of different industries 
are carried out at one address, e. g. cotton weaving and making up of household 
textiles, but normally these are not classified separately and the whole 
establishment is classified according to the main activity. The standard 
industrial classification for the manufacturing industries only consist 
of 119 Minimum List Headings which are distinguished by arabic numerald.. 
These Minimum List Headings have been grouped into 16 orders which are 
distinguished by alphabetical characters. A summary of orders and Minimum 
List Headings of manufacturing industry is given in Appendixf, (A)ý The 
alphabetical coding used in the Data Bank correspond to the following 
groups: 
Code I Croup of Industry 
A Food, drink and tobacco 
C Chemicals and allied industries 
D Metal manufacture 
E Mechanical engineering 
F Instrument engineering 
G Electrical engineering 
89. 
Code Group of Industry 
H Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering 
K Vehicles 
L Metal Goods 
M Textiles 
N Leather, Leather Goods and Fur 
P Clothing and Footwear 
R Briclýs, Pottery,. -. Glass and Cement 
S Timber and Furniture 
T. paper, Printing and Publishing 
U Other Manufacturing Industries 
90. 
3.6 Birth and Death of Corfipanies 
In Britain the precise number of registered companies on the registers 
of Companies House - Department of Trade, as at 31 December 1977 was 705,998, 
of which 627195 companies were effective and 78803 were in liquidation or 
course of removal. 
Table 3.1 gives statistics of new companies registered, dissolved, 
struck off, restored to the registers, in liquidation or course of removal 
and the effective number on the registers at 31 December for each year and 
the whole period of study (1970 to 1977). The new companies registered 
showed an increasing trend up to 1974 with a peak level of 67349 companies 
in 1973 which was more than twice the number of new companies registered in 
1970. With the economic conditions of 1974, the number of new companies 
dropped sharply (Fig. 3.1). The average number of new companies regis tered 
in each year during the period of study was 48873. The number of dissolved 
companies reached its peak level in 1977 with 7835 companies. The total 
number of dissolved companies during 1970-1977 was 56150. The average number 
of dissolved companies in each year was 7018. 
Struck-off companies, which includes a small number converted to non- 
company status reached its highest level of 32787 in 1977 and a total number 
of 183926 companies foi the period of study. 
The effective number of companies which represents the active businesses 
at the end of each year is the outcome of the difference between the companies 
on the registers at 31 December and the companies in liquidation or course 
of removal. e, g. the oýffective number of companies on the registers at 31 
December 1977 was 627195 or 88.84% of all companies on the registers in the 
same period. The other 11.16% represents the companies in liquidation or 
course of removal in 1977. 
Fig. 3.1 gives the movements of each group during 1970 to 1977. 
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93. 
The number 6f public companies on- the registers., tat 31 December 1977 
was 16819 of which 1184 companies were in liquidation or course of removal. 
The number of private companies at-the end of 1977 was 689179 of which 77619 
companies were in liquidation or course of removal. This indicates that in 
1977, private companies represented 97.62% of all companies on the registers 
and only 2.38% were public companies. Table 3.2 and Fig. 3.2 give a better 
picture of the private and public companies changes during 1970 to 1977. 
Before considering the number of liquidations, it is necessary to 
note that although the actual number of dissolved and struck off companies 
are given annually, the reasons why they have disappeared are not khown. 
Dissolved and struck off mean when a company ceases to exist as a legal entity 
and is removed from the registers of companies. This can be for many reasons* 
including that the Registrar could not obtain a. reply to his letters to the 
company. 
The extent of failure in its broadest sense is not entirely clear, 
because it is very difficult to distinguish between various categories of 
failure. Each researcher can interpret the scale and dimension of failure 
based on the definition accepted or chosen. There are two types of liquidation 
that involve inqolvency; compulsory liquidation which stems from winding up 
orders by courts following petitions to them, and creditors' voluntary 
liquidation, in which the company and its creditors come to terms without' 
court proceedings. 
Table 3.4 gives the number of liquidations notified in England and 
Wales during the period of study. This includes all types of liquidations. 
As can be observed from this table, there is generally only a few (1 to 4) 
liquidations in a year under the supervision of court. These are creditors'. 
voluntary liquidations in which the coirt has intervened as a result of 
-petitidn during the liquidation and they are included in the statistics of 
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99. 
creditors' voluntary liquidation. 
The number of liquidations reached its peak level of 10112 companies 
in 1976 and a total number of 67213 for the period 1970 to 1977. During 
this period 80.24% of liquidations notified were voluntary and 19.76% 
compulsory. Considering the voluntary liquidation, 62.1% were Memberst 
Voluntary and 37.2% were Creditors' Voluntary Liquidations. Fig. 3.4 shows 
that three series: All types, Compulsory and Creditorst voluntary-liquidations. 
moved broadly together during this period with a peak level in 1976*. 
I 
Comparison of-the major turning points in longer period has showa 
some differences in their timing. Compulsory liquidations have tended to 
change later than creditors, ' voluntary. liquidations and these increases 
tended to be more gradual and to persist Ddr longer wbich may be due to 
compulsory liquidations taking some extra time to work through the courts. 
Table 3.5 and Fig. 3.5 illustrate the manufacturing and all industries 
liquidations during the period of study. On average, 24.527. of all liqui- 
dations notified were manufacturing companies. 
Table 3.7 gives an industrial analysis of manufacturing companies 
of total liquidations notified excluding members' voluntary during 1970-1977. 
The highest number of failures was in Metals--and Engineering companies, 
with 149 in 1976. The lowest numýer of failures was in the chemical industry-I 
with 13 companies in 1971. Manufacturing industries in this period showed 
a record level in 1976 with 1319 failed companies. Table 3.8 gives the 
statistics of notified liquidations for manufacturing companies according 
to type of liquidation. The average number of, compulsory liquidations 
was 238 companies and 23.05Z of total liquidations. The average number of 
creditors' liquidations in manufacturing industries was 795 with 76.94% 
of all liquidations. 
Fig. 3.8 shows the movements of different liquidations in manufacturing 
companies. 
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TABLE 3.8 Liquidations Notified - Manufacturing Industries 
in England & Wales (1970-77) 
Year of 
Liquidation 
Compulsory 
Liquidation 
Creditors' 
Voluntary 
ion 
Total 
1970 245 709 954 
1971 214 784 998 
1972 212 662 874 
1973 187 535 722 
1974 192 754 946 
1975 356 919 1275 
1976- 289 1030 1319 
1977 211 968 1179 
1970-77 1906 6361 82 T 
Source: Companies in 1971 to 1978 
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TABLE 3.9 Pri mary Sample of Company Failure Data 
Year of Voluntary*Liquidation Compulsory All 
Failure Members' and Creditors' All Liquidation Liquidations (Liquidation) Creditors' 
1970 202 179 381 61 442 
1971 192 192 384 84 468 
1972 187 i42 329 70 399 
1973 160 154 314 82 396 
1974 171 143 314 35 349 
1975 268.. 212 480 71 551 
1976 337 253 590 73 663 
1977 308 213 521 72 593 
1970-77 1825 1488 3313 548 3861 
Source: London Gazette 1970 to 1977 
I 
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The level of business confidence may be gleaned from the rate of new 
companies registered, but one of the interesting indicators is the formation 
of new companies in the category of not exceeding ElOO share capital as Table 
3.3 gives the statistics of newly registered companies haýring a share capital 
and analysed by the amount of nominal capital. 
The numýer of companies in the category of not exceeding E100 increased 
from 1970 and reached its highest level in 1973 with 50795 companies which 
was 2.63 times the number of new companies registered in 1970 and in the 
same category. 
1974 showed a sharp fall which was a 51% decrease to the 1973 level. 
This is directly associated with economic conditions and cycles of 
activity in the economy. 
3.7 Identification and Definition of Data 
It was stated earlier in this chapter that inaccuracies ih data might 
arise both in connection with their acquisition and their use. In both 
cases possible errors must be judged in the light of the nature of the 
data and the form of information required. To do this, it was necessary 
to identify'the area of analysis to be undertaken and the items of data 
required for this analysis. A review of previous studies showed that I 
although age of companies is one of the most significant variables in 
business failure prediction models, there is no comprehensive study of 
age structure of failed UK companies that the author was able to identify. 
It was decided to apply a reliability methodology to the analysis of 
company failure data. Having identified the area of study, it was then 
necessary to identify and define the items required for this study. The 
following items were considered as the main elements of the Data Bank: 
1. Name of the company; 2. Registration Number or Company Number; 3. Incor 
poration date; 4. Failure data; 5. Age of company; 6. Nominal capital; 
7. Industry group. 
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8. Type of business 
9. Type of failure 
10. Assets I 
11. Liabilities 
12. Paid-up capital 
'n el f -1 n .1 t- -1 ^, n cz 
3.7.1 Registration Number 
Each company has its own registration number which is also called the 
company number. This number is necessary for any inspection or reference 
to the file of the company. 
3.7.2 Incorporation Date 
The certificate of incorporation is conclusive evidence that the 
requirements of the Act regarding registration and other relevant matters 
I 
have been complied with. From the date of incorporation mentioned in the 
certificate, the corporation can exercise all the functions of an 
incorporated company. The position is different for the public companies. 
They cannot commence business until the requirements of section 109 have 
been complied with. In this study the incorporation date is taken as the 
formation or established date. 
3.7.3 Failure Date 
Failure date in development of Data Bank is the date of commencement 
of liquidation in creditors' voluntary liquidation and winding up order 
in compulsory liquidation by the court. In this study failure means that 
the types of company liquidations that involve insolvency, compulsory 
and creditors' voluntary liquidations. To understand the process and I 
types of liquidations and their differences, one has to define them clearly. 
This is done under the heading of types of winding-up or liquidation. 
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3.7.4 Types of Liquidation or winding-up 
Winding up a company may be carried out voluntarily, or it may be 
done by the court or subject to its supervision. 
Voluntary liquidation: * A voluntary liquidation is either a members' 
winding-up or a creditors' winding-up. - 
3.7.4.1 Members' winding-up 
This arises where the directors, or the majority of them, make at 
a directors' meeting a statutory declaration that having made a full 
enquiry into company affairs, they are of the opinion that the company 
can pay its debts in full within-such period not exceeding twelve months 
from the commencement of the winding up as may be specified in the 
declaration. This declaration of solvency must be made at the latest 
on the day immediately preceding that on which the resolution for 
voluntary liquidation is passed. The declaration will be ineffective unless: 
a) It is made within the five weeks immediately preceding the date of 
the passing of the resolution. 
b) It includes a statement of the company's assets and liabilities as at 
the latest practicable date before the making of the declaration. 
3.7.4.2 Creditors' winding-up 
if the directors cannot make the declaration of solvency the 
liquidation will be a creditors' winding up. A meeting of the creditors 
is summoned for the day on which will be held the meeting at which the 
resolution for voluntary liquidation is to be proposed. Notice of meeting 
must be advertised in the London Gazette and in two local newspapers* 
Under a presiding director a full statement of the company affairs must 
be placed before the creditors. When a liquidation is appointed the 
directors' powers will cease except in a members' voluntary liquidation. 
The directors remain officers of the company. The company will of course 
I 
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cease to carry on business except for the purpose of winding up, but its 
legal status and powers remain until dissolution even if the articles 
state otherwise. 
When the company affairs are fully wound up the liquidator prepares 
an account showing how it has been conducted and how the company property 
has been disposed of. He will call a meeting to present the accounts and 
within one week after the meeting the liquidator must send a copy of the 
account to the Registrar of Companies. After three months have expired 
from registration of the return to the Registrar the company is deemed to 
be dissolved. The liquidator or any other interested person may yet apply 
to the court to defer the dissolution date for such time as the court 
thinks fit. 
3.7.4.3 Winding up by the cotirt- 
A company may be wound up by the court if it resolves by special 
resolution that it shall be so wound up. The other circumstances in which 
this procedure applies are: 
a) where the number of members is reduced below seven (two in a private 
company. 
b) where the company is unable to pay its debts. 
c) where the company does not commence business within a year of 
incorporation, or suspends business for a whole year. 
d) where default is made in delivering the statutory report to the 
Registrar of companies or in holding the statutory meeting. 
e) where the court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that 
the company should be wound up. 
The official receiver is by virtue of his office the provisional 
liquidator and will remain so until he or another is appointed liquidator. 
When the affairs of the company have been completely wound up by the court, 
112. 
on the liquidator's application, makes an order for dissolution as from 
the date of the order. Within two weeks the liquidator will send the 
Registrar a copy of the order. 
3.7.4.4 Winding up under supervision of court' 
When a tompany resolves to wind up voluntarily the court may order 
that the winding up shall be subject to its supervision. The court has 
power to order the appointment of an additional liquidatorg 
3.7.4.5 Other legal processes which may result in the failure of business 
. 
There are other legal processes which d6 not go in the insolvency 
statistics but which may result in a business ceasing to operate. These 
processes are initiated only by individual creditors, after judgement has 
been given in their favour and are generally carried out without regard 
for the claims of-other creditors. The most popular of these processes 
is the levy of execution against the debtors' goods. The process involves 
the seizure and, if they are not redeemed, sale of the goods. Since 'goods' 
for this purpose may ihclude machinery the levy of 'execution may often 
cause a small business to fail. 
3.7.5 Age I 
From previous studies in the field of corporate collapse and business 
failure, it would appear that the age variable, as Altman points out, 
a proxy for age, should be a prime measure to utilise in predictive models 
and identification of causes and symptoms of failure and finally in 
prevention or rescue operations. Age in this study is based on the 
difference between exact date of incorporation and failure date expressed 
in units ot 'months'. 
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3.7.6 Nominal Capital 
If the limited company has a share capital the Memorandum must state 
the amount of share capital and its division into shares of fixed amount. ' 
This nominal or authorised capital is the capital which the company is 
authorised to raise by the issue of shares. Actual capital depends upon 
the number of shares that are issued. 
3.7.7 Industry order and types of business 
These two have already been described in detail in the section of 
"The classification Used", 3.5. Industry orders are distinguished by 
alphabetical order and types of business are distinguished by numerals. 
3.7.8 Paid up Capital, Assets and Liabilities 
These items were drawn from the liquidators' statements at the 
commencement of liquidation. After the first step of defining the items 
of data required for the Data Bank, it was important to collect them 10 
from the right sources. 
3.8 Sources of Information 
The data sources for this research can be divided into primary and 
secondary sources. 
3.8.1 Primary sources 
The primary sources of data are: 
a) London Gazette (1970-1977) 
b) Company filýs 
C) Inspector Reports (Department of Trade) 
d) Published reports (media) 
e) Dissolved companies list 
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f) Registered Companies list 
g) Liquidators and Official Receivers 
3.8.2 Secondary sources 
a) Defunct companies 
b) Extel statistical services 
C) Time 1000 
d) Press and media 
e) Previous studies 
There are many other sources of informations in UK whose importances-vary 
according to the requirements of different research proposals. R. Coghill 
in an article describes a few sources of data and concludes that there 
is an inverse correlation between the quality of information supplied and 
their costs. The following diagram illustrates. this. 
The Information Pyramid 
Cl) 
0 
U 
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3-8.3 Procedure used for Tracing UK Company Information 
The chart illustrates the most accessible sources of information 
for UK companies. It should be noted that there are many other sources 
in the UK which are not shown in this chart, but will be named later in 
this chapter. 
In recent years considerable effort has been made in developing various 
data banks in order to provide accurate and readily available information 
for the study and analysis of company performance and structure. These 
attempts range from those of academic researchers to private firms and 
organisations. The major UK data banks and sources'of'information are 
given below: 
1. Extel statistical services 
2. Centre for Interfirm Comparisons Ltd 
3. Datastream 
4. Computer Information Ltd 
5. Dun and Bradstreet Ltd 
6. Financial Times 
7. Times 1000 
8. Investor Chronicle 
9. Industrial Aids Ltd 
10. Intercompany Comparisons Ltd 
11, Cower Press - 
12. Stockholders' Reports 
13. Information Research Ltd 
14. Jordan Dataquest Ltd 
15. McCarthy Information Ltd 
16. Tattersalls of Manchester 
17. Sewells Profit and Information Unit 
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18. O. W. Ros%ill Information Services Ltd 
19. Quoted Companies' Annual Reports 
20. Official Reports by Department of Trade 
21. Predicasts Inc. 
22. UK Kompass Directory 
23. Kompass British Exports 
24. Stock Exchange Official Year Book 
25. Register of Defunct Companies 
26. Whols Who 
27. Who Owns Whom 
28. Files. of newscuttings on local companies 
29. Specialised Trade Directories 
30. Bradford University Data Bank of Manufacturing Industries. 
3.9 Acquisition and Processing of Data 
The final part of this chapter is devoted to the procedure followed 
in the development of Data Bank. In addition to identification and 
definition of data and sources of information, it was realised that there 
should be a systematic method of development of data to avoid mistakes 
and errors in acquisition of informations and their use in the future. 
The development of Data Bank can be briefly categorised into six 
separate stages: 
Stage 1 Data Collection 
Stage 2 Identification of dissolved and undissolved companies 
Stage 3 File collection 
Stage. 4 Examination and analysis of files 
Stage 5 Coding and computerising of data 
stage 6 Programming and tabulation 
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3.9.1 Data Collection 
This stage of the research was based mainly on a detailed investigation 
and study of approximately 1600 volumes. o .f the London Gazette (from 1-1-1970 
to 31-12-1977), page by page, to identify the companies which went into 
liquidation considering: 
a. Type of business (manufacturing industries) 
b. Type of'failure (creditors' voluntary liq6idation, compulsory 
liquidation and creditors and memberst) 
Lack of any classification in segregating different industries was the 
main problem in this stage. The only informations obtained were; 
Name of the company 
Date of failure (appointment of liquidator) 
Type of business q 
Name and address of liquidator 
This process was a long time-consuming one which shaped the basis of 
Data Bank. The companies were classified according to type of failure 
(liquidation) and year of failure (1970-1977), with a total number of 3861 
companies in manufacturing industry. Table 3.9 gives the number of 
companies according to the above classifii--ations and its comparison with 
the total liquidations notified in manufacturing industry in the same 
period (Table 3.10) in England and Wales. 
3.9.2 Identification of dissolved and undissol, ýed companies 
This stage required an attempt to identify the companies i4hich had 
not been dissolved up to 1977. To obtain the undissolved companies, it 
was necessary to go through the list of all--registered companies which 
contains nearly 700,000 names. The number of companies at the end of 
this stýge was 2000. The registrationnumber of each company was added 
to their previous information in stage one. 
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3.9.3 File collection 
Although there were some problems at this stage of acquisition and 
processing of data, regarding the volume of data required, this was 
resolved with the co-operation of the officials at Companies House and 
the Department of Trade. 
Having completed the special forms for each comp . any, the files for 
2000 companies were adquired and prepared for the next stage of analysis. 
The cost of acquisition of the data was E100 (5p per copy of recotds). 
3.9.4 Analysis of files 
Investigation and examination of the company files had to be 
executed manually, each file being subjected to individual study. The 
information required for the later analysis had to be obtained from a 
number of different documents as Incorporation form, Articles of 
Association, Memorandum, Appointment of Liquidator's form, Winding-up 
order by court, Liquidator and Official Receiver's statements and in some 
cases the financial statements, afid records. This process was carried out 
for each of the individual 2000 companies studied and the final number of 
companies which, contained all the items of required information as to the 
previous definition was 1787. These are re-organised in different 
categories of businesses and industry groups (Table 3.11). 
It was found that the process of liquidation varied according to type 
of business, size and age of companies. It ranged from three months to 
years. The causes of delay are given in Liquidator's Statements. 
3.9.4.1 The causes of termination and delay of winding_up 
1. Winding up of associated companies 
2. Agreement of claims 
3. Receiver in possession 
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4. Agreement of taxation liabilities 
5. Collection of book debts 
6. Setting of liabilities and claims 
7. Inland Revenue position 
8. Realisation of bad debt's 
9. Realisation of stock 
10. Payment of dividends 
11. Consideration of legal matters 
12. Collection of retention 
13. Receivership not yet completed collection of outstanding debt 
14. Delay in the completion of winding up of the company's holding 
company and various fellow subsidiaries 
15. Link with other companies in compulsory liquidation 
16. Delays*on part of prospective purchaser 
17.. Possible action against directors 
18. Death of previous liquidator 
19. Lack of co-operation from directors 
20. Investigation by Department of Trade 
21. Legal-actions against directors 
22. Determining assets and liabilities of company, owing to breakdown 
of accounting systems between the company and other associated 
- companies. 
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3.9.5 Coding and Computeri: §ing 
Having acquired the scattered information for each of the 2000 companies 
it was necessary to computerise, them in order to simplify the further 
analysis. This process was carried out by coding some of the items. 
There were many punching errors in the primary lists which were'amended 
and the final lists were prepared in various orders for each item of data. 
The order of data in these lists is-6f the following form: 
1. Company's Registration Number 
2. Incorporation Date. 
3. Failure Date 
4. Age of. Company 
Nominal Capital 
6. Group of industry)- Based on standard Industrial 
7. Type of Business Classification 
8. Type of Failure I for creditor's voluntary liquidation 
2 for Compulsory Liquidation 
9. Assets 
10. Liabilities 
11. Deficiencies 
3.9.6 Programming and Tabulation (Computer Analysis) 
This was the last stage in acquisition and processing which required 
few computer programs to extract the information in various orders. These 
informations were later tabulated for further research. Tables of failure 
data with regard to the age structure of companies were prepared for 
each individual group of industry and year of failure which are given later 
in the present chapter. All the classified data have been recorded in 
the author's file in the computer centre of Bradford University, which may 
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be used for other studies in the field of business failure. 
3.10 Interpretation of Results 
The relationship of failure rat'e to týe age of companies is given 
in Tables 3.12 to 3.19. These tables present failure data'by age in 
various groups of industry and different years of failure during the period 
1970 to 1977. 
The special threat of failure to the young firms is evident in the 
relative failure rate among various age groups (Tabl es 3.12 to 3.14). A 
new firm is usually small one which is, as a class, hit harder by failures 
than larger firms. "The high mortality rate of young and small business 
enterprise has long been recognised as one of the costs of a system of 
free competition. vo(30 
As can be observed from Table 3.12,3.7% of all failures occur in 
the first year, 28.8% in the first three years. (Table 3.13), 47.2% of 
companies disappear by the end of the fifth year (Table 3,14) and approxi- 
mately two-thirds (67.6%) of manufacturing companies fail in fhe first 
ten years of their life (Table 3.15). 
The highest rate of failure can be s6en between the second (12.4%) and 
the third (12.7%) years for all companies. This is not the same for each 
individual group, e. g. groups D (metal manufacture), K (vehicles), and 
R (bricks, glass, etc) show the highest failure rate in theIr fifth year 
of life with 14.3%, 16.7% and 16.4% respectively. 
The first five to six years represent the high risk period or as 
Broom and Longenecker 
(30 ) 
state "the 'maiden voyage' for the new firm* 
cari provide theyeal tests of capital, product and business leadership. " 
The results are also consistent with the previous findings that "the longer 
a company survives, generally other things being equal, the smaller becomes 
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the probability of failure. "(101) 
Table 3.14, which gives the failure rate of companies in different 
intervals, indicates that groups U (miscellaneous manufacturing companies) 
and S (timber and furniture) have the highest early-age. or infant mortality 
rate with 39.7% and 34.3% failure respectiVely, after'the first three 
years. In the same period groups D (metal manufacture) and M (textiles) 
with 8.6% and 15.9% respectively show the lowest failure rate. After the 
first five years group G'(electrical engineering) with 55: 3% and group M 
(textiles) with 31.8% failure represent the highest and lowest failure rate. 
This pattern continues after fifteen, twenty and beyond twenty years. After 
twenty years, 92.1% of all electrical engineering corporations fail 
compared with 62.5% failure rate in textiles companies (Table 3.14). 
Considering the different groups of manufacturing industry, the 
textiles business have the best record for longevity and the electrical 
engineering have the poorest record. More than Half (55.3%) of the latter 
group fail to extend beyond five years and more than three-quarters (76.3%) 
disappear after the first ten years. Only 7.9% survive beyond twenty years 
and only 0.9% (nearly one percent) beyond fifty years (Table 3.15). 
In the case of te: ktile manufacturing companies, as can be observed 
from Table 3.14,50% of failure occur in the first ten years, 62.5% in 
the first twenty years and 89.9% in fifty years. 9.1% of these companies 
survive beyond fifty years (Table 3.15) which is ten times greater than 
the electrical engineering concerns of 0.9%. 
Table 3.15 gives the failure of various groups of companies in 10 
years intervals. The failurerrate sharply decreases from 67.5% for the 
first interval (0-10 years) to 16.2% for the second one (10-20 years). 
The failure rate diminishes in other intervals from 16.2% to 8.1%, 3.7% 
and 2.2%. Only 2.3% of all failed companies bad an age of more than fifty 
years. 
130. 
. "0 
014 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 0 
M INDUSTRY GROUP 0 Ln 0 
co -i t-n w w 
0 0 U1 I -Food, Drink and Tobacco' 
co ý0 -i t-n ON -f-- 
C" Chemicals and Allied Industries 
-j C7% Ln w co 
Metal Manufýcture 
00 
CT% 
00 
p- 
01% 
%-0 
J. - 
-j 00 
Z' ý0 Z1. ;0 
Mechanical Engineering 
?. - (7% 00 W -1 
I 
-1 w 
:4 Z4 
" Instrument Engineering 
-4 %0 
N 
00 
co 
-j 
a% 
Ln 
Ul 
W 
0 ' 
Z4 *_j 
I 
Electrical Engineering 
p- 00 00 -4 Ln Lo I 
Z' 00 Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering. 
). -A co 00 64 Ln 
I 
.. %J LJ - LA) 00 P0 N 'Vehicles 
1 00 -j 
Metal Goods 
0 
Ln - 
ýn 6. - ;0 ý0 , Textiles 
-4 CT% Ln 
r- %0. -4- Leather, Leather Goods and 'Fur 
I. -A co -i ON 
I-A ko w 00 1-j Un Clothing 
t-A 00 00 
r -1 
Ln 
p 
K) 
. 
14 
00 00 Ul Bricks, Pottery, Glass and Cement 
1-j ?% co ý3 -i T ON %0 -r. - %0 
w X. - 
41. 
. I Timber and Furniture 
Pý co ýj 
%D 
as 
%-0 
Z- 
_4 
LI) 
. t-A 
' Zo Z' 'i inting and Publishing Paper, Pr 
I-A : _1 
00 
p 
00 
p 
-j 
f, 
V1 L%) 
Ul Ln -4 -L' Other Manufacturing. Industries 
1. - 00 w ýj -4 
ON 
-4 
&I 
-j co 
ýj ýj 
'All Manufacturing Companies 
$4 
t-4 
(D 
A 
rt 
(D 
0 
43 
n 
rt 
9 
ri 
Ixi 
0 
>d 
tu 
14 
Pl 
I. 1. 
0 
çj 
rP 
(D 
Cl) 
131. 
rtl 23 "1 t: 3 
I. m 
LJ 
20M 
= 40. zo 
9-f 
e 
Lii 
%J DOM 
CKY 
A 
N ýi ýn 
a ts 
N m M 
I 
cl 
Re 
r 
IC3 
Lo 
--f 
: 33 
IDI. M 
132. 
Ln 0 
0< 
-r- 
0 
L1. ) 
0 
" 
0 
ý-d 
0 
0 
1 
: 1, (1) 1 Ln 1 4-1- 1 w 1 ý-A 0 W INDUSTRY GROUP 0 0 0 0 
1 01, ý0 " o t-n 1 4 ý 
. 40 
. .4 
-Food,, *Drink and Tobacco' 
a% cr% 
ýa Ln Chemicals and Allied industries 
I I co -4 Ln 
a, 
Metal Manufýcture 
0M 
co mechanical Engineering 
I I Ln -4 
Instrument Engineering 
0 
zo ;0 ;0 
co w Electrical Engineering 
%0 Pý -4 
0 
U. ) U-) 
Ship uilding and Marine Engineering. 
Z, -4 %D -i 
00 
, 
1 
ina Vehicle. 
0 
Metal Goods 
ý0 1--j w ý--& F-4 Ln 
C) 
Textiles 
Leather,, Leather Goods and Fur 
CO 1 17, 
ý-A 00 Clothing 
-j -4 -4 -j ... 
Bricks, Pottery, Class and Cement 
41 
CO. U3 
I 
*Timber and Furniture 
C) 
; 
w 0% ýO 
0 Ln Ul 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 
W ZD 
other Manufacturing. Industries 
Ln "J 
'All Manufacturing Companies 
0 
93. 
tr 
fD 
OON 
1-4 
0 
133. 
rrI ;a r- - ='Tl ', I t: 3 
Ed 
4"o 
Es :5 T tn tri 
in Li in :c ia 6 
OM 
10M 
N 
ri 
613 EHM 
-< 70.00 
00.20 
I 
=3 
Ei 
tiq 
ul 4 
m 
ul 
Ei = 13 -4 :a 
gi :a 
tn 
J 
134. 
Table 3.13 gives the cumulative percentage distribution of failed 
companies for various groups. Tables 3.16 to 3.19 provide the fatliare 
data for individual years of failure and the whole period (1970-1977). 
It is to be expected that the mortality of business enterprises will 
vary from year to year with business conditions as is suggested that "the 
rate of failure fluctuates from year to year because of changes in general 
economic conditions and other factors and is closely associated with 
, (30 ) general economic conditions .. Although the period of the present 
study is not long enough to show long-term trends in length of life, the 
effect of economic conditions of 1973 to 1975 in the UK is quite evident 
in the relative failure rate among Various age intervals. Table 3.17 
which portrays the relationship of the cýlmulative failure rate to the age 
of businesses in various years, clearly shows the high rate of mortality 
among concerns in business five years or less, e. g. 55.3%, 50.2% and 51t= 
for 1973,1974 and 1975 respectively, compared with 29.5% in 1972 which was 
a recovery year. 
The percentages of companies failed in these years with the age of 
more than 20 years are given in Table 3.18. This indicates that only 
12.8% and 12.9% of All failed companies in 1973 and 1974 were over 20 years 
while in 1972 this percentage is 25.7% or nearly two times that of 1973. 
Table 3.20 gives the number of failed companies for various groups 
of companies during the period of study (1970-1977). This Table indicates 
that group P (clothing industry) has the highest number of failures in a 
single year with 85 companies failed in 1977. The highest number of 
failures during the whole period occurred in gr. oup E (mechanical engineering) 
with 278 companies and group P (clothing) with 277 companies. The lowest 
number of failures was 18 companies in group F (instrument engineering). 
The year 1976 showed the highest number of failure;: (475) companies and in 
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the year 1970 the lowest number of failures occurred with only6l companies. 
Table 3.21 shows- the age distribution of manufacturing companies in 
UK and USA. As can be observed, approximately half of the companies fall 
up to five or six years of their life, and around two-thirds disappear 
after the first ten years. Less than one-third of manufacturing companies 
failed were in the age group df over 10 years. The higher percentage of 
failures for Hutchinson study is due to the size of companies that he 
studied which were comparatively smaller than the other two. They were 
the companies in a small town and not a sample of the country, 
3,11 Conclusions 
28.8% of all manufacturing companý failures in England and Wales during 
the period between 1970 and 1977 occurred in the first three uears, nearly 
half of the companies failed to survive more than five years. Only one- 
third of all companies extended their life beyond ten years. Approximately 
84% of companies failed in the first twenty years and only 2.3% s. urvived 
beyond fifty years of age (Tables 3.12 to 3.15). 
Textiles industries have the best record for longevity. and electrical 
engineering the poorest. 
The impact of economic climate is more evident on young companies 
than old ones. This can be observed from the relationship between age of 
companies and various years of failure. (Tables 3.16 to 3.19). 
The first five to six years represent-. the high risk period for the 
young companies. and new businesses. The rate of failure is diminished from 
the first decade (0 to 10 years) to the fifth one (40 to 50 years). The 
results are consistent with the views that the longer a company survives, 
other things being equal, the smaller becomes the probability of failure. 
It should also be noted at this stage that the Data Bank with 
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various classified data is available consisting of approximately 2000 
companies. 
The classification used in this study is based on Standard Industrial 
Classification and the manufacturing industry was chosen as the area 
of study because of its importance to national economy. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
APPLICATION'OF RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY 
TO THE 
ANALYSIS OF COMPANY FAILURE 
I 
4 
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4- APPLICATION OF RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY 
TO THE ANALYSIS OF COMPANY FAILURE. - 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is tcr exPlanY,; the-: 'appli6atiorr.. of=, liability 
methodology to the analysis of company failure data and to draw attention 
to a new category of failure theory: business failure afLd mortality. 
Although from the review of the previous studies in this field it 
would appear that the age variable would be a prime measure to utilise 
in a bankruptcy prediction model, there-is no evidence of any investigation 
regarding the failure pattern, behaviour and structure of companies in UK. 
Recognition of business failure pattern is of considerable 
importance in: 
a) identification of causes and symptoms of failure 
properly identified pattern of failure provides a framework for 
the analysis of causes and symptoms of failure in different stages of. 
company life cycle and avoids generalisation and confusion made by the 
previous authors. 
b) prediction of company liquidation (failure) 
Although the authors of failure prediction models argue that"one 
of the most outstanding and seemingly irrevocable failure statistics is 
the high propengity on the part of young firms to fail" 
4 ), 
and point 
out that "the chance of a young firm being classified as bankrupt is 
relatively higher than older firms" 
4) there is not any indication of 
the distinction between 'young' and 'old' firms and their probability 
of failure and survival at each stage of their life cycle. These can 
be obtained from the present study based on reliability functions and 
hazard rate plots. 
c) retcue operations 
Rescue operations which consist of prevention, turnaround, reorganisation 
and in some cases liquidation can be possibly carried out more effectively 
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if one can refer to failure characteristics of companies in any particular 
stage, which is provided in this chapter, to find out the propensity of 
the company to fail at any point. It can be concluded from the above 
applications that the reliability analysis of company failure data can 
develop a methodology and be used as a tool for any study regarding the 
company and business mortality. 
4.2 Business Failure 
It is fairly well established that "the longer a company survivds, 
generally other things being equal, the smaller becomes the probability 
of failure"(101) and "with most types of business the early years are 
( Q`6 ) (48 the most difficult. It is then that mortality is highest" . Davis 
in a paper on failure data, broadly analyses three types of failure theory: 
(a) The normal theory of failure, in which the failure probability density 
function is Gaussian. 
(b) Human mortality, characterised by rapid increase of the conditional 
density function after middle-age. 
(c) Exponential theory of failure, in which the conditional density function 
is constant. 
In (a) uniformly and in (b) after the very early years of life the 
conditional density function of failure probability with time is strictly 
monotonic increasing. In (c) it is constant. Lomax 
(104) 
referring to the 
above paper comments that "the economist immediately thinks of business 
failures in which it is reasonable to expect the conditional density function 
strictly to decrease monotonio-aýly`. 
I The objective of this chapter is to analyse the compiled manufacturing 
company failure data in England and Wales during the period 1970 to 1977 
to obtain the best pattern of failure and most appropriate distribution 
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which can describe different stages of company life cycle. 
4.3 Reliability Management 
Reliability management methodologi which is the basis of the present 
I(2) 
chapter is defined by Airing as "A body of concepts, mathematical 
models and methods directed toward the solution of problems, for predicting, 
estimating or optimising the probability of survival, mean life, and more 
generally life distribution of components or systems". 
The present-day theory of reliability has been developed during the 
last two decades by engineers and mathematicians in different countries. 
Among the first American textbooks were those by Bazovisky (1961) and 
Lloyd and Lipow (1962), Zelen (1963), Barlow and rroschan (1965). The 
Russian textbooks on reliability were written by Sahar (1962), Polavko 
(1964), Berg (1964) and Gnedenko (1965). 
The need for and the importance of reliability has been reflected 2. n 
the constantly increasing emphasis placed on it by research institutions, 
government and commercial industries. During the past few years, the 
reliability effort*grew to include many diverse activities. This study 
is one of the first to integrate reliability and business data for the 
analysis of companies. 
4.4 Basic Concepts of. Reliability 
4.4.1 Definition of reliability 
The most commonly accepted definition of reliability is given by 
Airing Research Corporation 
(2) 
as "Reliability is the probability that 
a system will perform satisfactorily for at least a given period of time 
when used under stated conditions". 
A reliability function is this same probability expressed as a function 
146. 
of the time period. Thus, reliability relates to the frequency with 
which failures occur. Here "failure" means "unsatisfactory performance", 
usually representing a judgement of an operator. This does not preclude 
the possibility of clear-cut failure, such as complete inoperability, 
in which case judgement does not enter at all. Since reliability is 
concerned with failure, it can only be measured by observing failure. 
Barlow and Proschan(14 define the reliability as "the probability 
of a system performing its purpose adequately for the period of time 
intended under the operating conditions encountered". 
The period of time intended is (O, t). Mathematically, the 
reliabilitý function is expressed as: 
where 
Also, 
R(t) = P(T>t) f f(t)dt (4.1) 
t 
f(t) is the probability density function 
t 
R(t) If (t)dt 
where 
F(t) is the cumulative failure distribution function 
(4.2) 
4.4.2 Failure rate 
The probability of failure in a given time interval t1 to t2 can 
be expressed by the reliability function 
Co Co 
ff Mdt ff (t)dt - R(t1) p'(t2) (4.3) 
t1 t2 
Failure rate Q(t) which is the rate at which failure occurs in the 
interval tI to t2 is defined as the ratio of the probability that failure 
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occurs in the interval, given that 
it has not occurred prior to tl; 
the start of the interval, divided by the interval length, thus: 
Q(t) 
R(t 1 R( t2) 
(t 1-t 2) R(tl) 
Alternatively: 
R(t) - R(t+h) 
Q(t) h. R(t) 
where tj 2-t and 
t2 t+h 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
4.4.3 Hazard rate 
The hazard rate or instantaneous failure rate, denoted by h(t), is 
-defined as the limit of the failure rate as the interval length approaches 
zero. Then the hazard rate is: 
h(t) = lim 
R(t)-R(t+h) 
h-*O 
. 
hR(t) 
fM 
R(t) 
1. dR(t). 
- 7(- -t) -d t 
This can also be written as 
-dln R(t) h(t) - dt 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
The hazard function is useful in describing the effect of failures 
on the population as a function of time. Hazard rate which is sometimes 
called the force of mortality is the conditional probability of failure 
of a device or system during the, next interval of time (t+h), given that 
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it has survived till time t., 
Referring to Fig. 4.1, the hazard rate can be written as: 
h(t) =f 
(t) (4.8) 
where 
R(t) .21- F(t) (4.9) 
One of the simplestýexplanation of hazard and failure rate is the 
analogy made by Airinc- 
(2) 
that "suppose a family takes an automobile trip 
of 120 miles and completes the trip in three hours. Their average rate 
was 40mph (120: 3), although they drove faster at some times and slower 
at other times. The rate at any given instant could have been determined 
by reading the speed indicated on the speedometer at that instant. The 
40mph is analogous to the failure rate and the speed at any point is 
analogous to the hazard rate". 
It is worth mentioning that the Weibull distribution is a useful 
description for h(t) as: 
h(t) 12 n n' -t 
rr- 1 (4.10) 
where n is called the shape parameter. 
With increasing n the Weibull mortality represents a progressively 
increasing hazard rate characteristic. n is called the scale parameter 
which stretches the distribution along the time axis. 
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4.4.4 Bath tub curve' 
There may be more than one contributory factor or cause to a particular 
failure and that often there is no completely clear-cut distinction between 
some of the causes. Nevertheless the time to failure pattern of the 
components and systems can often be categorised into three groups. These 
facilitate discussion of the various activities within the discipline of 
reliability mathematics without invalidating conclusions. One can then 
investigate problems of prediction, apportionment and assessment and 
present methods for arriving at solutions to these problems. The three 
classes of failure-are: 
1. Infant Mortality 
Infant mortality which may be called "running-in" type of failure 
I 
or 'early failure', are those which often occur during the research and 
development stage in engineering and manufacturing works. In the present 
study this would represent the introductory phase of. the company life cycle. 
2. Random Failure 
Random failure is caused mainly by unpredicted failure and seems to 
have a constant failure rate with no direct cause of failure. The growth 
and maturity phases of a company life cycle are the representatives of 
random failure. 
3. Wear-out Failure 
Wear-out failure which is caused by ageing of the equipment has an 
increasing instantaneous failure rate function. This failure can be best 
represented by the "declining phase" of company life cycle. 
The relationship of these three classes of failure can be represented 
by a "bath tub curve" as shown in Fig. 4.2. It should be noted that the 
heights of the early and wear-out failure periods, do not necessarily 
have exactly the same relationship depicted in the figure. The frequency 
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of early failures, for example, might be considerably lower for a mechanical 
component in the production phase. Similarly, the relative height of the 
curve in the random failure period might be quite different. Howevers- 
Fig. 4.2 gives an indication of the general relationship. 
4.4.5 Overall reliability 
Overall reliability is a measure of the relationship between the 
complete achieved performance of the system against the corresponding 
required performance under all the relevant environmental conditions. It 
may be illustrated-by the following block diagram: 
Required 
Performance 
orrelation Reliability 
Achieved 
Performance 
Overall Reliability Concept 
Under any of the relevant conditions, including any point in space and time, 
the reliability is the chance of the achieved performance-falling within 
the bounds of the requited performance. This is the procedure denoted 
by the "correlation" in the diagram, and the output of this block leads 
directly to the measure of reliability. 
4.4.6 Failure distributions 
A failure distribution represents an attempt to describe mathematically 
the life behaviour of a device, system or recognisable entity. 
The modes of possible failure for the item in question affect the 
analytic form of distribution used. On the basis of actual observations 
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of times to failure, it is often difficult to distinguish among the various 
nonsymmetrical probability functions available. Often information such 
as the failure distribution may not be known; there may be a set of 
observations of failure times available from historical records. One 
might wish to decide what class of failure distribution to fit to the 
observations and what the goodness of fit is. 
4.5 Probabilistic Models Describing_Failure Behaviour 
There are different stochastic and probabilistic models used in 
reliability assessment in describing failure behaviour. In this chapter 
the following probability distributions, fundamental to reliability' 
methodology, which have given the best fit for company failure data are 
examined. I 
4.5.1 Weibull distribution 
The weibull distribution, which is pbssibly the most popular and 
versatile model used, was first introduced by a Swedish physicist to 
describe fatigue failure behaviour. 
If the haz4rd rate of a device or system can be characterised by 
an expression of the form: 
h(t) =n( 
t-u ) n-I 
rl 11 
(4.11) 
where 
Ti 
> 
>u 
Since: 
t 
f h(t). EXP -f h(t)dt 
0 
(4.12) 
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Then ft (t) for the Weibull distribution is given by: 
M=R( t-u ) n-I . EXP -( 
t-U )n 
t Ti 11 rl 
and the cumulative distribution function by: 
F EXP _ 
t-U n (4.14) 
t 
t>u 
The reliability function is 
R(t) = EXP -(t-U) 
nt>u 
rl 
where, in the present study, 
n is known as the shape parameter 
TI the scale parameter or characteristic life 
U the location parameter or guaranteed life 
The hazard rate for the Weibull distribution for different values of 
n is: 
for n>1 it characterises an increasing failure rate 
for O<n<l decreasing failure rate behaviour 
when n=1 the Weibull distribution specialises to the exponential distribution 
with a constant failure rate. 
In reliability studies, the location parameter U can often be taken 
as zero, in which case: 
F(t) EXP (t-U) n t>O (4.16) 
(4.16) is called two-paramete .r Weibull distribution. 
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(147) (129) 
Conclusions drawn by previous research workers Tia Esfahani 
and Kamath(91) show that the Weibull fits failure data at least as good as 
alternative models. The reason is that the shape of the Weibull depends 
on the value of the n and therefore by choosing the correct value, the 
Weibull can be fitted to a variety of data. 
4.5.2 Log-normal distribution 
The log-normal distribution in its simplest form may be defined as 
the distribution of a variate whose logarithm obeys the normal law of 
probability. I 
mcAlister appears to have been the first person to set down explicitly 
and in some detail a theory of the log-normal distribution. 
Let t'be the time-to-failure random variable of a device, 'and T- log t 
be distributed normally with parameters V and a. Thus, 
f EXP ( L2 
2 
--<t<co (4.20) Ta 
it follows from the above that the density function of t, g (t), is given by: t 
9M=1 EXP 
lnt-p 2 
t>O t a. t V27r 
=0 elsewhere 
This is called log-normal distribution, 
where 
2 
a= variance of log t and a is the shape parameter 
v= scale parameter - mean-of log t 
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To calculate the mean and variance of data, one can use the following 
formula: 
Mean of data =e 
11+1cr 
Variance =e 
21j+a2 (e a2-, 1) 
4.5.3 Gamma distribution 
The gamma distribution can be considered as an extension to the 
negative exponentia. 1 distribution and is often used as a model in life- 
test problems. 
Gamma distributions describe a decreasing hazard rate when the shape 
parameter 0<1, constant hazard rate when a=1 (exponential), and increasing 
hazard rate 'when a>l. 
The probability density function of the gamma%distribution is: 
f(t) = 
(t/b)C. EXP(-t/b) (4.17) 
br(c+l) 
where 
r(C) -f EXP. (-U)UC-' dU 
0 
is called gamma function and: 
c is called the shape parameter 
b is called the scale parameter 
The reliability function is easily calculated by 
Co 
ff (t)dt 
t 
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4.5.4 Mixed Weibull distribution 
The probability density function (Pdf) of the bimodal Weibull (mixed 
Weibull) distribution is defined as 
()fl(t) + (1-0)f2(t) (4.22) 
0< te» 
f(t) 0 otherwise 
where 
0 is the proportion of early failures, obviously 0<0<1 
fl(t)-and f2(. t) are Weibull probability density functions given by 
O. -l 
f (t) =j exp(-t/ý (4.23) 
7.0 
j 
j=1,2 where 
I denotes early failure 
-2 denotes late failure 
ai >0 is known as shape parameter of jth type 
7i0 is known as scale parameter of jth type 
By convention, j's are chosen such that 
7 <7j 12 
a generalisation of which will be 
m 
f(t) E Ok f k(t) (4.24) k=l 
NO k <1 and 
m 
E0k 
k-I 
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Reliability and hazard rate functions are: ' 
R(t) = eR, (t) + (1-O)R 2(t) (4,., 25) 
where 
Ri (t) exp -(t/ (4.26) 
j=1,2 
h(t) 
f (t) Of l(t)-+ 
(1-O)f2(t)' 
(4.27) _t) -OR 1 (t)+(1-0)R 2 ("t'7 
The mathematical behaviour of a bimodal Weibull distribution reduces to 
a simple Weibull when the proportion parameter 0 is equal to zero or one. 
This distribution was first proposed by Kao in the reliability study of 
electron tubes. Keller and Kamath( 
92 ) later demonstrated its applicability 
to the failure time analysis of semiconductor devices and in this study 
it is applied to the analysis of company failure data. A detailed des- 
cription of the* model, estimation of parameters, applications and problems 
(91) 
is given by ARR Kamath 
im. 
0 
. 
4.6 Analysis of Company Failure'DAta 
The analysis of company failure data can be divided into three 
different parts as follows: 
Application and validity of statistical distributions. 
In this section various statistical distributions and models used - 
in this study are examinýd to explain the inherent variation of the company 
failure times. An attempt has. h1so been made to interpret physically the 
parameters of the distributions, and the conditions when they can be used. 
2. Analysis of company failure data according to the year of failure of 
companies (1970-1977) 
3. Analysis of company failure data according to the groups of companies. 
4.6.1 Application and validity of statistical distributions 
The distributions considered for the analysis of company failure 
data are: 
1. We. ibull 
2. Log7normal 
3. Gamma 
4. Exponential 
5. Mixed Weiýull 
Statiseical properties of these distributions have already been 
discussed 
The method of maximumlikelihood was used for the estimation of 
0 
0 
parameters and Kolmogorov-Smirnov'Test was applied to test the goodness 
of fit for various distributions. Both methods are described in Appendix Bk.. 
Three computer programs were used for the estimation of paramaters, (App-C, 
testing the goodness of fit and drawing the plots for 25 ranges of data. 
The following plots were produced for each group, which are shown. in this 
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chapter and in Appendix B. 
a. Hazard rate functions 
b. Reliability functions 
C. Cumulative distribution functions 
d. Probability density functions 
The specifications of each group for various distributions are 
tabulated and given; consisting of the parameters of distributions, 
critical value at 95% significance level and number of companies in the 
sample. 
Table 4.1 gives the Weibull distribution parameter for. different 
groups making up the manufacturing industry. It can be observed from 
this table that the shape parameters for the group lie between 0.8 and 
1.00 representing slowly decreasiiig or constant hazard rate. This seems 
to suggest that the companies included in the groups have an almost 
random failure nature. The Weibull scale parameters of the groups vary 
a little and'lie between 100 and 160 months as given in Table 4.1, with 
the exception of textile companies which have a scale parameter of 235 
months. The reliability and hazard rate plots for the fitted distribution 
(theoretical) are shown in Figs. 4.3 to 4.30. 
From the reliability curves it can be observed that the reliability 
or probability of survival of companies decreases sharply at the initial 
stages as can be expected for the value of the parameters that were 
estimated. 
Table 4.2 represents the parameters of the fitted log-normal distri- 
bution, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov ýest statistic, D-Max, and critical values 
at 95% significance level. 
A low value of shape parameter indicates a relatively high proportion 
of incipient failures. As can be seen from the Table the log-normal shape 
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TABLE 4.1 Weibull Distiibution Parameters of Company Failure 
Data Manufacturing Industry 
No. of 
the Sample 
D-Max Shape Scale Mean -Critical Values 
at 5% 
Significance 
A . 47 O. C%9 0.88 130 138.3 0.198 
C 48 0.09 1.12 120.7 115.7 0.196 
D 35 0.18 1.26 161.3 1.50 0.23 
E 278 0.10 0.96 117.8 119.6 0.082 
F 18 0.16 1.18 127.5 120.3 0.32 
G 114 0.12 1.00 96 95 0.127 
H 44 0.13 0.96 110.6 112.6 0.205 
K 42 0.14 0.92 114.1 118.4 0.209 
L 150 0.10 0.93 139.7 144.5 0.111 
M 88 0.09 0.93 235.2 242.3 0.145 
N 35 0.17 0.94 148.1 152.1 0.23 
P 277 0.11 0.96 126.6 129 0.081 
R 55 0.18 0.93 114.2 118.2 0.183 
S 239 0.10 0.96 117.3 119.6 0.088 
T 239 0.17 0.89- 123.4 130.1 0.088 
U 78 0.125 0.97 98 99.4 0.154 
All 1787 0.092 0.937 125.6 130 0.032 
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TABLE 4.2 Log-Normal Distribution Parameters of Company Failure Data - 
Manufacturing Industry 
Group of Industry No. of 
the Sample 
D-Max Shape 
Param. 
Scale 
Param. 
Mean Critical 
Values 
at 95% 
Sign. 
Food, Drink and 
Tobacco 47 0.146 1.33 4.23 167.5 0.198 
Chemicals and 
Allied Inds. 48 0.076 0.99 4.31 120.9 0.196 
Metal Manufacture 35 0.133 0.97 4.62 162.7 0.23 
Mechanical Eng. 278 0.053 1.03 4.24 118.2 0.082 
Instrument Eng. 18 0.11 0.92 4.39 123.3 0.32 
Electrical Eng. 114 0074 0.91 4.08 - 0.127 
Shipbuilding & 
Marine 44 0.10 1.03 4.18 110.4 0.205 
Vehicles 42 0.096 1.06 4.19 116.4 0.209 
Metal Goods 150 0.058 1.04 4.40 141.4 0.111 
Textiles 88 0.089 1.21 4.87 270 0.145 
Leather, Leather 
goods and Fur 35 0.155 1.10 4.43 155 0.23 
Clothing 277 0.076 1.10 4.29 133.8 0.081 
Bricks, Pottery 
Glass & Cement 55 0.13 1.00 4.21 ill 0.183 
Timber & Furniture 239 0.066 1.09 4.21 122.8 0.088 
Paper, Printing & 
Publishing 239 0.064 1.09 4.25 128.3 0.088 
Other Manufacturing 78 0.088 1.04 4.05 99 0.154 
All Groups 1787 0.041 1.08 4.28 - 0.032 
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parameters (which is related to var. iarice) of companies in different groups 
vary between 0.92 to 1.33 indicating that the groups have a similar failure 
. 
behaviour. 
One of the typical characteristics of log-normal distribution is 
that it exhibits increasing-hazard rate at the initial stage of life 
followed by a gradual decrease. 
-I The sample hazard rate plots shown in Figs. 4.3 to -: 4.30 corres- 
ponding to the groups do-not disagree with the possibility of having a 
relatively high i4fant. mortality at the initial stages of company 
formation. These include new and usually smail businesses which fail dide 
to factors such as lack of experience, working capital and inability 
to compete in a'free competitive market. 
If for any particular group the parameters of the log-normal 
distribution are available, one can determine the time at which the hazard 
rate starts decreasing. This effectively would give some indication of 
that time beyond which the company would withstand the risk of failure with 
age. 
Referring to Table 3.. 12 one can obserVea, decreasing trend of numbers 
of company failure after the first three to four year'g of their lives. 
This indicates that the first three years as the highest risk interval 
for the manufacturing companies examined. 
The fitted log-normal reliability functions for the companies (Figs. 4.3 
to 4.130 ) ýhow that in most of the cases log-normal distribution giv6s a 
better fit to the sample reliability functions. Table 4.3 gives the 
gamma distribution parameters, K. S. test statistics, D-Max and the corres- 
ponditig critical values at 5% confidence level for each group. As 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, gamma distribution characterises 
monotonically increasing hazard rate for the shape parameters greater 
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TABLE 4.3 Gamma Distribution Parameters of Company Failure Data 
Manufacturing Industry 
Group of Industry No. of 
the Sample 
D-Max Shape 
Param. 
Scale 
Param. 
Mean Critica 
Values 
at 95% 
Sign. 
Food, Drink & 
Tobacco 47 0.175 0.73 189.8' 138.5 0.198 
Chemical and 
Allied 48 0.18 1.11 103.5 115.4 0.196 
Metal Manufacture 35 0.26 1.61 93.3 149.9 0.23 
Mech&dical Eng. 278 0.12 0.66 181.1 119.9 0.082 
Instrument Eng. 18 0.15 1.21 99.2 119.8 0.32 
Electrical Eng. 114 0.23 0.59 161 0.127 
Shipbuilding & 
Marine 44 0.154 0.65 172.3 113 0.205 
vehicles 42 0.16 0.61 195.8 119.2 0.209 
Metal Goods 150 0.12 0.54 269.6 145.5 0.111 
Textiles 88 0.11 0.90 268.3 242.6 0.145 
Leather, Leather 
Goods & Fur 35 0.19 0.80 190 152.5 0.23 
Clothing & Footwear 279- 0.12 0.76 170 129.4 0.081 
Bricks, Pottery, 
Glass & Cement 55 0.21 0.59 199.8 119 0.183 
Timber & Furniture 239 0.11 0.80 149.3 119.9 0.088 
paper, Printing & 
Publishing 239 0.13 0.56 234.7 131.4 0.088 
other Manufacturing 78 0.14 0.70 141.1 99.6 0.154 
All Manufacturing 1787 0.14 0.66 198.1 0.03 
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than 1.00, -and monotonically decreasing for the shape parameters less 
than 1.00. In both cases, the hazard rate asymptotically approaches 
1 
exponential failure rate (constant hazard rate - scale parameters)' 
This distribution would be ideal in the application of company failure 
analysis if the failure 6f companies'is necessarily due to accumulated 
causes and also if one has a reason to believe these causes were random 
with the same distribution. As can be seen from the Table 4.3, most of 
the shape parameters corresponding to the manufacturing industry groups 
have a value of less than 1.00. Corresponding hazard rate plots shown 
in Figs. 4.3 to 4.30 are almost constant representing nearly exponential 
failure characteristics. From these results one can only infer that the 
gamma distribution can be chosen as the appropriate one, when a company 
fails randomly. Figs. 4.3 to 4.30 give the fitted reliability curves 
which show the decreasing nature of probability of survival of companies 
with age, for gamma distribution. As can be seen from the plots, the rate 
of decrease at the latest stages are comparatively lower than the initial 
stages. This distribution seems plausible in the case of company failure, 
since there is an asympthatic positive limit for the conditional failure 
rate. 
Table 4.4 summarises the results of analysis of company failure data 
using exponential distribution'. This includes K. S. test statistics, D-Max, 
and critical values at 95% significance level for each group. As can be 
observed from the table, the values of scale parameters do not differ 
significantly from the Weibull scale parameters (Table 4.1). This 
distribution would only be acceptable for the company failure data if 
I 
one has the reason to believe failure is purely random. However, froml: the 
sample hazard rate it would be difficult to explain the relatively high 
hazard rate exhibited at the beginning using the exponential distribution. 
176. 
TABLE 4.4 Exponential Distribution Parameters of Company Failure Data - 
Manufacturing Industry 
Group of Industry No. of 
Sample 
D-Max Scale 
Parameter 
Critical Values 
at 95% 
Si nificance 
Food, Drink & 
Tobacco 47 0.112 138.5 0.198 
Chemicals & Allied 48 0.064 115 0.196 
Metal Manufacture. 35 0.112 150 0.23 
Mechanical Eng. 278 0.114 120 0.082 
Instrument Eng. 18 0.101 120 0.32 
Electrical Eng. 114 0.119 95 0.127 
Shipbuilding & 
Marine 44 0.136 113 0.205 
Vehicles 42 0.161 119 0.209 
Metal Goods 150 0.124 145 0.111 
Textiles 88 0.113 242 0.145 
Leather, Leather 
Goods & Fur 35 0.183 182 0.23 
Clothing & Furniture 277. 0.106 127 0.081 
Bricks, Pottery, 
Glass & Cement 55 0.198 119 0.183 
Timber & Furniture 239 0.116 120 0.088 
Paper, Printing 
& Publishing 239 0.136 131 0.088 
Other Manufacturing 78 0.130 100 0.154 
All Groups 1787 0.114 130 0.032 
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Table 4.5 gives the Mixed Weibull distribution parameters, K. S. test 
statistics, D*Max and the corresponding critical values at . 5% confidence 
level for each group. As can ýe seen from this Table, the-ratio of the 
late to the early scale. parameters vary between 4 to 5 and the corresponding 
proportion parameters has a value'of 50%, which seems to suggest that 
almost half of the companies are susceptible to the early failures which 
is about one-fourth of the characteristic life of the rest'of the 50% 
of the companies examined. This, however, does not appear to be inconsistent 
with the sample cumulative -distribution. plot for-all groups shown 
in 
Fig. 4.31 where about'50% of the companies fail before five years. 
Figs. 4.32 to 4.33 give the Bayesian probabilities of early failure with 
age for total manufacturing companies, paper, printing and publishing group. 
Figs. 4.34 to'14.49 show the reliability functions for fitted mixed-Weibull 
distribution. The hazard rate plots are also given in the same figitres. 
Because of the increased number of parameters in this model, one can 
observe a close fit to the sample reliability function. The probability 
V 
of survival of the company can be directly read from these curves. 
The conclusions regarding distributions examined are: 
1. Weibull distribution adequately represents failure behaviour of 
companies examined, if and when the following assumptiops are justified: 
a) the instantaneous hazard rate Zconditional probability 6f failure 
of an existing company has a monotonic increasing* or decreasing nature. 
b) if there is not any non-zero instantaneous hazard rate limit. 
2. Log-normal distribution explains adequately the company failure data 
and its instantaneous hazard rate characteristic provides physical meaning 
with regard to-the incipient failure of the companies observed. The 
practical interpretation of the decreýsing instantaneous hazard rate 
is that a company progressively improves its chances of survival with 
181. 
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experience after an initial period-of infant mortality. 
3. Gamma distribution, as mentioned earlier, has the characteristics closely 
related to the company failure data under the following assumptions: 
a) the failure of the company is due to some accumulated causes 
and the nature of the causes itself ; being random. 
b) the instantaneous hazard rate (conditional probability*of failure) 
has a positive limit for the-limiting value of age considered. 
4. Exponential distribution describes company failure if the nature of 
failure is random. However, this does not explain the incipient failure 
observed in the company failure data. 
5. Mixed Weibull distribution provides greater flexibility due to tfie 
increased number of parameters. It has the properties of both the limiting 
failure rate and the capability of representing incipient failures depending 
I 
upon the values of its parameters. The application of the model is based 
on the following assumptions: 
a) the companies have a dichotomous nature in which a proportion of 
companies are highly vulnerable to the external factors which cause 
the companies to fail prematurely, with the rest of the companies 
having a normal life. 
b) both types of companies have the same failure behaviour 
characteristics (statistical distribution). - 
4.6.2 Analysis of company failure data according to year of failure 
Tables 4.6 to 4.16 give the values of the parameters of the 
distributions used for individual year of failure (1970-1977). 'It can 
be observed from the Tables that in the year 1974 the mean life of companies 
studied indicates a relatively low age as compared with companies failed 
as a whole and other years. This reflects the general state of the national 
19 6. 
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TABLE 4.8 Manufacturing Companies Failed in 1970 
I- 
TABIY, 4.9 
Distributions Parameters Proportion 6f 
il 
D-M M Fa ure ax Shape Scale ean Early Late 
ib 
Early 
0 045 
1.95 53 50.92 
ull We 
Late 
. 
1.11 233 1_49.08 
Log-Normal 0.08 1.08 4.30 133 
Weibull 0,13 0.92 128 133 
Gamma 0.15 o. 61 220' 133 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.174 
No. in the Sample 61 
Manufacturing Companies Failed in 1971 
W ib l 
Early 1.43 64 51.431 -- e ul 
Late 
0.060 0.99 246 1 48.57 
Log-Normal 0.05 1.19 433 155 
Weibull 0.10 0.86 139 149 
Gamma 0.13 0.57 262 150 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.143 
No. in the Sample '90 
TABLE 4 . 
ýO manufacturing Companies Failed in 1972 
Early 
0.052 1.77 75.36 
1 51.42 1 
Weibull, 
Late 1.43 JQ8 
Log-Normal 0.057 1 1.03 4.64 177 
Weibull 0.11 1.03 173 171 
C amma 0.15 0.93 184 170 
Critical Value at 952 Significance Level = 0.133 
No. in the Sample 105 
199. 
economy in that particular-year and that the newly formed companies were 
particularly vulnerable to the'recession and the effect of the oi. 1 crisis. 
] 
In general, the mean life gives an indication of macro-economic effects 
on individual companies. The hazard rate and reliability functions for 
each year are given in Figs. 4.50 to 4.67 . 'The interpretation of the 
plots depends on the validity of assumptions and the values of parameters 
shown in the Tables 4.6 to 4.16. One can infer-from these values that 
the failed companies in England and Wales during the period 1970 to 1977 
exhitited a common failure behaviour. 
. 
4.6.3 Analysis of coinpany failure data for each group 
The parameters of the-distributions examined in this study are given 
for each group of companies in Tables 4.17 to 4.32. In most of the groups 
the Weibull characteristic life of companies appears to lie between 110 and 
130 months (i. e. 9 to 11 years) with an almost random failure characteristic 
being exhibited in most cases (shape parameter 1). In particular, metal 
manufacture, metal goods, textiles, leather goods and fur indicate a 
comparatively longer life span than the rest of the companies. Considering 
the failure characteristics of the companies as a whole and disregarding 
the nature of individual industrial groups, the overall Weibull scale 
parameter of 125.6 months indicates that 63.3% of*new-born companies fail 
before achieVing an age of 10 years. 
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TABLE 4.11 Manufacturing Companies Failed in 1973 0 
Distributions Parameters Proportion df 
i D-Max Me lure Fa Shape Scale an Early Late 
ib l 
Early 
5 
2.31 37 47.3.2 
We u l 
Late 
0.0 3 
1.19 206 1 52.68 
Log-Normal 0.085 1.06 4.17 113 
Weibull 0.12 0.92 112 117 
Gamma 0.15 0.58 201 117 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.115 
No. in the Sample 141 
TABLE 4.12 Manufacturing Companies Failed'in 1974 
TABLE 4.13 
W ib ll 
Early 
- 
2.01 47 50-35 1 
e u 
Late 
0.054 1.23 180 
. 
_1 49.65 
Log-Normal 0.06 0.99 4.17 107 
Weibull 0.11 1.00 108 108 
Camma o. 14 0.75 145 
E 
108 108 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level. o. 102 
No. in the Sample. 179 
Manufacturing Companies Failed in 1975 
Early 2.18 41 48.62 
Weibull - 
Late 
0.032 
1.25 223 51.38 
Log-Normal 0.07 1.07 4.23 122 
Weibull 0.12 0.93 119 123 
Gamma o. 14 0.66 185 124 
Critical Value at 952 Significance Level - 0.078 
No. in the Sample = 307 
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TABLE 4.14 Manufacturing Companies Failed in 19.76. 
Distributions Parameters Proportion 6f 
i 
D-Max Ife lure - 
Fa 
Shape Scale an Early Late 
ib 
Early 
0 927 
1.84 47 48.44 - 
We ull 
Late 
li; 
ý] . 
1.21 247 
--- I 
51.56 
Log-Normal 0.06 1.11 4.33 141 
Weibull 0.10 0.92 133 138 
Camma 0.12 0.62 223 139 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level - 0.062 
No. in the Sample 475 
TABLE 4.15 Manufacturing Companies Failed in 1977 
W ib ll 
Early 
- 
1.93 47 - 49.63 e u 
Late 
0.025 
1.25 219 
1 
50.37 
Log-Normal 0.05 1.06 4.25 124 
Weibull 0.10 0.96 121 122 
Camma 0.12 0.69 176 123 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.066 
No. in the Samile 429 
TABLE 4946 Manufacturing Companies Failed in 1970-197.7 
Early 
2 1.85 48 49.36 Weibull. - 
Late 
0.0 3 
1.21 231 50. '164 
Log-Normal 1 
0.041 1.0 8 4.28 
Weibull o. 092 0. Q37 126 
I 
Gamma 
I o. 14 1 0.66 198 
Critical Value at 952 Significance Level 0.032 
No. in the Sample = 1787 
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TABLE 4.17 Food, Drink and Tobacco 
I 
TABLF, 4.18 
TABLE 4. a9 
Distributions Parameters Proportion 6f 
i 
D-M Me lure - 
Fa 
ax Shape Scale an Early Late 
i 
Early 
0 095 
0.91 63.68 49.73 
We bull. 
Late 
. 
1.15 220 
-1 
50.27 
Log-Normal 0.146 1.33 4.23 167.4 
Weibull 0.090 0.88 130.0- 38 
Gamma 0.175 0.73 
1 
190 138 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.198 
No. in the Sample = 47 
Chemicals and Allied Industries 
W ib ll 
Early 
- 1-89 47-9 e u 
Late 
0.054 1.71 205 52.33 
Log-Normal 0.076 0.99 4.31 121 
Weibull 0.090 1.12 121 116 
Gamma 0.18 1.11 104 116 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level ý 0.196 
No. in the Sample ý8- 
Metal Manufacture 
Early 
- 
2.50 60 52.29 Weibull 
Late 
0.071 
3.57 284 47.71 
Log-Normal 0.133 0.97 4.62 163 
Weibull 0.18 1.26 161 150 
Camma 0.26 
1 
1.61 93 150 
-1 1 
Critical Value at 952 Significance Level - 0.23 
No. in the Sample = 35 
212. 
TABLE 4.20 Mechanical Engineering 
TABLE 4.21 
Distributions Parameters Proportion 6f 
i D-Max Me n 
lure 
_ 
Fa 
Shape Scale a Early Late 
W ib ll 
Early 
0 035 
1.97 48.45 49.85 
e u - 
Late 
. 1.91 209 50.15 
Log-Normal 0.053 1.03 4.24 118 
Weibull 0.10 0.96 117.8. 119.6 
Ca 0.12___ 
1 
0.66 
1 
181 119.6 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.082 
No. in the Sample = 278 
InsLrument Engineering 
W ib ll 
Early 
- 
1.92 62 '53.8 
e u 
Late 
0.117 1.78 220 43. L7 
Log-Normal 0.110 0.92 4.39 123 
Weibull 0.16 1.18 128 120 
Gamma 0.15 1. ýl 99 120 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.32 
No. in the Sample. - '18 
TABLE 4ý. 22 Electrical Engineering 
Early 2.28 46 51.78 
Weibull 
Late 
0.053 1.12 161 48.22 
Log-Normal 0.074 0.91 4.080 
Weibull 0.12 1.00 96 
Camma 0.23 0.59 161 
Critical Value at 952 Significance Level - 0.127 
No. in the Sample = 114 
TABLE 4.23 
TABLE 4.24 
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering. . 
213. 
Distributions Parameters Proportion 6f 
i 
D-M M Fa lure ax Shape Scale ean Early Late 
i 
Early 
o o66 
2.67 35 44.72 
We bull 
Late 
. 1.25 194 55.28 
Log-Normal 0.10 1.06 4.19 116 
Weibull 0.13 0.96 ill 113 
Gamma 0.15 0.65 172 113 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.205 
No.. in the Sample = 44 
Vehicles 
W ib l1 
Early 
1 
1.94 50 52.05 
e u 
Late 
0.063 1.08 206 7.95 
Log-Normal 0.096 1.06 4.19 1.16 
Weibull 0.14 0.92 114 118 
Gamma o. 16 0.61 196* 119 
I 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.209 
No. in the Sample 42 
TABLE 4. 'ý5 Metal Goods 
. 11 
.1 
Early 1.79 64 50.93 
Weibull - 
Late 
0.034 
1.06 244 49.07 
Log-Normal 0.058 1 1.04 4.40 141 
Weibull 0.10 0.93 140 144 
Gamma 0.12 0.54 270 145 
1-3 
R 
Critical Value at 952 Significance Level = 0.111 
No. in the Sample = 150 
214. 
TABLE 4.26 Textiles 
Distributions Parameters Proportion 6f 
F il D-M M a ure ax Shape Scale ean Early Late 
i 
Early 
0 050 
1.62 65 47.06 
We bull. 
Late 
. 
1.68 456 1 52.94 
Log-Normal 0.089 1.21 4.87 2.70 
_ 
Weibull, 0.09 0.93 235 242 
Gamma 0.11 0.90 268 242 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.145 
No. in the Sample 88 
TABLE 4.27 Leather, Leather Goods'and Fur 
ib ll 
Early 
2-89 44 
- 
51-141 We u 
Late 
O. o58 
- 
1.56 101 
1 
48.86 
Log-Normal 0.155 1.10 4.43 155 
Weibull 0.17 0.94 148 152 
Gamma 0.19 0.80 190 152 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.23 
No. in the Sampl e 35 
TABLE 4. % Clothing and Footwear 
Early 1.74 44 49.11 Weibull 
Late 
0.032 
1.65 205 50.89 
Log-Normal 0.076 1 1.10 4.29 134 1 
Weibull 0.11 0.96 127 129 
Camma 0.12 0.76 170 129 
Critical Value at 952 Significance Level = 0.081 
No. in the Sample - 277 
215. 
TABLE 4.29 Bricks, Pottery, Glass & Cement, etc. 
Distributions Parameters Proportion 6f 
i 
D-M If Fa lure ax Shape Scale ean Early Late 
i 
Early 
0 055 
2.48 49 56.06 
We bull - 
Late 
. 
1.12 225 43.94 
Log-Normal 0.13 1.00 4.21 ill 
Weibull 0.18 0.93 114 118 
Gamma 0.21 0.59 
1 
200 119 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.183 
No. in the Sample = 55 
TABLE 4.30 Timber, Furniture, etc. 
ib l 
Early 2.01 37.26 47.641 
ul We - 
Late 
0.039 1.43 220 1 52.36 
Log-Normal 0.066 1.09 4.21 123 
Weibdll 0.10 0.96 117.3 119 
Gamma 0.11 0.80 10 119 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.088 
No. in the Sample. 239 
TABLE 4. 'h -Paper, Printing & Publishing 
Early 
043 0 1.80 48 50.16 
1 
Weibull 
. Late 
. 1.09 229 1 49.84 
Log-Normal 0.064 1.09 4.25 128 
Weibull 0.17 0.89 123 130 
Camma 0.13 0.56 235 131 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0 . 088 
No. in the Sample = 239 
TABLE 4.32 Other Manufacturifng 
216. 
Distributions Parameters Proportion 6f 
D-Max Mean Failure Shape Scale Early Late 
ib l 
Early 
0.064 
1.99 40 51.80 
We u l 
Late 1.24 181 48.20 
Log-Normal 0.088 1.04 4. o5 99 
Weibull 0.125 0.97 98 99 
Ca o. 14 0.70 141'_ 9T_ý 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.154 
No. in the Sample . 78 
TABLE 4.33 All Typqs of Manufacturing Companies 
TABLE '0 
W ib lI 
Early : 1.85 48 49.36 
e u 
Late 
0.023 1.21 231 50.64 
Log-Normal 0.041 1.08 4.28 
Weibull. 0.092 0.937 126 
Gamma 0.14 0.66 198 
Critical Value at 95% Significance Level 0.032 
No. in the Sample 1'787 
Early 
Weibull. 
Late 
Log-Normal 
Weibull 
Camma 
Critica. 1 Value at 957. Significance Level 
No. in the Sample 
t4 
217. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Although the Weibull, log-normal, Camma and mixed Weibull distributions 
appear to be particularly appropriate to use in the analysis of company 
failure data, it was found that mixed Weibull. can best represent the various 
phases of a company life cycle, due to its properties and flexibility 
which were mentione& earlierg e. g. Fig. 4.34,4.35 and Table 4.5. 
It is considered that companies are most at risk during the early 
period of formation (1 to 3 years). This high risk experienced at the early 
stages is most likely due to problems encountered with regard to market 
penetration and the- difficulties of entering and operating in a highly 
competitive business environment.. In the present study this initial stage 
id defined as 'Introductory. Phase'. Among the emergent mix of companies 
are several entities dependent on one product or process. These companies- 
are particularly at. risk when introducing a newly developed product, and 
as a consequence suffer a high mortality raýe- 
During the latter stages when the company has established itself and 
assured a relatively stable market for its product, the chance. s of failure 
are decreasing. This is referred to as the 'Growth Phase' which is 
followed by the 'Maturity Phase' when the company enters a stagnation period. 
The chances of failure are more likely to be random and arise from inherent 
deficiencies associated with the organisational and management structure. 
The mixed Weibull 'distribution can also describe the 'Declining Phase' of 
company life cy6le when both sales and profit fall repeatedly and cash flow 
balance progressively deteriorates until the company is forced into 
liquidation. - Hazard rate characteristics of the mixed Weibull distribution 
appears tb describe the various phases of failure, depending upon the value 
of parameters. Having concluded that the mixed Weibull model is the best fit 
for company failure data,. one can possibly draw attention to the strengths and 
218. 
weaknesses of the other distributions examined in this study. Tabler4.1 to 4.4 
Hazard rate characteristics of the log-normal distribution appears to 
describe the phenomena of high mortality rate during the 'Introductory 
Llhase' and a gradual decrease of the 'Growth Phase'. However, since the 
hazard rate tends to be zero over time the 'Declining Phase' cannot be 
represented by this distribution. eg. Fig. 4.9. 
Gamma distribution on the other hand can be used for the 'Growth and 
Mattirity Phases' of company life. cycle assuming that the duration of the 
initial stage is significantly small. This distribution has a monotonically 
decreasing hazard rate characteristics with limiting positive failure rate 
with time, -e. g. Fig. 4.5. 
Finally., the Weibull 'distribution with a shape parameter less than 1.00 
adequately represents the 'Crowth Phase' of the company life cycle. It 
suffers from the same weakness of log-normal distribution where the limiting 
hazard rate is zero. It is interesting to Aote that for the shape parameter 
greater than 1.00 the 'Declining Phase' can'be adequately de scribede. g. Fig. 4.7. 
For the comparison of failure behaviour pf companies, the hazard and 
reliability plots for various groups, fitted in different distributions, are 
given in this 
. 
chaptLr and Appendix B. Eig. 
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a 
CHAPTEWFIVE 
APPLICATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY 
TO THE ANALYSIS AND IDENTIFICATION OF 
CAUSES AND SYMPTOMS OF COMPANY FAILURE 
5. ' AppliCation of Risk Management Methodology to the Analysis of 
Causes and Symptoms of Company-Failure 
5.1 Introduction 
Although one is primarily interestdd in the successful aspects of 
growing concerns, there is much to be learned by studying the characteristics 
of failed companies. Mistakes often result in more management lessons 
than success stories. 
It is difficult to identify specific causes of failure in any 
individual case. A whole series of contributing circumstances would lead 
. 
ying causes up to the final collapse. One of the best ways of identif ' 
is by following the history of a firm from beginning to the end and con- 
sidering all theups and downs in its fortunes. - 
Causes of business failure are generally described in simplified terms. 
some people 
( 11) 
see companies fail because they are greedy, others suggest 
management is the critical factor; directors often blame government and 
economic situations; experts give obvious causes and symptons invariably 
with little distinction between these two. 
on close examination, such explanations are ambiguous and inadequate 
as they are all single factor theories advanced to explain complex 
phenomena. There is no reason to think that any company is any exception 
to the rule that each business success, especially when it is rapid, 
carries within it 'bacteria' which may ultimately 'rot it away'. In the 
analysis of causes and symptoms of company failure, the way one looks 
at the problems depends to some degree on individual philosophy. 
The methodology adopted in this chapter is based on a risk management 
methodology which can be applied to the identification of threats, risks 
and critical factors which caused the companies to fail. The scope and 
concept of risk management are described later in this chapter. The plan 
of this chapterUs in the following order: 
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1. Analysis of specific individual company history. 
2. A general review of the evolution and development of companies 
3. A brief review of the problems and causes of failure in small 
businesses. 
4. A compilation of causes of large company failure. 
5. A list of non-financial symptoms exhibited by failed companies in a 
classified form according to functional areas. 
6. Analysis of critical factors of company failure and development of an 
illustrative model for change appraisal. 
5.2 Objectives 
In recent years a significant volume of research has been carried out 
into aspects of corporate collapse and business failure, including pre- 
and post-bankruptcy behaviour. One particular area which has not been 
studie d in detail is the analysis of causes and symptoms of failure. This 
is crucial to other. related studies e. g. prediction, prevention and rescue 
operations. 
It can however be noted that most of the studies to date on this topic 
have been carried out by Americans, except for a few which were based on 
( 28) ( 31) -i( 4 
British companies, i. e. Bosewell , Brough , Argent 
). 
The 
present study is one of the first attempts carried out to identify the 
causes and symptoms of company failure based on a detailed analysis of 
recently failed companies. 
The present chapter is devoted to the application of risk management 
methodology to the identification of the threats and risks which are 
generally ignored by companies that eventually fail. 
The importance of analysis has been stressed by many authors, in 
particular Argenti quotes "for too long managers and writers on management 
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have shown the tourist the new and sparkling city centre, so to speak, 
and carefully kept him away from the slums and shanty towns". The avoidance 
of failure is as mich a part of a manager's job as-t the achievement of 
success. An attempt to untangle the causes of failure could be beneficial 
not only to management, but it would also help guide further research in 
I 
other rewarding directions. A final purpose of the present chapter is 
an attempt to find a common pattern of failure behaviour including 
deficiences in management. An objective of this subsidiary study was tO' 
see if "lessons" could be identified for other companies at risk. 
5.3 Risk Management 
Risk management is a wide concept with no standard definition, but it 
(19 
is generally taken as embracing the following functions, as A. P. Benson 
def ines: 
The identification and evaluation of potential threats to corporate 
assets and profits. 
2. The measure of the p*otential loss which these threats may cause if 
they occur. 
3. The making of decisions aimed at the limitation or reduction to 
acceptable levels of these threats. 
_ 
4. The taking of such other steps as may be necessary to protect the 
corporation against the balance of residual risk. 
This definition suggests', quite correctly, that thexe can be no single 
measure of risk in corporate affairs. There is a need in the large. 
corporation for a risk co-ordinator to bring together the disciplines 
which may contribute to the managing of risk and to ensure that a consistent 
and coherent approach to matters of risk is adopted. 
J. R. Parkinson(117) provides a valuable summary of the current practice 
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of risk management and defines the functions, describes the activity and 
shows 'clearly the role of. risk management within a given company. He 
comments that "the function of the risk manager is not to 'manage' risk. 
He may manage the handling or financing of risk, but only those in the 
mainstream of the company activity can actually manage risk themselves. 
'In 
these areas the risk manager helps to identify problems, evaluates 
potential loss levels, contributes to solutions and is involved in the 
implementation of the measures ultimately taken to rdduce potential 
financial loss. Management of risk must be an integral part of modern 
corporate activity". 
D. k. Marks 
(L07 ) believes that "it is management's role to evaluate 
the risk and to propose a policy to eliminate or reduce it and to keep 
the risk -constantly under review". i 
The risk management concept, first developed in the United States, it 
based on the belief that insurance is only one of a number of techniques 
for the handling of risk. Tony Benson( 
21) 
makes it clear that "risk 
management is a wide field and the identification and-tevaluation of 
risk is a difficult business for the industrial company, but if it bears 
in mind the loss which can follow a given predictable incident, the job 
is not impossible". He also believes that the corporate risk manager 
today is "the man who, suitably involved in the earliest planning stages, 
should contribute to the totality of thinking on matters such as these. 
Line management in the company should properly involve itself in managing 
risks, for instance an engineer has a major fuLtion as an identifier of 
risk in connection with existing plant, proposed amendment to it and new 
projects". Even in terms of evaluation of probabilities in connection. with 
risk, it is likely that the engineer has a leading part to play (Benson). 
Data is available on the failure rates which can only properly be inter- 
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preted by an engineer. 
5.4 The Scope of Risk Management- 
The development of risk management can be seen as part of the more 
general development of management science; most branches of management 
I 
have become increasingly more analytical'in recent years. 
Risk management recognises the-interdependence of activities and 
importance of them to the success of organisations. It employs 
statistical, analytical, accounting and other techniques to co-ordinate 
risk control activities and maintain them at uptimum efficiency and 
effectiveness, Keller 
( 93). 
83ý Horriganý wo favours an academic approach to the definition of pure 
and speculative risks and functions of risk management, sees the latter as 
composed of "identification, measurements and control of risk" and 
discusses the principal elements of each and looks at the relationship 
between risk management and profitability. 
. 
(37) 
Caswell and Wilkins trace the broadening of the risk management role 
in industry from identification, assessment and control of all risk areas 
to the actions required as a result of social and environmental legislation 
I 
and the issues of product liability. 
(47) 
Crockford traces the development of risk management and discusses* 
aspects of risk a nd uncertainty that threaten a business and considers 
the most-appropriate strategy for treating risks (reduction, protection$ 
trandfer, financing) to different situations. Fuan and Davis quote 
(49) 
definition of risk management objectives and content that "risk management' 
is an aspect of financial management" and give the unusual definition of 
obiectives as being "to maintain as completely intact as possible the 
cycle of circular flow of funds in business or service organisations". 
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iacksoý891fines risk improvement as "the identification of risk areas 
in every aspect of a company's assets, facilities and operations and 
improving the situation economically by eliminating, reducing or controlling 
the risk, together with the preparation of contingency plans to minimise 
the operational dnd financial effects of loss and failure". 
All businesses are exposed to different risks and it is the responsible 
management who should identify the directions from which trouble may-strike. 
This requires a detailed study of those companies who have failed because 
I 
either they did not recognise the threats and risk areas or they ignored 
( 96) 
them, H. F. Kloman. describes risk management as having the following 
elements: "exposure identification, loss evaluation, loss prevention and 
control, loss funding, and risk administration". J. V. Davis( 
49) 
states 
that "risk management practitioners nedd to become skilled in financial 
I 
management skills.. Financial management skills will make the risk management 
more effective in working with financial superiors, jin the firm who are 
becoming more closely identified with the risk manager's function". 
5.5 Risk of Failure 
Every company is always at risk. The risk exists in every business 
function with a wide range of possibilities. In the auth; r's opinion a 
large number of companies failed could have been prevented if adequate 
monitoring procedures. had been introduced together with appreciation or 
awareness of the risks by management. Awareness can be achieved if 
there is a good understanding of the weaknesses and risks facing the 
company. As the business environment becomes more hostile and competitive 
the chances of failure increase. 
Lack of risk consciousness has put many firms in the hands of 
receivers and liquidators. Therefore risk awareness is an essential pre- 
225. 
requisite in success or avoidance of failure. In the present economic 
climate it is particularly difficult to minimise risk and maximise the 
chance or survivalg however it behoves management to sharpen its ability 
with regard to threats and risks facing their operations. 
5.6 Risk Management Methodology and Company Failure Studies 
Risk management methodology can be briefly identified as follows: 
1. Identification of threats and risks 
2. Evaluation and measurement 
3. Prevention and protection 
4. Control and solution (elimination, reduction and transfer) 
- It 
is interesting to compare these definitions with the scope and 
concept of company failure, which can generally be defined as: 
1. Identification of causes-and symptoms of failure 
2. Financial analysis and prediction 
3. Prevention and control 
4. Rescue operations (Re-organisation, Receivership and Liquidation) 
The author is of the opinion that the role of the risk manager is one 
that will become increasingly more challenging and rewarding if he can 
see the connection between the company failure and risk management. 
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5.7 Compýnies Studied 
It is important to consider business failure from the point of view 
of 'fundamental' causes as well as the ways the causes may be evidenced. 
To achieve this it is necessary to have access to the files, history and 
background of failed companies to obtain the right information, especially 
that relating to the structure and organisation of firms. 
The sb-lection of companies studied in the present chapter was based 
on the following requirements: 
1. The companies must have passed the early phase of failure which was 
identified as 'early failure' in Chapter Four of the present study relating 
to the analysis of time to failure and pattern of company failure. -There- 
fore the companies selected have passed the risks of infant mortality. 
2. The companies must have had approved published reports by the 
official inspectors appointed by the Department of Trade, or special 
reports by experts. 
3. The companies were quoted as a public company. 
in work reports by previous researchers there is much confusion between 
causes and symptoms of failure - in many cases the symptoms being identified 
as actual causes. Again, these early studies-are characterised by a lack 
of detailed information. It is the belief of the author that the above 
requirements on selection of companies would obviate the problems. The 
names of the companies studied and the inspectors or experts are given 
in the Table overleaf. 
S 
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Company Inspectors Appointed by the 
Department of Trade 
Rolls-Royce. Ltd RA MacCrindle QC 
P Godfrey FCA 
Court Line Ltd 
Clarksons Holidays Ltd 
Halcyon Holidays Ltd 
JP Comyn QC 
DS Morpeth TD, BCom, FCA 
J Hamilton MA 
Blanes Ltd 
John Willment Automobiles Ltd 
The Vehicle & General 
Insurance Co. Ltd . 
Mitchell Construction * 
Bernard Russell Ltd 
Handley Page 
Roadships Ltd 
(formerly known as Ralph 
Hilton Transport Services 
Ltd) 
DAL Smout MA, UM 
BE Basden FCA, 
PJ Millett-QC 
MR Harris FCA 
TM Eastham QC 
RTM McPhail MBE, CA 
Simonds 
DAL Smout, MA, MM 
BE Basden MA, FCA 
K Cork (Receiver) & Travers 
Benet Alan Hytner QC 
Ian Alexander Noble Irvine FCA 
I 
*Handley Page and Mitchell Construction were not investigated by 
the Department of Trade, but many experts have analysed their 
failure e. g. Siamonds, Travers, Argenti, etc. 
0 
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The author? s view is that before considering the list of causes and 
symptoms of failure in large companies it is desirable to obtain the growth 
and evolution picture of the fl'rMs and difficulties encountered in this 
stage. This provides a guide to understanding where the'process of 
failure starts and why ? In other words it is necessary to understand 
the behaviour of healthy firms before one can identify the sick one. - 
Behaviour relating to the failed one is then seen to be a deviation from 
normal growth and evolution. This deviation can'arise from an organic 
defect in the firm and in biological terms is analogous to an individual 
being born with a physical defect which induces dysfunctional behaviour. 
Again in the same way that over-indulgence in food, drink, lack of exercise 
etc. can result in premature death, gross mis-management of acompany 
can cause premature failure. 
Before consid6ring the failure characteristics of large companies, 
it is also important to know the difficulties and general causes of fallure 
in small businesses where the rate of mortality and risk of failure 
is very high compared with large companies. 
0 
5.8 Development of Firms 
In a capitalist economy, it can be said that firms may grow for a 
large number of reasons. A review of the literature offers many reasons. 
Edward and Townsend (1961) note that "most businesses start small and 
with pedestrian objectives. Their purpose is to do something similar 
to what is already being done, and their prospects depend on an expanding 
demand for their product or on their ability to take some of the custom 
away from existing firms". (1961, p. 4). They add that the most obvious 
way for a firm to grow is through market penetration and development. 
Some authors(153) b*elieve that over the last decade and particularly in 
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the US, there has been a popular misconception that 'growth' of large 
companies has been achieved by the purchasd of other companies in fields 
unrelated to'those of the purchaser. This phenomenon has produced what 
is often called 'coqglomerate' companies - subsidiaries or divisions that 
(130) 
have little in common but unified financial management. Shumpeter (1942) 
(100) 
puts the emphasis of growth on entrepreneurship. Le vitt (1964) poinýs 
out the importance of this fact by reference to technology-, organisation 
structure and human relations. Nevertheless, companies pass through 
(15 ),, 
several stages of, growth and development. Barnes and Hershon refer 
to these stages as "The Company Transition" which are shown in Exhibit 
(34) 
5.1. Buchele (1967) defines growth as a series of crises, while Chandler 
(39) 
(1962) referred to this as-the result of the company's strategy and 
(70 )- 
structure. Greiner argues: "Historical forces do indeed shape the 
future growth of organisations". Greiner identifies at least five phases 
of organisational growth and development. Each phase is characterised by 
having both 'evolution' and 'revolution'. The term evolution is used to 
describe periods of growth with relative organisation stability. The term 
revolution is used to describe periods of "substantial turmoil" in 
organisation life. Thus as a company moves through developmental phases, 
each evolutionary period creates its own revolution. The management's 
solution to each revolutionary period is the'deciding factor for the 
next stage of the company's revolutionary growth. 
(143) 
Exhibit 5.2 gives different pýases of the company growth. Strausa 
provides some detail about the nature of growth and survival7of companies 
and suggests the: existence of a critical stage undergone by firms as they 
pass through fKom 'Youth' to 'Adolescence'. He notes that the point at 
which this critical point occurs is determined by several factors, among 
them are: 
EXHIBIT 5.1 Characteristics of Company Growth 230. 
organisational 
Characteristic 
Patterns of 
First Stage 
Patterns of 
Second Stage 
Patterns of 
Third Stage 
Core problem survival management of growth managerial control 
and allocation of 
resources 
Central Function Fusion of diverse Fission of general Fusion of independent 
talents and pur- authority into units into an inde- 
poses into a uni--ý7., _- specialised functions pendent union of fied company companies 
Control System Personal (ingide) Cost centres and Profit centres and 
Survival'Un policy formulation abstract performance 
market place (inside); growth criteria (inside); 
(outside) potential (outside) capital expansion 
potential (outside) 
Reward and Ownership, Salary, opportunities Salary, performance 
motivation memberbhip in and problems of growth bonus, stock options, 
the family peer prestige 
management style Individualistic; Integrating specialists Integrating 
direct management collaborative manage- generalists; collec- 
ment tive management 
Organisation: 
Structure Informal Functional Division 
specialists organisations 
Primary Task Direct super- Managing specialised Managing generalist 
vision of managers managers 
employees 
Levels of Two At least three At least four 
Management 
Source: Barnes and Herson (1976) 
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1. The ability and personality of its top management 
2. The company's production technology 
3. The nature of its market 
4. The legal statfis of the firm -a proprietorship, partnership or 
corporation. 
Urrea 
(153) in a stuýy of evolution and development of the family 
firms concludes "The most important determinants for the continuity and 
survival of the family firms were the delegation of authority and the issue 
of management succession". 
Although these authors have not referred specifically to the declining 
phase of companies and its process, they agree that there are difficulties 
at the development and evolution stage due to the fact that growth is more 
than enlargement. The firm changes its proportions as well as its overall 
dimensions and moves to the point where management must be able to switch 
a rut-oriented company to a change-oriented one through an analytical 
and systematic investigation of the details, with self-confidence and 
imagination in creating viable systems and strategies. Otherwise the 
company finds itself in a position where the author calls "the beginning 
of the end" or the starting point of the failure path. 
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5.9 Small Businesses 
Some small businesses get killed, other die through sheer mismanagement, 
but the fact remains that a good many small firms die prematurely or 
unnecessarily. The small business sector, according to the Bolton Ccmmitteels 
estimate( 27) employ 31% of all employees and its output is one-4; fifth of 
GNP - facts which make it clear that small firm operation forms a very 
important part of the eaonomy. In its Conclusions, the Committee stressed 
that the small firm is in many ways a highly efficient organism, better 
adapted to exploiting certain kinds of economic opportunity than larger 
units, and with special advantages of intense commitment of the owneri 
manager. Walsh believes that the theoretical potential of small businesses 
for growth is in many cases not being realised. There are three main 
reasons for preferring to remain small - lack of managerial capacity, 
inadequate rewards and loss of the personal . touch. 
(33) 
Rosemary Brown quotes that "the fact is that over the last two decades, 
the small business sector, has been in-consistent decline. This is not a 
uniquely British phenomenon; the same has been happening in Germany, France, 
Japan and North America". 
The law of today's industrial jungle is the survivAl of-the biggest. 
Hypermarkets are replacing supermarkets, the multinationals are in 
full strength, and the current understýnding of economies of scale implies 
international co-operation. Small should not be conftised with mini. 
The definition of a small firm, as given by the Bolton Report, is in 
general terms one that employs le ss than 200 people, although there are 
various qualifications. The three characteristics that Bolton sees as 
. 
typical of the small firms are: 
1. It is managed by its owner or part-owners in*a personalised way. 
2. It has a relatively small share of the total market. 
,I 
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3. It is independent, in that it does not form part of a larger enterprise 
and itw owner-manager is. free from outside control in taking their 
principal decisions. 
Failure in small businesses 
Thý threat of failure confronts many small business enterprises, 
particularly those that are*newcomers. The high mortality rate of young 
companies indicates that small firTas are the primary victims. 
As was stated in Chapter Three, the author found that 28.8% of all 
failures in manufacturing industry in England and Wales occur in the first 
three years and 47.3% in the f irst five years of their life. The figures 
for America are nearly the same. Dun and Bradstreet statistics of business 
failure shows that 53.2% of companies. were 5 years, ot less, old. Broom 
Ct al quote that in view of the obviously limited resources and lack of 
financial stability on the part of many small firms, it seems probable that 
small business mortality is 'greater than big business mortality; over 78% - 
of the failures occurred in firms having less than $100,000 in liabilities. 
The most significant causes of small business failure were given as: 
lack of skill in management, competition, lack of capital, location, premature 
expansion. They also believe that. the following types of changes are 
symptoms of impending business failure: 
1. Deterioration of working capital position 
2. Declining sales 
3. Declining profits (or increasing losses) 
4. Progressively higher debt ratios. 
(139) 
spooner who chaired a discussion of a teamýof specialists to 
find the real answers to small company problems, summarises their findings 
as follows: 
a. Management Myopia: This is one of the biggest threats to the small firms 
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and-'. one of the biggest obstacles to overcome in planning a survival programme. 
This is partly a belief that insolvency, like iccidental death, is something 
that happens to the other chap, and partly a refusal to accept that past 
successes may not provide a formula for surviving the rough-and-tumble of 
business today. 
b. Too much reliance on flexibility: The second point emerged is that 
because a small business relies so much on flexibility - its ability to 
react facter than big companies - corporate planning of any kind is 
considered as a dangerous constraint; the result being that too little 
attention is given to planning and anticipation of areas to which they 
will be unable to meet. 
c. Cash and profit: Any survival plan has to be 'conceived in two parts: 
short-term and long-term. The first is concerned with cash, the second with 
profit. Weaknesses in this area are frequently caused by the small firm's 
difficulty in recruiting (let alone retaining) someone with sufficient 
expertise to take the role if not the name of finance director. 
d. Gearing problems: Many small firms often run into trouble because they 
under-estimate what inflation has done to their demand for working capital. 
e. Control: Small firms are traditionallty anti-planning because they 
fear that committing themselves to a specific course of action will cramp 
their style. The choice of controls is largely governed by the nature of 
the business. 
Bolton's comment on small firms is that the economic climate in which 
they are operating, with high inflation causing severe cash shortage, 
higher taxation and the increased burden of government 16'gislation, combined 
with poor trading conditions has led to a record rate of bankruptcies and 
receiverships among small firms. The obvious limits on resources financial 
and human, the high costs of up-to-date'technology, and the increasing rate 
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of product and service obsolescence make the management of smaller businesses 
far more difficult than the management of giants. 
5.10 Rolls Royce Ltd 
5.10.1 Background 
Although Rolls Royce was incorporated on the 15th March 1906, with 
an authorised share capital of E60,000 the foundations had already been laid 
in Spring 1904 when the Hon. CS Rolls travelled to Manchester to meet 
Henry Royce. I\ 
In the few years before the outbreak of the First World War, the 
Rolls Royce Silver Ghost became established as a high quality car. Shortly 
after the outbreak of war in 1914 Henry Royce began to design his first 
aero-engine as a private venture, having failed to persuade his fellow 
directors to enter the field of aviation. After 1918, the production of 
this engine continued on a reduced scale. 
In 1931, the Bqntley Motor Car Company which was in financial 
difficulties was acquired by Rolls Royce. In 1938, Rolls Royce acquired 
Park, Waid and Company, a firm of coachbuilders. In 1943, the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production asked Rolls Royce to take over from the Rover Company 
Ltd the control, as manager's and agents of this Ministry, of a shadow 
factory at Barnoldswick where the development of the Whittle W2B engine 
was taking place. At the end of the Second World War the company was 
developing its own design of jet engines. 
In the years from 1951 to 1966 Rolls Royce developed-and put into 
service turboprop and turbojet engines for both military and civil purposes. 
In 1957 Sentinel (Shrewsbury) Ltd was acquired to enlarge the capacity 
for the production of oil engines. Another coachbuilder, 11 J Mulliher, was 
acquired by Rolls Royce in 1959. 
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Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd was another acquisition in 1966; this 
company at that time was developing the Pegasus engine for the Harrier 
aircraft and jointly with SNECMA (a French aero-engine manufacturer), the 
Olympus 593 for the Concorde. 
Extension of activitiei and entering into the nuclear engineering 
field through 'Rolls Royce and Associates Ltd', the manufacture of rocket 
motors and use of computers for management purp6ses, are other stages of 
the company's history. I 
A significant stage of Rolls Royce history started in March 1968 
when a contract was signed with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for 
the construction and delivery by Rolls Royce of an advanced technology 
engine designated the RB211-22. The contractial obligations entered into 
by Rolls Royce were formidable. The RB211-22 was the largest engine that 
Rolls Royce had ever undertaken. Ultimately it was expected to develop 
some 42,000 lb thrust, which may be compared with the 21,800 lb thrust 
developed by Conway, the largest Rolls Royce engine which had as yet 
entered service. 
This contract was greeted with enthusiasm throughout the country, 
and certainly this major breakthrough into the US market, for such it was, 
represented one of the largest single export orders ever obtained by a 
UK concern. 
These events were accompanied by a financial growth of the company 
to a point where in 'The Times 500' of 1969/70 Rolls Royce was listed as 
the 22nd largest industrial company in the UK. However, the continued 
devblopments of civil aircraft engines withoutnsubstantial supporting 
military contracts placed a severe strAin on the financial resources of 
the company. 
Partnership with a US company, the Allison Division of General Motoes 
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Corporation and collaboration with other European aero-engine manufacturers 
are amongst other different projects undertaken by Rolls Royce. 
By 1970 technological difficulties experiencdd with the RB211 
development programme were causing severe financial problems and a trading 
loss for the half year to June 1970 resulted. The ever-increasing financial 
requirements for the completion of RB211 which had reached to more than 
E100 million and delay or postponement of tha project put the company and 
its advisers into a situation to conclude reluctantly that it could not 
properly continue, and finally on 4 February 1971 Rolls Royce appointed a 
Receiver. 
The White Paper "Rolls Royce Ltd and the RB211 Aero Engine" records: 
"Rolls Royce's liabilities were large, hurriedly estimated, in part 
unquantified and unquantifiable, No great reliance could be placed 6n- 
the company's estimates which had been prepared hurriedly. In the end 
Ministers considered that whether the RB211 project was stopped or continued, 
it would not. be a responsible use of public funds to assume a very large 
unquantified commitment either by supporting the company with funds which 
it had no prospect of repaying or by the Government taking the company 
over and thereby making itself responsible for all the company's debts and 
obligationsill, 
on 4 February 1971, Rolls Royce was clearly insolvent because: 
a. It was unable to pay its debts as they fell due. 
b. The future cash requirements were E107 million in excess of the E70 
million-borrowing facilities normally available to it. 
c. The loeses of resources committed to the RB211-22 project, combined 
with the liability for damages which might arise in connection with' 
the delay in delivery of the engine, were likely to exceed the net 
tangible assets of the company. 
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This was the end of the road for Rolls Royce, the company which 
according to inspectors and most of the people was not 
lacking in skilled 
engineers, it was not lacking in aero-engine experience, it was not lacking 
in advice from outside advisers and consultants of the highest repute, it 
was not even lacking the confidence of its bankers and Her Majesty's 
Government. Rolls Royce was never short of brainpower, or even 
individually competent managers. What it lacked was an adequate, proper 
and right management system needed to combine that brainpower into a strong, 
wealth-creating organisation. ' 
5.10.2 Causes and Symptoms of Failure 
Board and Management Structure 
Rolls Royce's Article of Association which was amended in July 1958 
states: 
"That divisional boards be created with effect from 23 July 1958 for 
the management and carrying on the business of the company's Aero Engine 
Division, Motor Car Division, Oil Engine Division, and International! 
Division respectively, and that the same be herebu constituted. 
This amendment permitted the creation of Divisional Boards. The 
International Division was disbanded in 1964 *ith its activities merged 
with,: those of manufacturing divisions and in part became the responsibility 
of the company Commercial Director. 
Following the acquisition of Bristol Siddeley its activites were 
reorgardsedtAnto six divisions. In September 1967 according to the 
reviewed regulations, the divisional boards were to accept basic 
responsibility for the management, capital expenditure and financial 
results of those minor subsidiary-and associated companies which were 
primarily concerned with the business of that division. 
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The divisional boards were responsible to the main board through 
the divisional managing director. In some cases members of the main board 
were members of a divisional board, in other cases a main board director 
was responsible for affairs of a division. 
The composition of the board was in numerical terms between 14 and 16 
directors during the petiod 1967-71, of these, 10 were full': time executive 
and the rest non-executive directors. 
"In terms of the background, two of them were finance men as financial 
directors and the other eight directors were basically engineers by training 
and experience from service with Rolls Royce. The non-executive directors 
were bankers or distinctive businessmen". 
The working of Derby Engine Division (DED) was of particular importance. 
Its board was dominated by engineers. The information placed before it took 
the pattern of the main board papers. This board, according to the Official 
Report, was not "the effective body through which the real management processes 
of the division were carried out. Several witnesses have testified to, the 
effect that as a management forum for decision taking, it was ineffective 
which was partly due to the unwieldy size of the board - in 1969 it numbered 
22 members of whom only one was not an engineer 
In truth, management of the division rested primarily with Sir 
David Huddie, its managing director. For this reason it suffered from the 
laclý of a strong helmsman when Sir David found that the RB211 project 
required him to be out of the UK, and when his physical well-being began 
. 
to deteriorate. ý' 
The organisational structure consisted of five autonomous functional 
departments. Just as the main board eventually saw. the value of a 
finance committee, so did DED and in May 1970 a divisional finance committee 
was formed. 
Finally in the management structure of Rolls Royce, it was perhaps 
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unfortunate that the chairman and chief executive functions were in the 
hands of one man. The weaknesses of management structure-and board can be 
summarised as: 
1. Unbalanced board with a domination of engineers. 
2. Ineffective diHsional structure and organisation. 
3. Poor communication and information system, due to lack of proper 
considerition to different aTeas. 
4. Too mush authority and reliance on one man. 
5. Poor value system for selection of board members. 
Risk and Uncertainty Surrounding the Industry 
one of the main points made in the Plowden report, which considered 
the development of the aircraft industry, is that: "Aircraft manufacture 
has always been, and is likely to remain, an uncertain business. It will 
never be possible to make a simple and straightforward plan and by pursuing 
it doggedly, guarantee success. " 
The risk associated with aero-engine-manufacture in general and Rolls 
Royce in particular can be broadly categorised as: 
a. Production risks 
b. Research and development risks 
c. Dependence on one large buyer risk (dependence on government) 
d. Market risks 
e. Industry risk 
The most significant problem is that of uncertainty or unpredictability 
in respect of future technological developments, their feasibility, the 
difficulties to be overcome and the associated costs. The difficulties are 
compounded according to the degree of advance beyond proven technology. 
The more a project involves entering the higher reaches of unproven 
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technology, the more the difficulties are multiplied. To take work of this 
nature to a successful outcome should normally be undertaken only by a 
company on terms where the cost exposure of th3t company is appropriately 
limited or underwritten e. g. on a 'cost plus' development contract basis. 
The undertaking of projects in Rolls Royce, especially the RB211, when 
the company was already in an uncertain financial situation, was based on 
basically fixed price terms with limited launching aid from Her Majesty's 
Government. This placed the company at risk or as official reports say, 
"An open-ended commitment which was a speculation rather than ordinary 
commercial risk". other reason of speculation of this project is when 
investment. in the project is relatively high in-relation to the net worth 
of the company, and dependence on its success vital. 
"Another problem for Rolls Royce management was the problems. Of 
uncertainty and unpredictability in relation to future devdlopment turnover 
and work 10ad". 
Also there was a risk due -to overspending and inef f icient use of 
resources of other projects if there was a delay in- the completion of 
the project. 
Einallyl, the boai! d as a whole did not appreciate f'ully the ext . ent of 
the risks involved and failed to produce the objective analysis of the 
risks involved. They accepted the rash commitment of a risky and unqertain 
investment. 
The Chairman of Rolls Royce accepts in an interview with inspectors 
that the board did not sufficiently examine at the time neither the risks 
nor the consequences which would arise should the company's projections turn 
out to be wrong. 
There is no': doubt that few businesses are wholly without risk, but 
the size of the risk and the consequences of failure should always be 
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adequately considered before an entire business is jeopardised, but these 
were not adequately probed. The whole structure of. the company was 
hazarded on one contract. It is not always wrong for a business to put 
all its eggs in one basket, hor is it always wrong for a business to 
undertake a speculative project, but Rolls Royce combined these two and 
invited disaster. 
I occasional Change of Accounting Policy Concerning the Treatment of 
Research and Development Expenditure 
By altering the treatment of the R&D expenditure and acceptance of 
new accounting presentation, Rolls Royce intended to show profits which 
would justify continuing their dividend distribution. As the inspectors 
quote, "This was of vital importance, because any redtiction in their profits 
or dividend meant immediate restriction of their ability to broaden their 
business in any way which required either raising fresh money or the 
acquisition of some other business". 
The effect of these accounting policies on the reported profit 
for the nine years to 1969 compared with those which would have been 
reported had the company continued to write off as incurred all Research 
and Development expenditure is shown in the following Table. 
Profit (loss) 
after taxation ' 
Dividend Transfer 
retained 
to (from) 
profit 
As reported After writing off As reported After 
R&D as incurred writing off 
EM EM EM R&D 
1961 2.5 (1.7) 1 1.5 (2.7) 
1962 1.7 o. 6 o. 7 1.0 (0.1) 
1963 4. o 5.4 1.2 2.8 4.2 
1964 3.6 4.7 1.5 2.1 3.2 
1965 4.5 4.4 1.6 2.9 2.8 
1966 5.3 5.3 3.7 1.6 1.6 
1967 7.5 5.2 6.1 1.4 (0.9) 
1968 8.8 4.6 7.3 1.5 (2.7) 
*1969 4.3 2. o 4. o 0.3 (2.0) 
*Before special provision Ell million 
* 
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Dependence on'Borrowed'Money 
The proportion of bRrrowed money by Rolls Royce in different years 
is set out in the following Table: 
Year 
1961 
126a 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
% Financed by 
Borrowed Money 
46 
51 
41 
33 
38 
49 
50 
44 
45 
This Table clearly indicates the dependency of Rolls Royce on 
borrowed money to financ& its business. 
Defects in Financial Control 
The inspectors' report on financial control indicates that "the 
machinery of financial control in the company had a good many defects. 
The personalities on the financial side were out-gunned and out-numbered 
by those on the engineering side". 
The evident deficiencies in financial control of the company were: 
a. Lack of any standard form of submitting reports 
b. Lack of financial. control organisation. The clear sign was, the diverse 
manner in which different division's reported to the main board and the 
company financial director. 
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c. Inadequate financial controller's staff 
d. Poor presentation of variances in standard costing sense. Variances were 
never expressed in percentage terms to hindsight their significance. 
The narrative explanations of adverse and unsatisfactory figures 
were minimal and did not explain the root causes. 
e. Voluminous, out of date and inconsistent information to the board. 
f. Lack of board's consideration of financial infonuation. The financial 
information was optional rather than compulsory reading add the board's 
consideration of this information occupied vert little of its time. ' 
g. Poor forecasts. 
h. Different costing systems 
k. Poor product profit plans. 
Although the inspectors came to the conclusion that at the end of 
the day, however, the appointment of a receiver was not caused by a defective 
system of accounting, reporting or forecasting, it should bear in mind that 
failure is not a sudden process, and as it takes time to happen, therefore 
each of the defects could have had some contribution to the final collapse 
of the company. .. 
Financiil Causes 
The contract with Lockheed provided that for engines delivered 
up to 31 December 1971 there was to be a specified fixed pHce, therefore 
Rolls Royce was to carry the risk of cost and wage inflation in that period. 
Underestimation and Optimistic Forecasts based on Previous Success 
Too much confidence on estimates of previous pvojects, especially 
SPEY, which turned out to be so reliable was a source of misplaced accuracy. 
As one of the main board members says, "We launched the SPEY engine in about 
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1962 with its various marks in subsequent years and we forecast that the 
launching cost of that engine would be E30 million approximately. When the 
end of the day came, we had spent E30 million approximately. It was quite 
remarkable. The RB211 is what we call a three-shaft engine-Up to the stage 
when it was abandoned, everything about that engine had been absolutely right; 
it undoubtedly gave a great deal of overconfidence". 
The reliable estimates of SPEY was in part due to the experience 
'gained in the Conway,, and Medway engines, but in the case of the RB211 
comparable experience was: not available, and it was not therefore reasonable 
to expect the same stabdard of reliability in the estimates. 
The larger the proposed technological steps, the larger the probability 
of overspend and the further forward projections are made, the less reliable 
they become. 
_TDO-Ambitious 
Project 
The design of the RB211-22 engine incorporated major advances beyond 
the company's existing technological frontiers. The step forward in 
technology that Rolls Royce was proposing to take was too big. 
There was too much enthusiasm and ambition without proper consideration 
of risks, uncertainties and market and partly a gap between marketing and 
production. Commitment to develop, produce and deliver the RB211 project 
to a fixed time scale and at a basicallý fixed price, was another contribut6ry: 
factor in delay, increasing difficulties and financial problems of the company. 
Poor Acquisition 
Lack of proper study of acquisition proposals in the case of Bristol 
Siddeley, especially the financial figures, was a weakness. Although this 
acquisition and the burdens it imposed on Rolls Royce were not, according 
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to many people. Causative of later crash, nevertheless this was something 
of a ', shot-gun wedding' and did nothing to strengthen Rolls Royce. 
The author is of the opinion that as the failure is a long tem 
process and it happens gradually, therefore one must accept the financial 
problems raised by the acquisition and its effect on borrowing money and 
future decisions that the company took. 
Inadequate Attention to Other Works and Projects 
Too much attention to a big project always brings less consideration 
of previous or other projects in progress, which, in some cases, can give 
more support or help to the development of the big project. For instance, 
the continuance of the RB178 demonstrator programme, which was terminated 
for mainly financial reasons, would have helped considerably with the 
development of the RB211 engine. This is due to the weaknesses of project 
management and the effect of undertaking an ambitious project at a time 
when the prestige and survival of a company is at stake. The author believes 
this is a symptom rather than a cause. 
Technical Problems 
Four major technical problems were: 
1. The RB211-22 was the first civil project to be undertaken after the 
re-organisation of the engineering department and the creation of 
project groups, which did not allocate the invaluable experience of 
senior design personnel to the RB211, especially in the early, critical 
stage of the design. 
2. Too much involvement ýmd commitment of different divisions, when Rolls 
Royce was taking the Lockheed contract. 
3. Inexperienced and insufficient staff to cope with the sudden influx 
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of work,. for example in the development of the RB211-22. 
The death of a dynamic leader and brilliant engineer (Mr A Lombard) in 
July 1967. 
CItitirman s7 Faigeý* Statements. 
In the Chairman's Statement of 22 June 1970, shareholders had been 
told that the board was satisfied that the-company had sufficient working 
capital, though estimates by -then available forecast showed a subspantial 
cash shortage. The word -'satisfied' was in the circumstances a misleading 
and unfortunate one.. 
5.10.3 Summary of Causes of-Rolls Royce's Failure 
1. Too much dependence on a single c ustomer and project. 
2. An inadeqt! ate management information system. 
3. Too much reliance on previous succqss and ability 
4. Lack of appreciation of risks and uncertainty involved in industry 
and undertaking an ambitious project. 
5. Weak board of directors with a-poor composition of balanced skills 
and management ability. 
6. The gap between marketing and production. 
7. Over-ýrunning of cost and time due to poor estimation. 
8. Lack of standard accounting systems. 
9. Ineffective divisional boards (DEB) 
10. Failure in investment strategy, i. e. the changing pattern of activities 
from military and government sector to private contracts. 
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5.10.4 Summary of'Symptoms 
1. Voluminous reports to the board. ' 
2. Lack of consideration of financial reports sent to the board 
3. Out of date information; accounting manipulation 
4. Too much dependence on borrowed money (gearing) 
5. Too much reliance on a single project and customer 
6. Technical problems and stoppages of projects. 
7. Poor estimates and forecasts 
8. Increasing difficulties in changing the designs 
9. Increasing Costs'of development stage 
10. Financial problems, liquidity difficulties 
11. Too much dependence on the engineering side 
12. Lack of adequate finance personnel 
13. Unbalanced attention to different projects 
14. Lack of direction by board 
15. Chief executive and chairman responsibility for one man 
16. Poor comm6nidation 
17. Overspending 
18. Ratio of 
Actual cost coo high. Initial Estimates 
19. Delays in project completion date and delivery of engines 
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5; 11 mitchell Construction 
5.11.1 Background 
Mitchell Construction was one of the construction industry's few 
glamour shares, much favoured by experts for its seeming financial acumen. 
(131) 
quotes: "This is a story of determination, company loyal* As Simmonds ty, 
competitive edge and seAsible accounting. 'Its fall is a sobering illustration 
of how even such qualities as these can go badly awry. * It is the abrupt 
demise of a vigorous and successful E40 million a year company". 
The company had until January 1973 afi almost unimpeachable growth 
record. At the time of crash it left behind unffilfilled home-baded contracts 
worth over E24 million. Mitchellhad plenty of work overseas with activities 
in the Caribbean, South Africa, Poutugal, Canada, Holland and Germany. At 
one time it held the world hard rock tunnelling record. 
it. was on January 31 1973 that the Chairman and founder of the company 
conceded that the position of the company had become untenable and asked for 
a receiver to be brought in. The debts of the Mitchell Construction Kinnear 
Moodie Group at the time have been put at some E6.5 million. The losses sprang 
from two distinct quarters, the first was the losses incurred and continuing 
on the group's largest and most spectaaular. contract of all - the Kariba 
Power Station in Zambia, work on which started in 1971. The second was 
due to delayed payments to the company on some 20 UK contracts iP; 'the. -. -- 
, Iýublic sector. 
5.11.2 Causes'and Sympt6mg 
1. Lack of proper*: risk analysis 
There-was no appre6iation of risks associated with a spectacular project 
such as the Kariba Power Station. This always happens when a company is 
already in trouble and when they went to buttress them the only alternative 
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left (and in reality the worst) is a big and spectacular contract or project 
which is lacking a proper study of resources available, feasibility and 
risks and uncertainties involved. 
In 1970 this mistake committed Mitchell Construction, already in 
some trouble, 'to the power station contract. This happened when the company 
decided to go alone after its joint tenderer Burton Construction failed 
to obtain the necessary bond as guarantee. This decision to go alone was 
to invite more risk and earlier disaster. 
Another aspect of the risk associated was stated indirectly in the 
1969 Chairman's annual report where it says that "the Zambian company was 
being closed down because of the dffect of 'political tensions on British 
companies". 
Lack of experience of executing large isolated contracts in Africa 
was a gamble and another-risk which was not adequately appreciated. 
Finally, a mas6ive differential in company's tender of Ell million 
plus with other bidder which was nearly E2 millioný while the company did 
not have skill or experience advantage. 
External Factors 
Rock falls in 1970 killed two men and brought part of the site to a 
standstill, and the employer failed to provide access roads and accommodation. 
Also the site of the underground machine hall was moved by the designers 
which again caused disruption. 
Poor Relations with Consulting Engineers 
Although the company had maintained good relations with the old 
Ministry of Buildings, its relations with consulting' engineers which were 
vital links in the chain, were hostile. 
Delayed Payments 
Mitchell Construction's emphasis on public projects and the public 
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sector was not successful. There was a time when the company did have a 
staggering figure of Ell million outstanding on some 20 UK contracts for 
public and government authorities. Delayed payments was a prevalent problem 
in the public sector. 
It is of considerable importance to know that, as Simmonds(131) wri'tes, 
"construction is one of a minority group of industries in which work is paid 
for in instalments. Contractors are normally paid monthly on the basis of 
a measurement of the work completed, less certain retentions. In this way 
working capital can be kept to a'minimum - an important factor contributing 
to the high birth rate and rapid early growth of construction companies. 
If payments are inadequate or delayed for any reason, the cost of financing 
a contract can easily be increased by many times over the amount allowed for, 
creating liquidity problems. 
" This is not a cause, but a sign of bad-financial 
policy and control in Mitchell Construction, which was a contributory factor 
to the financial difficulties and collapse of the company. This is further evident 
when one*considers the three categories of payment to contractors in 
construction and civil engineering, which are: * 
1. Interim payments as the work proceeds- 
2. Final payments for the contracted work 
3. Additional payment on account of variations. 
Value System 
"Annual reports after annual reports listed new appointment but the 
sad result was that towards the end there was a chronic lack of e: qerienced 
site staff, because the encouraged young managers had all been promoted ti 
higher jobs which they were not yet fully equipped to do". 
There was a complete lack of a system for promotion and successionI 
I 
Even if there were systems and procedures, their use was wrong. As a 
condequence, the top managers were pulled downwards into minor affairs, 
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dealing with clients on site, where they had no business to do. 
The sign of a poor value system is the lack of a balanced team. 
"The group was being run less by managers than-by technologists and 
eng .n sit. 
Centralisation (Lack of Identity) 
The organisational structure of the group which was based on 
centralisation, had given considerable agitation to move Mitchell Construction 
away from group-headquarters in order to give it a separate identity and 
leave the group organisation, but unfortunately the construction company 
was such an integral part of the group organisation at Peterborough 
that to rem6ve it would have left a completely unviable entity. 
There were suggestions, had Mitchell disentangled itself from the 
group and functioned in a similar manner to other operating companies, 
separate liquidation might have been possible. The centralisation was not 
only organisational, it was also geographical. 
The reason for geographical centralisation was to rely on services 
provided from group headquarters at Peterborough. 
Failure to set up a proper organisation meant unaccessibility of 
the company to a, vast market of medium-sized and smaller contracts, dile to 
inability to compete with local firms. The centralised organisation of 
the company with its communications system added t'b the problems and costs 
of managing even other contracts in the region. 
Lack of Strong Sales and Marketing Organisations 
Mitchell Construction nexier found any suitable substitute for hydro- 
electric and CEGB work when these contracts dried up. The sudden slow--down 
in CEGB work in 1968 was a severe blow, since at this time the company was 
lacking a strong sales and marketing organisation to seek new opportunities, 
which was, to a large degree, because of its preference for the competifive 
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rather than negotiated contract. 
I Lack of Response to_Competition and Chanae 
Mitchell followed its individuality, even though the large schemes 
had run out. It did not quickly respond to the changes that its rival firms 
showed, for instance it was slow in the area of property development which 
had proved to be vital for construction companies. 
The group was also much behind its competitors to combine in consortia 
to carry out ventures which they could not manage on their own. The group's 
response to change was not on time and this was one of the major weaknesses 
and causes of collapse. Mitchell Construction which was run by one man in 
nearly 15 years, climbed from an obscure engineering company to an inter-7- 
national group, buts its response to change was poor and too late. 
There was no succession policy in replacing the . founder who withdrew 
from day-to-day running of the company. The top management needed re- 
organisation; the whole organisation needed a complete change. Diversifi- 
dation into more promising fields would have helped the company Oien it 
needed bases of earnings. The changes were not properly recognised, even 
when they were identified there was resistance to them which was due to 
being too proud of earlier success and expectation that, because the business 
had gone so well in the past it would somehow or other continue to do so in 
the future. 
The group failed to develop an organisational structure, led by top 
management, with a framework *ithin which steps necessary to maintain the 
company's viability could have been taken. Without fundamental changes, it 
was only a matter of time before the company failed. 
Finance 
In Mitchell Construction one can briefly describe the financial 
problems as adequate procedures inadequately followed-up. There was too 
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much paperwork for contracts and lack of corrective actions. 
One Man Idea 
The founder of the group had the credit of developing a small company 
into an international group. He had qualities of strength and determination 
but the system in the group was not flexible en6ugh to replace him adequately. 
It is said that part of the groupts trouble was the strength of the 
man who made the c6mpany. Strong 1ýaders, -according to some, opinions, will 
never relinquish control sufficiently to give top managers complete freedom. 
In Mitchell Construction, the leader had to keep-firm hold of the reins 
because nobody else, as was to be expectedg had qualities of srength and, 
determination in the same measure. 
5.11.3 Conclusion 
- The significant causes of collapse in this company were: 
1. Lack of response to change 
2. Value system (management structure) 
3. One man idea 
4. Project failure 
5. Too much dependance on big customers 
6. External Factors 
7. Poor policies 
8. Ineffective organisation 
5.11.4 Symptoms 
1. Losses due to financial difficultues df Kariba project which reached 
E2.5 million and was continuing at a rate of more than E200,000 a month. 
2. Adverse report from Kariba project in the city. 
3. Declining pattern of share prices. The company's share price in 1971 had 
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been sliding continuously and steadily. Publication of 1971 Accounts for 
half-time gave a loss of 50p overnight. 
4. Accounting results. This is-a by-product of decisions taken to cover 
the company's weaknesses and a product of accounting manipulation to 
give a better appearance to the balance sheet. 1971's full year's 
account which showed an amazing profit of El million (taking into account 
the half-yearly account) not only did nothing to remove suspicions, but 
it served to increase,! the fear. 
5. Too many meetings. One of the directors attended 146 meetings in one year. 
6. Depressing atmosphere 
7. New appointments 
8. Reducing numbers of experienced personnel 
Extensive paperwork. i 
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5.12 Roadships Ltd (formerly known as Ralph Hilton Transport Services Ltd). 
5.12.1 Background 
The stoVy of this company starts *ith a quick review of its founderls 
background, who was born in 1923 and in 1954 he bought a lorry and drove 
this for profit while he was an assistant. in his father's public house. 
In 1956 he purchased a petrbl filling station and workshop and gradually 
built up a small fleet of lorries. By 1959 he acqdired depots in Clapham, 
Greenwich and Vauxhall and his fleet rose to 49 vehicles. 
By this time the turnover of the business was E69,000. Hilton 
accepted his then auditors to form a limited liquidity company which was 
duly formed but the real weakness and threat started from this point, as 
he continued to run the business on the same lines as if he was the sole 
proprietor of his firm.. From 1961 the expansion of the company was by 
means of acquiring other small transport businesses. By the end of 1968 
the vehicle fleet had risen to 400 vehicles and the turnover for the first 
time exceeded El million with activities of shipping and forwarding, a 
Customs & Excise approved warehouse, the manufacture of tarpaulins, insurance, 
security and road transport. 
During 1968-1970 Hilton Transport Services Ltd (HTS) acquired companies 
of larger size with the total investment of E568,000. The important point 
was that none of these businesses was particularly profitable at the time of 
acquisition. The object was to acquire transport depots with a sufficient 
nucleus of existing customers to make possible an expansion of the transport 
business out of London. In these two years HTS built up its regional 
transport services with trade concentrated 6n the short and medium hauls. 
William Joy Ltd and W Reeves & Sons Ltd were of-particular interest to-, 
the acquisitions of the company. During 1969-70 the company achieved a 
substantial growth in its warehousing and distribution business. The 
258. 
commitment of capital forced the company to go public when the prospect 
of a successful-flotation was not as bright as'might have 
been desired. 
The common feature of most of the early acquisitions was unpTofitabilityp 
unsued tax losses and all were acquired for cash. In many cases goodwill 
had been over-valued. Ralph Hilton Transport Services Ltd (HTS) was a 
publicly quoted company. Hilton Transport Services changed its name on 
the 16th September 1974 to Roadshipp Ltd and on the 6th June 1975 Roadships 
was placed in the hands of a receiver and manaýer. 
5.12.2 Causes and Symptoms 
1. Board of Directors 
During 1962 to 1967 the company was run in all respects ad Hilton's 
firm. Between 1967 and November 1970 the board never functioned as such 
and that, window dressing apart, the company continued to be run as a 
proprietary firm. Thete was conflict between Hilton and others relating 
to the frequency of board meetings. Every lunchtime a number of directors 
and employees assembled in the directors' canteen. 
There were signs of an autocracy in the board and company, as one of 
the directors describes the atmosphere as "like Gestapo headquarters", we 
find a trifle hyperbolic but we do accept that if any director or employee 
had made a determined effort to stand yp to him, his life would have been 
nasty, brutish and short. 
The Chairman and Managing Director post-was held by one man which does 
not seem correct in a public company. 
Inability of the board was also the major reason to decide to be 
floated as a public company. 
Management Problems 
The Hilton Transport Ltd management problems caused by many factors, "but 
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mainly it was brought about bq the autocrat chairman with a rough and tough 
business nature". 
Inexpert'and inexperienced management of the warehousing sector clearly 
contributed to the losses, as inspectors point out "There was reckless and 
ill-thought programme of expansion without a proper management information, 
costings and control'system". The autocracy did not permit a balanced or 
participative board in the company. He ignored the recommendations-by other 
directors; "he had divested himself of real advice at board level and after 
su=aer 1970, he was so misled about the true trading performance of the 
company. He was never adequately advised of the chaos in the accounts 
d epartment. The personal style of management wa& wrong. 13- 
Lack of Proper Acquisition Policy and Strategy 
There were unjustified acquisitions and -mergers 
based on the claims 
that management would be strengthened by the merger. There were also 
unjustified claims that the merger would result in combined financial 
resources which would put the new group in a stronger position to consolidate 
for further expansion. The acquisition of the companies from British Oxygen 
Co. Ltd was a seiious mistake.. The merger with J&H was also a serious 
mistake with serious adverse consequences. The main reasons for poor 
acquisitions and mergers were: 
a. Lack of clear strategy 
b. Irresponsibility of the board 
C. Autocracy of the chairman 
d. Lack of working capital and acquisitions with borrowed money. 
e. Lack of management ability. 
f. Irresponsibility of finance company. 
g. Lack of skill 
_and 
care. 
The company was finally trapped by a continuing depression in the industry, 
whilst committed to a very substantial expansion programme. 
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Cash Problems 
- Inadequate cash planning has contributed to the serious financial 
position of the company. By February 1972 the company was faced with the 
serious problems of under-capitalisation of its equipment. 'The cash crisis 
was briefly caused by: 
a. Costly expansions and over-expansions 
b. Capital spending 
C. Lack of control over business 
d. Profit shortfall 
e. Downturn in transport buýiness 
f. Unprofitable enterprises 
g. Misfeasance 
Misleading Reports, 
_ 
Accounts and Statements 
The results of Hilton Transport Services for the half-year to 31 January 
1971 announced with E244,000 profit before taxation were considerably 
overstated, the overstatement being not much less than E106,000. This 
was due to fraud and lack of skill and care of the company accountant, the 
state of the accounts department and lack of board responsibility. Also, 
the results of HTS to 31 July 1971 as E500,000 were overstated, in the 
region of E299,000. The circular to shareholders relating to Bain and 
Hodge was misleading. Whilst the company did not have a sufficient working 
capital, the circular claimed that the company could meet existing 
requirements. Another circular to sharehIlders dated 16 June 1972 was 
misleading in stating unjustifiable optimistic forecast of company's trading 
profit. 
The Chairman's report for the year ended 29th July 1972 was misleading 
with unjustifiable optimistic forecast of the company's trading position. 
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The major factors in misleading statements were: 
a. Lack of an able and responsible board 
b. Poor management and information system 
c. Lack of skill and care 
d. Errors of judgement 
e. The Chairman's autocracy and the pressure he put upon others* 
f. Fraud. 
Poor Communication 
There was a shortcoming in information required by the board to enable 
the formulation of policies. The information system and cmtrol in this 
company was in deteriorating state due to management style, lack of ability 
of the board and autocracy. Even the accounts department, which had never 
been adequate, dramatically deteriorated after July 1971. The most significant 
sign of poor corm unication was the disarray in accounts and other departments, 
which led to misleadiýg reports, erroes and poor acquisition decisions. 
The board did not take any effective steps to ensure that it was supplied 
with detailed financial and management information on a regular basis. 
1 
5.12.3 Conclusion 
According to official report by Benet Alan Hytmer, QC and Ian Alexander 
Noble Irvine, FCA, the collapse of Hilton Transport Services Ltd resulting 
in the appointment of a Receiver and Manager on 6th June 1975, was 
ultimately due to "weaknesses in the company whichixisted at the date of 
flotation and which, not having been remedied by the time of the merger with 
J&H rendered the collapse of HTS inevitable; " 
If we want to classify the most significant causes of I-ITS' failure, 
the following order can provide a reasonable picture. 
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1. Lack of proper study before going public. 
2. Lack of a formal and clear expansion strategy 
3. The ineffective board with an autocrat on top 
4. Lack of appreciation of duties and responsibilities 6f a public 
company by directors 
5. Lack of an effective information and control system. 
6. Poor management structure and system 
7. Inadequate management accounting system 
f 
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5.13 The Vehicle and General Inýurance Company'Limited 
5.13.1 Background 
Vehicle and'Ceneral, which is referred to as V&C 6r the company in 
this analysis, was incorporated on 10th September 1923 for the purpose of 
insuring bicycles. By 1959 this business had almost ceased. About this 
time the then controlling shareholders disposed of their shares in V&C 
and it was suggested to Er Reginald Ivor Buur and his accountant adviser, 
that V&G might form the basis of an investment company to be run in 
conjunction with an existing finance company of which they were directors 
and in which they ýad shareholdings - Liverpool and County Discount Co. Ltd. 
, 
On 9th Janiary 1961 V&G held a board meeting and the existing directors, 
secretary and auditors resigned, and on 13th January 1961 new directors 
were appointed. The company now had a pjaid-: up share capital of E50,000 
which, in accordance with the requirements of the Insurance Companies Act, 
1958, enabled it to undertake all insurance business, the new owners and 
management were installed and motor underwriting commenced. 
The premium income of V&G grew rapidly during early and mid 1960s. 
The expansion of the company was based on acquisition and formation bf 
subsidiaries. In 1962 Automobile and General Insurance Co. Ltd (A & G) was 
formed as a wholly owned subsidiary for the purpose of insurance of drivers 
with reasonable no claim records. In the same year Andrew and Booth Ltd 
which was an insurance broking concern was acquired. This acquisition 
followed with acquiring numerous small companies operating in the same field 
to secure a tied market. 
In March 1963 Occidental Life Insurance Company Ltd was registered in 
England and in 1965 this company became a wholly owned subsidiary of V&G 
with changing its name to Life, Casualty and General Insurance Co. Ltd (LCC). 
Another wholly owned subsidiary was formed in March 1974 for the 
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insurance of commercial vehicles as The General and Commercial Motor 
insurance Company Ltd C). 1 k'7 
In 1967, V&G acquired the whole of the issued share capital of 
Metropolitan General Insurance Company Ltd (M $ G). Veral Insurance 
Holding Company (Veral) was incorporated in Canada, in 1967, as a wholly 
owned subsidiary of V&G. In March and June 1968, the Would Auxiliary 
Insurnace Corporation Ltd (World Auxiliary) and the Pioneer Life Assurance 
Company Ltd (Pioneer) were acquired by V&G. 
In addition to the acquisitions named so far, V&G acquired 
substantial although not controlling shareholdings in Liverpool and County 
Discount Company, Vehicle and Ceneral Insurance Company (Australia) Ltd, 
World-Wide Assurance Co. Ltd, with percentage of issued equity capital 
acquired of 49%, 242 and 25% respectively. 
The motor insurance was effective, popular and received a great deal 
of publicity in the press. In 1968 and 1969, V&G in common with most 
British companies operating in the motor insurance market, reported losses 
on motor underwriting accountd after allowing for wholly inadequate 
provisions for outstanding claims. Also, V&G had to face much increased 
competition at the time of severe inflation. 
There was press speculation concerning the viability of V&G after, 
the announcement of reduced interim dividends for the year 1970. In 
February 1971 at a meeting with the Under-Secretary at the Department of 
Trade and Industry in charge of the Insurance and Companies Department, it 
was disclosed that motor claims to the end of 1970 were E2 to E21 million 
larger than expected. This meeting was followed by the decision to restrict 
the conduct ofinsurance business. On', 25th and 26th February 1971 there 
was another meeting between the company and the British Insurance Association 
(BIA) to explore the possibility of a rescue. operation by members of the BIA. 
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And finally, as the inspectors write: 
"Over the weekend of 27th and 28th February, Cooper Brothers & Co., Chartered 
Accountants, on the instruction of the BIA member companies, reviewed the 
financial position of the V&G group. " The result of the report was that 
no rescue operation would be mounted. On the afternoon of lst March 1971 
the directors announced that V&G was ceasing to trade and that petitions 
would be presented to the Court for the winding up of V&G and several of 
its subsidiaries. The significance of V&G to the Btitish motorist is 
borne out by the fact that on the evening of lst March 1971 the BBC flashed 
on the nation's television screens an announcement of-the collapse of V&G. 
Mis-ma agement 
The management and especially the executive directors of the company 
failed in the appreciation of their duties. The board was responsible in 
many areas of mismanagement. 
a. policy clashes 
The disagreement as regards policy between managing director and 
financial director of the company was a sign of mismanagement and failure 
to keep peace between them, which was the responsibility of the chairman, 
caused personality clashes. These two who were responsible for divergence 
of policy tried to build up their own empire within the company and as 
the Chairman of V&G puts it down "a great deal of my activity was keeping 
the balance between these two gentlemen on certain policies and views. " 
b. Management information 
Although the management and directors of V&G had sufficient information 
available to them, throughout 1969 and for most of 1970 the executive 
directors refused to accept financial results shown by management information 
on the grounds that the information available coming from inaccurate data 
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processing in a. Also there was evidence that in 1969 and the 
early part of 1970 the management information was kept confidential. 
c. Dominant Managing Director 
The managing director of V&G was a man of forcefCL1 character and 
with a domineering personality who, with the aid of a generous salary 
policy, commanded the respect and loyalty of most of the senior staff of 
V&G. He liked to keep in touch with his staff at all levels, which 
caused him to bypass senior executives and caused considerable friction 
between directors and the senior executives in the last years of V&C. 
He also placed some restriction on the dissemination of important management 
information. 
Disastrous Investments 
The directors of V&G Australia who were also the directors of V&G UK 
were in a large measure responsible for the ill-advised venture into the 
Australian market. The investment was disposed of at a loss in excess of 
E500,000. V4G Australia committed a fundamental error in carrying out 
its stated policy of selective underwriting. There was misleading 
information about V&G Australia and apart from a comment published in 
the 1965 accounts of V G, the shareholders were given no information at all 
about the progress of VG Australia. 
Data Processing Problems 
Due to lack of experience of data processing staff and lack of he, lp from 
IBM, the stat. e of affairs in 1966 and 1967 was unsati9factory and much of 
the information produced by the data processing department was unreliable. 
Information produced by a computer can only be relied upon provided the 
computer is being supplied with accurate data for processing, but in the 
case of V&G inadequate estimates. of costs of motor claims were put 
on to the computer files during 1968 to 1970. 
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Lack of Appreciation of'Unprofitable Motor Underwriting 
While the offices of V&G had information available which made them 
aware that the provision for outstanding claims was inadequate, they 
allowed the 1969 account to be published with the inclusion of a wholly 
inadequate provision for claims. Also the audit work on the provision 
for outstanding claims at 31st December 1969 was insufficient. The 
results of operation shown by the 1969 accounts of V&G were misleading. 
Lack of Control over the Agents' Accounts System 
During 1967 the system was allowed to operate with totally inadequate 
control on amounts charged to brokers and not paid by them. Because of the 
lack of control on the system, V&G had inadequate information as to which 
brokers owed the various amounts comprising this balance, and thereforeý 
were unable to readily determine the collectibility of the amount outstanding. 
Acquisition of World Auxiliary & Pioneer 
This acquisition, according to the directors of V&G was a major factor 
in the collapse of V&C. This acquisition gave rise to continued losses 
in 1968 and 1969 which was mainly due to inadequate control over this 
acquisition. The damage to V&G flowing from World Auxiliary arose out 
of policies pursued by the V&G management. The substantial losses I 
resulting were beginning to emerge at the end of 1970. 
, Another acquisition which was not supported by any proper reason was 
Pioneer which was a small soundly and conservatively run life company. 
V&G directors decided to acquire the control of this company without 
enough experience and too*much commitments. 
, 
Lack of Board Participation 
There was a clear sign of refusal to take'full account of the views of 
the senior executives in 1969 and to work with them as a team for the 
benefit of-the group. After publication of the 1968 accounts there was 
41 
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a revolution inside V&G general management in order to control and achieve 
things which they desired to do, but it did not take long. 
Misleading Annual Reports and Accounts 
The publication of annual reports and accounts of the V&G for the 
years 1966,1967,1968 and 1969 gAve an increasingly misleading impression 
of the results of operations and of the state of affairs. The profits shown 
in the published account for the yýars 1966 and 1967 were overstated; in 
both years the auditors of V&G failed in their responsibility to make 
adequate enquiries. The interim report for the six months ended 30th June 
1969 was wholly misle: ading and false in material particulars. 
5.13.2 Conclusions 
Vehicle and General Insurance Cbmpany Rtd was the case of an organisation 
which grew in size through many acquisitions, investment and formation of 
subsidiaries but its administration and particularly its accounting practices 
did not keep pace. 
V&G was different from bost of the other motor companies in many ways: 
with its aggressive sales policy it operated through brokers, to whom the 
high rates of co=nission were offered. It set out to attract careful 
private motorists by offering large no-claims bonuses. Expansionwas rapid; 
V&G had a motor premium income (After deducting re-insurance) of 
E307,000 in 1961. This rose to one of E2 million in 1963, to E5 million 
in 1965, E12.8 million in 1967 and E171.1 million in 1969, which means a 
growth of 56-fold in eight years. This growth put strain on the company 
and its organisation, but V&G did not respond properly to the changes. 
Weaknesses. in accounting and reporting were at the heatt of V& Gts 
difficulties. 
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5.14 John Willment Automobile 
5.14.1 Background 
John Willment Automobile (the public) was incorporated and began to 
trade in 1921. The public company was a 75% owned subsidiary of John 
Willment (Properties) Ltd, a private company of which Mr Willment was 
the majority shareholder. 
In 1963, Mr Willment's private. company "Car Sales". began to operate a 
new Ford main dealership at Twickenham. Shortly afterwards, Car Sales 
acquired the share capital of Kingston, a priirate company carrying on a 
similar dealershipat Kingston-upon-Thames. In 1974 Car Sales acquired 
a controlling interest in the public company, then Wood and Lambert Ltd 
which carried on a Ford main dealership at Stamford Hill, and Mr Willment 
was appointed Chairman. As part of the same transaction, Kingston was 
transferred to and became a*wholly owned subsidiary of the public company. 
Up to this time, the public c6pany had been efficiently and 
conservatively managed and it was in a sound financial position when the 
change of control took place, which was followed by a period of rapid 
expansion with borrowed money, which transformed the financial position. 
The chronological events from the date of incorporation in 1921 are: 
23 Feb. 1921 Incorporation of the public company as Wood & Lambert Ltd. 
June 1921 Ford main dealership at Stamford Hill opened. 
Dec. 1953 Commencement of dealings in the shares of the public 
company on the Stock Exchange following its flotation 
as a public company 
March 1954 Incorporation of Car Sales 
Nov. 1959 Incorporation of Properties 
Jan. 1963 Acquisition of Kingston by Car Sales 0 
April 1964 Acquisition of 1.9M shares in the public company by 
Car Sales 
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Conditional contract entered into for the acquisition 
of Kingston by the public company. 
Appointment of Mr Willment as Chairman of the public co. 
Acquisition of Woodfords by the public co. from 
Mr T Wood, retiring chairman of the public company. 
January 1965 Acquisition of Twickenham dealership from Car Sales 
january 1965 Contract entered into for the acquisition of Kent & 
Surrey by Car Sales 
March 1965 Issue of circular to shareholders in connection with 
the acquisition of Kingston 
April 1965 EGM approving the acquisition of Kingston 
November 1965 Name of the public company changed'from Wood & Lambert 
to John Willment Automobiles Ltd 
January 1966 Resignation of Mr Wood as director of the public co. 
Acquisition of Kent & Surrey by the public co. 
March 1967 Issue of circular to shareholders in connection with 
the acquisition of Kent & Surrey. 
November 1967 I'ssue of circular to shareholders in connection with 
the acquisition of various properties by the public cos 
from Car Sales and Mr Willment. 
December 1968 Acquisition by the public co. from properties of an 
option to purchase a 25% interest in Automotive Eng. 
may 1969 Resolution of the board of the public co. to acquire 
the remaining 75% kiterest in Automotive Engineering 
November 1971 Resolution of the board of the public co.. not to 
proceed investment in Automotive Engineering. 
Resdlution of the board of the public co. to acquire 
from Marina development project a. t Cowes IOW. 
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9 October 1972 
10 It 
31 MaY 1973 
27 Sept. 1974 
6 December 1974 
24 December 1974 
Suspension of Stock Exchange quotation 
Resolution of the board of the public co. to acquire 
a 902 interest in a sand and gravel excavation business 
at Havant, Hants. 
Appointment of Inspectors by the Dept of Trade & Industry 
Issuing of circulars to shareholders giving them certain 
additional information about the private and public 
groups. 
Appointment of Receivers of the public co. and 8 of 
its subsidiaries. 
Appointment of a Receiver of Bedhampton 
5.14.2 Causes and Symptoms 
'I. Acquisition Policy 
one of the significant factors in failure of most expanding companies 
is the decisions taken for acquisition and investment which are mainly based 
on unclear objectives and policies of the company and the lack of proper 
appraisal by management. All acquisitions in 1965 by this company were 
carried out without proper regard to financing them .. There was also 
examples of inexcusable delay in issuing circulars to shareholders in 
connection with the acquisition, e. g. Kingston, Kent & Surrey. The mistakes 
with regard to poor investment was evident in the acquisition of Brentford 
Properties. 
2. Confused Transactions 
There are a few transactions in this company which causes problems for 
the liquidity of the company, e. g. the transfer of properties from the 
private group to the public in 1967. The object was to find a remedy for 
the situation brought about by the outflow of liqiiid funds from the public 
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to the private between 1964-1967. The transactions improved the appearance 
of the balance sheet, but did not help liquidity problems., 
3. Lack of Proper Information System 
The informal enquiries with no basic information was the basis of*. bhe 
commitment of public'company to some projects e. g. East Cowes. The board 
was not able to -assess the viability of projects due to the lack of 
proper information systems in the company. There was no data concerning 
the available financial resources or even the information regarding the 
company's expertise, personnel or experience for undertaking a new project. 
This caused wrong and sometimes rash decisions by the boaed, e. g. the 
Havant quarry project was undertaken on the basis of estimated costs by 
guesswork which was grossly inadequate and obsolete. 
Ineffective Control II 
The inspectors quote "Having taken the decision to proceed with the 
project at East Cowes and Havant Quarry, the board of directors ceased to 
I 
have any effective control over expenditure". 
Interest Charges 
By the end of 1973, E1,900,000 of borrowed money was invested by the 
public group in the projects with interest charges that caused financial 
problems. 
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6. Project Failure 
The collapse of John Willment Automobiles Ltd was done, according to 
the conclusion of the inspectors of the Department of Trade and Industry, 
"as a direct consequence of two major attempts at East Cowes (Marina) and 
Havant Quay and the heavy interest charges which have resulted". 
The basic causes of failure'of these projects can be summarised as. 
follows: 
6.1 Major Diversification of Activities I 
The Ford strike in 1971 left Mr Willment disillusioned and pessimistic 
about the prospecti facing the public group's business as Ford main dealers. 
He determined to diversify its-activities into Marina developments which 
was a completely new activity to the company. 
6.2 Lack of Elementary Information at the Board 
It is inescapable that the board's decisions to proceed with the project 
on the information before them was one which no reasonable board of directors 
acting with ordinary competence could have made. The consequences of this 
was collapse. 
6.3 Inadequate Planning and Forecasting 
The original estimates of the costs of the projects were grossly 
inadequate. They were based on informal enquiries made by Mr Willment and 
had no independent validity. There was no accurate forecast or scheduling; 
no forecast of financial requirements. 
6.4 Ineffective Control over Expenditure 
Once the initial decisions had been taken to proceed with the above 
projects, the board of the public compagy ceased to have any effective 
control. This also caused escalating costs with more difficulties. 
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7. Inexperienced board members. 
, "One had been in the motor trade all his working life with no other 
experience, bthers were bystanders.. ' 
8. Too-much ambitions and enthusiasm. 
one of the reasons for taking the decisions to coumit the public 
company to these projects was based on enthusiasm even though he knew it 
was not a viable project. 
9. Overspending, delays and heavy interest charges, with unforeseen 
problems all contributed to the failure of the projects. 
10. Irresponsibility of the board, 
Another example is the failure and neglig6nce of the board to advise 
the Stock Exchange and obtain approval of the shareholders in the case of 
the acquisition of the Twickenham dealership. The Marina site at East Cowes 
and the project at Havant. 
11. Poor cash flow. 
During the period 1964 to 1971 the business of the public group 
generated funds amounting to only some E317,000 and lacked--' self-generating 
cash flow. 
12. Unjustified outflow of liquid'funds from the public to the private 
I 
which was another responsibility of the directors and board. 
13. Poor trading results. 
By, comparison with other Ford main4dealers, the public's growth, turnover 
and return on capital was low, which was mainly due to poor management 
and heavy interest charges. 
14. Lack of reliable management information and budgetary control. 
This was due to(a)failure to maintain up-to-date and reliable accounting 
records, and (b) lack of any full-time financial directors and accounting 
i 
staff, (c) defective financial management structure, (d) irresponsibility 
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of one of the directors, who was a Chartered Accountant; (e) irresponsibility 
of the board in maintaining adequate financial control. 
In summary. 
This is a clear casd of incompetence and mismanagement with some 
indication of dishonesty and irresponsibility. 
15. Lick of appreciation of the duties of directors of a public company 
in the interests of the shareholders. 
16. Inexperienced member as a M. D. of a project the Marina. 
17. Unbalanced and obedient board 
18. Poor economic climate 
19. Strike at Ford 
one of the most significant symptoms of failure in this case was the 
lateness of accounts and reports. Its record of delay in publishing its 
accounts has been appalling: in 7 of the 10 years from 1964 to 1973. 
20. Unclear policies and strategies. 
This was the main basic cause of trouble, objectives of. the company were 
iignored, policies were based on too fast expansion in too short a time and 
strategies based on uncertain, unclear and guesswork forecasts available 
resources and experience. The examples: all acquisition, -*investment and 
commitment to different projects. Poor. expansion and investment money based 
on gearing over borrowing and under-capitalisation. 
21. Irresponsible and incompetent board 
This was clearly-evident from different perspectives. 
a. Delay in publication of the public company's accounts 
b. Intercompany indebtedness 
C. Inadequate, false, misleading and censored information supplied to its 
allareholders. 
d. Board disputes over acquisition decisions. 
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e. Lack of appreciation of duties as a pfiblic company director 
f. Lack of response to problems by the board on time 
g. over-optimistic chairman's reports. 
h. Profit forecasts had been pure fiction and when there was loss it said 
'satisfactory progress'. 
k. Appointment of inexperienced members as M. D. of completely diversified 
activity. 
I 
.4 
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5.15 Handley'Page 
5.15.1 Background 
Handley Page, which was one of the first aircraft manufacturers to be 
formed in Great Britain, had prospered for 50 years from its foundation in 
1909. Undev: the guidance of the founder, Sir Fredri'ýck Handley Page, it 
built a series of military aircraft and civil airliners including the 
World War II Halifax and Victor jet bombers. 
The Victor aircraft provided the company with the bulk of its business 
in the 1950s and early 1960s, but military orders started to tail off 
with the government's-changed defence policy. The company was too small 
to carry the heavy costs of progressing on to jet transport development. 
The next step was diversification into oil-filled radiators and 
brewery equipment which proved disastrous and eventually cost the company 
more than ElM. ' 
Handley Page concentrated its activities on the small airliner and 
executive aircraft sect6r, * as small airliners needed a relatively modest 
investment in development costs. A new project was Jetstream, an aircraft 
which was designed to carry 20 passengers at up to 300 MPH, with estimated 
total development costs of E3M and a price of E125,000 apiece. This 
project was accompanied by a re-organised leadership and was an immediate 
success. By mid-1966 the company had orders for 20 aircraft and in 
Septo-mber 1966 the company announced orders for a further 100 aircraft 
worth-a-tbtal of E12.5M. A few days later the government 6ffered E1.25M 
just under half the aircraft's development cost. 
The plans proved difficult to be achieved. The company started running 
into financial problems. The 1967. consolidated accounts showed that the 
company was heading for really massive trouble, turnover had slumped from 
E8-58M in 1966 to E5.97M as goverment work declined. 
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The last period: 
In June 1969 the company failed to produce its full year figures on 
time and the share price dropped sharply from 18s to 6s9d. almost overnight. 
on the'l7th day of this month a joint rescue operation was mounted with 
an injection of E1.25M in cash and replacement 6f five directors including 
the Chairman and managing director of the company. Optimism was*agaIn 
expressed by the new chairman and even the financial press quoted the 
chairman's comments that "our pr6duction problems are solved, the financial 
situation makes sense, now we have to sell. " But the sales position 
deteriorated, the Americans cancelled their orders and wanted to take over 
the company. Barclays Bank appointed a receiver who asked the Americans 
either to buy the company or it would go into rapid liquidation. Craven 
who had invested a good deal of money and did not want to see the-company 
go out of business agreed to buy the company's new subsidiary, Handley Page 
Aircraft, which had been formed by the receiver for Jetstream project for 
E14.2M. The London Stock Exchange suddenly cancelled the Handley Page 
listing. Craven took over formal control of Handley Page Aircraft at the 
beginning of December 1969 and the company was producing Jetstream five a 
month at the beginning of 1970. Finally Craven's health failed and the 
company in May 1970 petitioned the court to be wound up; the winding pp 
order was made in June. 
5.15.2 Causes and Symptom 
Too much dependence on a big customer: 
Handley Page- was another example of companies which put too much 
reliance on a single large customer and ignore the risks of losing the 
market and product once thý customer changes his policy, as for example 
when the British government changed its defence policy and reduced military 
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spending. The consequence was to diversify into the oil-filled radiators 
which proved to be a failure with a cost of ElM. 
Investment Strategy: 
When the company lost the military orders, it decided to diversify 
either into a new product or a new market. The first one, 'which was 
the oil-filled radiators, failed and the second one was to concentrate on 
the small airliner and executive aircraft for potential demand in America. 
The company rushed out for this project which was called Jetstream, and 
the place had been, idesigned to carry 20 passengers at up to 300 NPH. The 
estimated total development costs and ptice were E3M and E125,000 
respectively. 
Lack of experience of the commercial world and the American market in 
particular, poor estimation, unreliability of product, late delivery, 
increasing costs followed by rash decisions to fit inadequate engines 
and the lack of an independent marketing and sales organisation all 
contributed to the failure of the project and diversification. 
Financial Difficulties: 
i 
In 1966 the turnover fell from E9.71M to E8.59M. As Travers quotes: 
"The trading profit dropped from E532,999 to E457,555 after crediting 
E114,183 released from depreciation provisions by a property sale, and 
charging E171,087 in radiator losses and the cost of closing down the 
radiator operation. Handley Page transferred E225,000 from its 1966 
profits to a special development reserve (compared with E400,000 the 
previous year), making the total reserve ElM. However E549,504 of 
Jetstream development costs were capitalised as an asset. If, following 
previous practice, these costs had been charged against profits of the 
year, Handley Page would have list E91,949. " 
Handley Page's 1967 consolidated accounts showed that the company was 
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heading for serious trouble. The statement of affairs published by the 
official receiver showed that Handley Page made a profit of E264,000 in 
1968 and lost E881,000 during the seven months of 1969 that preceded 
liquidation. 
In June 1969 the company failed to produce its full year figures on 
time and share p. rices plummeted from 18s to 6s9d almost overnight. This 
was caused by liquidity problems as the deputy chairman, who joined the 
board later, commented. 
Project Failure: 
The Jetstream project which was based on the need of market and a 
survey that showed a potentiiil demand in the American market was an aircraft 
capable of carrying up to 20 pe6ple at up to 300 MPH and a weight not 
more than 12,500 lb. The project attracted many orders and it was scheduled 
for the first flight in 1967. By the end of 1966 the aircraft project showed 
the signs of some difficulties. It was proved to be late, overweight, 
underpowered and far from the design pefformance specifications. The 
weight was 12% above original specification; following these weaknesses, 
the company lost some of the orders and financial difficulties started to 
appear. The company poured more money into the project by raising El. lM 
from sharehblders in mid-1967 and another ElAM in October of the same year. 
By December the cost of each aircraft moved up to around E200,000,60% more 
than original priýetestimates. The test flyinS programme suffered a major 
setback when the only prototype instrumented for performance flying was 
damaged in a landing test. 
Poor management structure: 
While the company was heading for disaster, the changes of members of 
the board, chairman and also creating a new management structure was in 
process. These were signs of underlying causes which were based on poor 
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policies and lack of a proper control system. The company with that level 
of reputation was lacking its own sales organisation and marketing management. 
Poor control: 
Lack of control from production to finance was an important factor in 
the failure of the project and collapse of the company. Poor and in some 
cases too optimistic forecasts, poor scheduling and lack of production 
control to meet the original estimates and specification caused too much 
diversified results concerning delivery time, weight and power -arid became 
. the 
important factors in Handley Page's only hope - Jetstream aircraft 
disaster. More important as the article by Travers describes "The company,. '3 
accounts underline the need for constant and close scrutiny and for careful 
correlation between profit and loss and balance sheet figures". This need 
was not implemented by the company. 
Board of directors: 
There is evidence, as Travers quotes that "eirery word in the documents 
provided by the chairman was agreed by the whole board, the whole text was 
very carefully Vetted iýdeed - you will find that our forecasts were subject 
to us being able to meet our specifications. " 
Another statement by the secretary of the company writes "Your board's 
confidence in the Jetstream aircraft continues and is shared by our 
distributors. " This statement, which appeared in December 1968 showed too 
much optimism expressed by the whole board. 
Misleading chairman's report: 
In June 1967 while the Jetstream project was already six months behirtd 
schedule, overweight and underpowered and*the company was financially in 
difficulty, the chairman presented an extremely optimistic report, 
commenting: "Once again I am able to report that your company is in a 
stronger financial position than it was last year ..... In summary, your 
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company is on track and all systems are working satisfactorily. " 
This was a completely wrong picture of the situation and the company, 
as Travers points out, was now really beginning to feel the pinch of falling 
gover=ent orders. 
5.15.3 Conclusion 
The official receiver's comment on the collapse of Handley Page was 
Misjudgement by the directors at the material times and incorrect assess- 
ment of the capital requirements of the Jetstream programme and dissipation 
of available resources in a mistaken policy of'diversification and unrealistic 
anticipation of demands and profit availability of government conversion 
work which did not materialise. " The official receiver puts more blame 
on the managing director and chairman of the company for shortcomings. 
The interesting comment by the company's chairman is that he blamed the 
Handley Page collapse on "inability to produce Jets , treams on schedule and 
to specification and to lack of capital to tide it over the period needed to 
reach earning point. " Two more comments on the failure of the company by 
its directors summarise the causes of the failure as: 
1. General weakness in technical and financial control 
2. Jetstream acceptance difficulties. 
Finally, Travers in his article, "Flight to Disaster" concludes that: 
The company collapsed and died because it tried to translate dreams into 
hard facts". Realistic planning and proper financial controls could have 
produced a commercially viable aircraft and kept costs within bounds. , 
Travers also believes that the story of Handley Page has some lesions for 
accountants and recommends the accountant to keep an open eye for changes 
in accounting bases. lie claims that the company charged aircraft development 
costs against profits up to 1966 and then started capitalising them. The 
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only indication of the change in policy was a brief note in the chairman's 
report for 1966. 
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5.16 Blanes Ltd 
5.16.1 Background 
Amalgamation of John Harold & Blanes with Lever (Clothiers) Ltd led to 
incorporation of Bernard Holdings (Blanes) Ltd in 1954. Continued success 
led in May 1959 to the incorporation of Blanes Ltd as a private company. 
Blanes, as a private company, so prospered that by June 1963 it could 
properly be described in the Financial Times as "one of the leading UK 
produces of fashion day and evening dress in the medium-price range". The 
, company has an expanding export trade in Europe and Africa. The directors 
of the company seemed an ideal combination of production, salesmanship and 
finance plus a successful designer and another young salesman. In 1969 
Blanes Ltd and its subsidiaries were widely regarded as a vigorous group 
of companies. It specialised in the manufacture of women's clothing. 
The company's share price had quadrupled in the 51 years since the company 
went public upon an offer for sales on 1963, and pre-tax profits had grown 
almost as fast. .. 
Lack of experience and appreciation of duties and responsibilities by 
the board caused problems. Mr H Bernard, chairman and mainstay of the 
business, retired in 1970, other directors resigned due to growing distrust, 
hostility and problems. The group virtually fell apart, and by October 
the company's-share price was down to 3/- less than one-ninth of that in 
January 1969. 
Final Stage (nearly 6 months): 
26th May 1970 First intimation of Blane's bad trading 
Resignation of H Bernard and B Lever 
5th June 1970 F Russle took the chair, according to the chairman's 
statement. 
5th June 1970 Meeting of the board, and appointment of F Russle as 
chairman. Blanes were running at a probable loss of 
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between E3000 to E4000 per week. Decision to reduce 
staff and expenditure (re-organisation). 
11 June 1970 Notice of termination of service of Miss Ruchland with 
five weeks. She was a director of six years' standing 
and a designer for Blanes Dress House for some 16 years. 
July 1970 -Collapse of Bernard Russle Ltd, one of its subsidiaries 
8 October 1970 Mr-F Russell resigned as chairman of the company, also 
as chairman of Bernard Russel 
16 October 1970 Announcetaent to the Press of the board's intention to 
appoint an independent chairman outside the fashion trade 
22 October 1970 A circular was forwarded to shareholders. -.: '-",. 'h 
23 October 1970 Press comments: e. g. Investment Chronicle, after the 
share price had dropped during the year from a peak of 
19/- to 3/- and whilst questioning certain share sales by 
the family directors, pointed out that first warning to, 
sharehblders had come as late as the end of July 1970. 
There had previously been the bullish trend in the 
chairman's statement in Nov. 1969, and finally the article 
referred to the groups' misconceived optimism. 
26 October 1970 Press comments and concern led to the suspension of 
the quotation in Blanes shares on the Stock Exchange. 
Loss of confidence in financial circles and uncertainty 
as to the future viability of subsidiaries, increasing 
liquidity problems. 
30 October 1970 The formation of a committee to represent the 
institutional shareholders for possibilities of rescue. 
11 November 1970 Extraordinary general meeting called for the purpose of 
putting the company into liquidation. 
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5.16.2 Causes and-Syuptoms 
Lack of response to change: 
As the inspectors quote: "Despite the fundamental change of status, 
after the public flotation of Blanes shares, their business attitude 
continued very much as before". 
2. Lack of formal conduct of affairs: 
The author believes, although this can be considered as a contributory 
factor of failure, but it is a sign of irregularity in an organisation. 
3. Lack of appreciation of responsibilities and duties; 
This was evident among the board members as the reports refers to it 
on many occasions. If one accepts this factor as a human element which 
exists more or less in different companies, then the question is 'how 
effective is the system and'organisation they are working in? ", which means 
the underlying cause should be*in the system and board selection. A symptom 
was lack of discipline for normal board practices. 
Lack of competence and experience: 
The directors were well suited to their roles as working directors of 
a relatively small private company, which was not at all the. same thing as 
running a listed group of companies. "They relied heavily on their 
I 
professional advisers, for they had no experience and little conception of 
the duties and obligations"of directors of a public company. " as the 
official inspectors. write. 
5. Pricing policy: 
There was an unsophisticated method of pricing for garments in relation 
to its costing system and it was mainly arbitrary. 
Poor financial management practices: 
This evidence of unsatisfactory financial management practices was a 
lack of co-ordination in the methods of costing, pricing and accounting 
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between the manufacturing and selling departments of Blanes Dress House. 
Financial control was also poor. 
7. Inadequate succession policy: 
The author believes this can be considered as a symptom of poor value 
system in this company, which is of great importance to the survival of 
any organisation. 
8. Poor central administrative structure: 
As the company becomes weak, the central administration loses its 
control and effectiveness. The signs of this weakness in this company 
were: 
a. Insufficient co-ordination betwern various departments and various 
companies. 
b. Lack Qf unity of audit responsibility. 
9. optimistic and false chairman statements: 
A clear indicator of an ailing company is the phrases and words used- 
by the chairman in his reports and statements to shareholders of the company. 
This was also a present symptom in this group which was given by misleading 
profit forecasts and the assurance that the group is doing well. 
10. Lack of appropriate marketing organisation: 
Once the company fails to recognise the changes needed then it fails 
to provide the requirements of runfiing the company. The group lacked 
an appropriate marketing organisation because it was thinking of running 
the company as before. 
11. Management information system: 
One can expect to see a weak information system and communication in 
a failing or failed company. The group's central information system was 
poor and ineffective. The information was wrong and manipulated, especially 
the accounting ddta. 
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12. poor financial resitlts: 
The symptoms of failure can be seen by experts in the financial results 
of a company. This group's financial results were deteriorating after the 
previous difficulties due to managerial causes and other factors such as 
the collapse of the group's subsidiaries. This followed by a declining of 
share prices, press comments on loss of confidence and collapse. 
13. The manner of sales of, 'shares by directors: 
There is evidence of selling of shares by some directors without the 
knowledge of other directors, which caused 
a. distrust and hostility in the board room 
b. Abuse and violence 
14. Irresponsibility of auditors: 
They failed to put more pressure on the board to take corrective steps 
to remedy the shortcomings in accounting procedures. 
5.16.3 Conclusion 
Blanes Ltd failed because the family directors were unwilling to change 
methods which had been adopted for a small pfivate company, but not for a 
listed public company. The group failed because it was unprepared-to become 
public and lacked the requirements of being a member of the public sector. 
More important was, 'as inspectors quote "lack of realisation and appreciation 
of responsibilities and duties of the board and directors as members of a 
public group which is supposed to be more organised, better equipped and 
have the ability to adapt and respond to change.! 
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5.17 Bernard Russell*Ltd 
5.17.1 'Background 
Bernard Russell Ltd was incorporated as a private company on 24th 
November 1964, it was the creation of Hr Harry Bernard who was the chairman 
of Blanes Ltd. 
In 1964 Blanes was to expand into jersey fabrics as part of its policy 
of widening its interests in ladies' wear. The company was formed with a. 
share capital of E1000 and Mr R. a sales manager in a spottswear concern 
having no previous experience of management outside sales, as Managing 
Director. There was an agreement that working capital of the new company 
should be provided by Blanes. As an incentive Mr R was given 250 shares 
and was not required to make any payment therefor. The remaining 750 shares 
were all owned by Blanes. The company was financed by substantial loans 
from its parent company and its sales were running at the rate of nearly 
ElM a year, gross profit for the year ended 30th June 1969 was E262,409 and 
net profit of E60,312. On 19th November 1970, as a result of an investigation 
by an independent firm of Chartered Accountants, two liquidators were 
appointed. 
The initialsuccess of the company was considerable in terms of trading 
results, so that within five years of its formation the company's sales 
had attained the annual rate of nearly EIM, but there were significant 
defects underlying the company's operations. 
Bernard Russell Ltd was incorporated as a separate legal entity but 
was never under the management of an effective board. Therein lay the 
seeds of failure. It operated much as if it were a department within a 
parent company, yet at the same time was only subject to a minimum of 
supervision by the parent company directors. The public shareholders in 
Blanes suffered a total loss on a substantial investment of group funds in 
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this ill-conducted venture. Finally, the company ceased its trade in 
November 1970 and appointed a liquidator. 
5.17.2 Causes and Symptoms 
1. Lack of formal directors' meeting to review the operation of the 
company. 
2. Poor organisation: 
Undefined authority and unclear responsibility and even job specification 
was evident in this company. - 
3. Incompetent managing director: 
Managing director of the company was always under the domination of the 
parent company directors and lacked both the power and compýtence of a 
managing director. As the inspectors quote "Managing director was a salesman 
with no managerial experience. " 
4. Inadequate accounting system: 
The accounting practice of the company was in a confused state which was 
mainly due to joint auditors without division of duties, co-ordination 
and exchange of information. 
5. Lack of appreciation of duties: 
I 
This was an evident sign of weakness in this company among the members 
of the management team and also joint auditors. The main reason was undlear 
lines of responsibility and inadequate organisation system and management 
co-ordination. 
6. Accounting manipulation: 
The fear of the man on the top causes manipulation of accounts by, 
inflating stocks and profits. 
7. Poor succession policy: 
The company did not have any planned policy for selection of successors, 
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to the family directors when they resigned because of their ill-health. 
8. Resignations: 
This is a symptom of some troubles. The high turnover of labour and 
especially directors indicates the weaknesses. Resignation of designer 
and director and the dispute among board members were warning signs in 
this company. 
2. Relationship with parent company: 
There was a confused relationship between the parent company, its 
directors and the company which was a contributory factor in poor 
administration and-lack of leadership in the company. More important was 
the company's lack of identity. 
10. Idle board due to the poor value system: 
The inspectors, in a part of their report, refer to the board and stress: 
"Employees were appointed to the board to give them the status of directors 
but without any intention that they should take part in policy decisions 
or even be advised of the state of affairs of the company". The board 
never met to review the operations, accounts of ev6n the budget. 
11. Irresponsibility of accountants: 
Although the main problem in this case was the existence of an % 
uncooperative joint auditors, but their irresponsibilities are clear from 
this expression: "They never attempted to ensure that adequate audit 
pr6cedures had been applied and did not take adequate steps to satisfy 
thems6lves as to the valuation of stock. " This gave a misleading picture 
of the company and having concealed the management deficiencies, remedial 
actions were never taken. 
12. Lack of a proper information and control system: 
There was no sign of any effective exchange of information. Unwilling- 
ness together with lack of co-operation and co-ordination of different 
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departments were the reasons that company was not able to have an effective 
information system. The main cause was at the top and the board. 
13. Too much influence of family directors, mistakes in costing, poor 
production control, lack of liaison between members of the management team, 
poor conduct of business and unwillingness to take advice from senior 
executives, by the managing director are other contributing factors in the 
collapse of this company. 
5.17.3 Conclusion; ý 
The conclusion of the failure can be summarised as a gradual process of 
mismanagement with lack of identity and authority which was due to influence 
of the parent company directors. Also, failure to establish an independent 
but adequate management structure with clear policies and responsibilities. 
0 
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5-18 Court Line Ltd (Founded 1905, Failed August 1974) 
5.18.1 Background 
Court Line was founded in 1905 as an operator of tramp steamers. The 
ownership of the business was restructured in 1929 and again in 1947. The 
present Court Line company was incorporated on 12th December 1928 as Cary 
and Strick (Steamers) Ltd. It was converted to a public company on 12th June 
1947 and its name changed to Court Line Ltd on 22 October 1952. - 
Court Line consisted of over 100 companies, including dormant and non- 
trading companies and those of limited activity. It was organised into 4 
divisions, consisting of 52 constituent companies. The divisions were: 
1. Shipping and group management 
2. Shipbuilding, shiprepairing and engineering 
3. Aviation 
Leisure ' 
I 
The main business throughout the period from 1905 to the early 1960s 
was tramp steamers. 
In 1961 Mr John Young joined the board and in 1963 he became managing 
director, succeeding the then managing director, the Hon. WS Philipps, who 
became chairman and remained until the date 9f liquidation in August 1974. 
1963 saw the start of considerable changes in the company. Between 1963 
and 1966, Court Line disposed of its tramp steamers and invested pro-t: ý- 
gressively in tankers. In 1965, Court Line acquired Appledore Shipbuiaders 
Ltd which was a small company, pioneered the first covered-in shipyard 
in the UK with government loans. In 1965, Court Line acquired Autair 
International Airways Ltd. In 1968-69 Court Line showed interest in the 
Caribbean and in June 1969 sites were acquired on St Lucia, where two hotels 
were built, the Halcyon Beach Club (opened in Nov. 1970) and Halcyon Days 
(opened in June 1970). In November 1969, the aviation side changed its 
1. 
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image, aims and finally its name in January 1970 to Court Line Aviation Ltd. 
It became closely connected with Clarksons Holidays Ltd, which catered for 
mass travel at the cheap end of the market and became their largest 
customer. Clarksons Holidays had a number of competitors and a price- 
cutting war raged for some years, indeed up to the time of the joint 
collapse of Court Line and Clarksons Holidays. This war at times reached 
such heights that package holidays were being offeted at below cost. 
In January 1970 Court Line extended its shipbuilding side by 
acquiring North East Coast Shiprepairers Ltd and amalgamation of three 
companies namely, 
1. Middle Docks and Engineering Co Ltd 
2. Brigham and Cowan Ltd 
3. Mercantile Dry Dock Co Ltd. 
In August 1971 Court Line acquired the Leeward Island Air Transport 
Services Ltd, the local Caribbean airlines. In February 1972, the group 
bought a hotel on Antigua which was extended and re-opened as the Halcyon 
Cove. two years later and at the same time bought from a liquidator another 
hotel, renamed the Halcyon Balmoral in Nassau. In June 1972, the group's 
shipcuilding expansion was completed by the acquisition of Doxford and 
Sunderland Ltd and its subsidiaries (D & S) which included shipbuilding and 
shiprepairing yards and other engineering works. 
In August 1972 Aviation ordered and entered into leasing agredments for 
two Tristar aircraft and took options on three others. In April 1973 Court 
Line acquired 85% of Clarksons Holidays which by this time had grown beyond 
its own capabilities and its parent company's expectations with resulting 
heavy losses. Clarksons Holidays finances were unsound, its recording 
and booking systems were faulty and SHI were not disposed to inject further 
large sums of money into it. 
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In June 1973 the group acquired Owners' ýerviees Ltd (OSL) a holiday 
villa business. In May 1973 Court Line acquired The Associated Travel 
Leisure and Services Group (ATLAS) which specialised in student travel 
and which operated an advance booking charter business. In October 1973 
Court Line bought the R Harris &-Son (Builders) Ltd group of companies 
(Harris), a Devon based building contractor and developer. 
In February 1974 the group took over,! -. not the companies, but the 
passenger bookings of the Horizon group, an inclusive tour operator 
specialising in the upper end of the market. At the same time, it acquired 
a 58% interest in a related, but independently run, company called Horizon 
Midlands Ltd. In March 1974 the group-bought a controlling interest in its 
third hotel in St Lucia, the Marigot des Roseau. In March 1974 also, the 
group accounts up to 30th September 1973 were published prior to its annual 
general meeting in April. The treatment of goodwill in these accounts 
resulted in the group exceeding its borrowing powers. 
In June 1974 Court Line approached the government for assistance and 
as a result an agreement was made for the government to acquire all its 
shipbuilding, shiprepairing and engineering interests. On 15th August 1974 
the principal companies in the group ceased trading. Up to the evening 
of this day, it had been-. -running its various businesses in the ordinary way - 
receiving and paying out money, giving credit and accepting credit. In 
particular it had operated 6p to the last moment its holiday flights. 
Financial Position of the Group as Shown in the Published Report 
and Accounts at 30th September 1973 
Net tangible assets of the group at 30th September 1973 were E13.108M. 
The debt-to-equity ratio was 5.6 to I- much higher than average in UK. 
The borrowings amounted to 3.15 times the net tangible assets. 
Trading profits of E8.114M (according to directors' report) are reduced to 
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E4.8531A by including Clarksons losses and this further reduced to E996,000 
after deducting interest costs. 
The aviation and leisure division made a loss of E3.532M. 
With this financial position, the group had to face the consequent 
problems and threats of oil c-kises, the 3-day week, the slump in the 
shipping market and the reduction in the leisure market, Arab/Israeli 
war increased 6il pHces, restrictive prices and incomes policy and 
changing general economic climate in this country and overseas. 
The Final Stage of Failure ' 
This stage which covers the events that occurred between the 30th 
September 1973 and 4th April 1974 is of great importance both in analysis 
point of view and its considerable impact which was mainly brought about 
by unjustifiable and rash decisions and policies. On 30th September 1973 
the financial position of the group was in a state of bleeding. In 
November 1973 Court Line purchased R'Harris and Son (Builders) Ltd and'its 
subsidiaries. In the same month, the arrangement of the Pallian Yard 
loan with the Department of Trade and Industry was completed. This was 
a E9M loan to convert-the Palliin yard into a covered yard as Appleaore-type. 
The total cost was estimated at about E24M; one of the pre-conditions 
of the loan was that Court Line should f irst put up E3M towards a 
reconstruction scheme which was never put up by unable Court Line. At the 
end of 1973 and early 1974 the ailing company came face to face with 
external factors: Arab/Israeli war in October, difficulties with oil supplies, 
increased oil prices, 3-day week working in UK, reduction in demand for 
leisure market. The first effect was on the grouý's shipping interests 
and next was the Aviation and Leisure Division which suffered in a declining 
market. 
The impact was soon seen in the cash position of the group and increased 
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problems for Clarksons difficulties. Despite this critical situation, 
Court Line acquired on Ist February 1974, the business and goodwill of 
Horizon Holidays Ltd with a chaotic accounting record. This was a big 
mistake and a most unfortunate acquisition for the group. This happened 
in the absence of risk awareness and uncertainties surrounded the eaonomy 
of the country and the whole world. 
In February 1974 Court Line made another mistake with taking a 10% stake 
in a Consortium interested in North Sea Oil and gas called the Van Dyke 
North Sea group, by a loan from Barclays Bank. On 22nd February Court Line 
issued a preliminary profit announcement disclosing a profit (before tbX 
and extraordinary items) of E5.02M before deducting loan stock interest of 
E320,000 and excluding Clarksons losses of E3.18M. On 13th March 1974, 
the published accounts of - the group were available, but they received adverse 
press comments and Court Line's ordinary shares immediately fell*from 
381p to 30p as against the 1973 peak of 170p. 
The breach of its borrowing powers was a disturbing feature that the 
group could not and did not realisd until the end of March. The group 
was permitted under the articles to borrow up to five times its capital 
and reserves less goodwill, while the published accounts showed capital 
and reserves less goodwill amounting to E6.3M and borrowing of E41.2M, 
which was much greater than their permission. 
During 12th March 1974 and 4th April 1974'Court Line came face to face 
with disturbing facts such as 
a. the lack of accurate up-to-date information 
-b. High gearing position of the'group 
C. Breach of its borrowing power 
d. Press comments 
e. BTI advice of disposal of all the shipping fleet 
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Assets disposal adviceý 
g. Unhappy and disturbed advisers and interested parties. 
But there was another mistake giving an over-optimistic picture of 
the group-'s position and future prospects in the chairman's report-, and 
finally Court Line was, on 15th August 1974, forced to go out of business 
and made headlines as 'Big Catastrophe'.. 
one of the desires, which proved to be a disaster, of Court Line was 
"to show pre-taxed profit at their largest even by the adoption of 
unconservative, inconsistent or illogical accounting practices". ' The 
1973 accounts received significant adverse comments from the financial 
press regarding that desire or weakness. 
5,18.2 Causes and Symptoms 
1. one-Man Idea 
Although the group was controlled by the directors, working as a team, 
major decisions were principally influenced by the personality of Mr Young 
who was the Managing Director and an influential and dominant figure in 
the group, especially on matters of policy. His approach to the business 
was ýoo optimistic, with too much influence on his fellow directors. 
2. Inner Management Team 
This was a team consisting of Mr Young and a few directors close to him 
for important exec4tive decisions in an informal manner which was against 
their duties. 
3. Lack of Formal Management Information and Reporting System 
This was a clear feature of the group which was a contributdry factor 
in poor communication and inadequacies of investment and acquisition decisions. 
4. Ineffective Management Accounting Arrangements 
This signs of this factor could be seen from 
a. lack of discipline in procedures 
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b. poor methods of submitting returns 
C. Inadequate explanation of trends and variations 
d. Inaccurate returns and forms 
5. ýoard of Directors 
Irresponsibilities of the board's members was a significant-factor in 
most of the inefficiencies and inadequacies of the group. The group was 
controlled by a very-small head office organisation under Mr Young. The 
sign of this irresponsibility was clear from its board meetings, which were 
a formality for legal documentation of decisions which had been taken 
informally. This board was lacking a balance of knowledge and power diie 
to influence of Mr Young. 
6. Lack of adequate and proper central administration structure and control 
The sign of this inadequacy was the increasing divisional difficulties, 
poor bookkeeping and accounting methods and finally losses due to poor 
performances., 
7. Breach of duties 
a. unofficial loans and tips to Mr Macqueen who was Aviation Director of 
Clarksons Holidays before Court Line's take-over and was never employed by 
Court Line. 
b. this loan was never officially or formally mentioned at board level. 
C. the existence of the loan was deliberately. and effectively concealed 
in the books of accounts and was not disclosed in the published accounts. 
d. serious loss due to this loan transaction. 
8. Unwillingness to accept advice 
Although this caused some dispute between the group arid its financial 
advisers and merchant bankers, due to refusing to take legal advice before 
entering into the agreement of May 1972, regarding buying E500,000 ordinary 
stock of Doxford and Sunderland Ldd (D & S), but in itself there was a 
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symptom of ineffective board and one-man rule. 
9. Acquisition Policy 
This is the starting point of most crises for mostýcompanies which 
are. in the process of development and diversification. Court Line suffered 
more in its acquisitions which was due to inability of the company in 
proper feasibility studies, adequate research of factors involving or 
surrounding the acquisition, and too optimistic forecasts based on poor 
assessments of information available. There are few examples to prove 
these weaknesses which became the characteristics of acquired companies, 
for instance 
9.1 the gýoup's involvement with the Lock arose from an over-optimistic 
assessment of 1973 tanker boom market. This alone brought a loss of ElM. 
9.2 too ambitious acquisition: This sort of acquisition usually stems 
from previous success as happened to Court Line whose previous acquisitions 
of Appledore proved to be a success and it made the group to acquire D&S 
which resulted in a great loss and its financial consequences contributed 
to the collapse of the group. 
Causes of D&S Failure 
1. Lack of assessment of management abilities and its weaknesses. 
2. Lack of adequate research for acquisition 
3. Underestimation of modernisation costs and overestimation or profits 
4. Problems due to overmanning 
5. Over-priced bid 
6. Labour relations and strikes 
7. Too much enthusiasm of previous success. 
9.3 Expansion and acquisitions: Another example of expansion that Court 
Line experienced was a chain of expansion-acquisition-expansion which had 
great significance in the group's collapse. The Airline activities expansion 
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in the late 1960s with Tristar resulted in acquisition of the failing 
Clarksons Holidays and Horizon and finally the expansion of activities 
into the leisure business. The whole aviation division can be a completely 
separate case in analysis of company failure and therefore it is analysdd 
in some detail. 
10. Cash flow problems 
The financial difficultues and changing trends of different items and 
ratios are more symptoms than causes and appear as a consequence of previous 
mistakes and troubles, as it happened after different illogical acquisitions 
and investment cases e. g. Van Dyke. 
11. Accounts manipulation (artificial accounting) 
Another warning sign and symptom of ill health o, f the company and 
its declining position either financially or non-financially. This is done 
to 'window-dress' the accounts and mostly the balance sheet in situations 
where the company needs more credit and needs to attract the attention of 
creditors and satisfy its shareholders. 
12. Investment policies 
Court LinJs investment policy was in a field which, from the start, 
proved to be a failure. The characteristics of E679ý000 investment in Van 
Dyke North Sea group were 
a. it was in a very crucial time of the group's history 
b. it was commercially not sensible 
C. it was too speculative 
d. Lack of capabilities and experience 
e. Investment with borrowed money in a situation when the group was already 
in a highly borrowed position 
f. Lack of any satisfactory reason for investment. 
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5.18.3 Aviation and Leisure Divisions 
5.18.3.1 Background 
The Aviation Division arose from a decision made during 1963-64 to 
change from tramp cargo vessels to diversify and expand. In 1965, 
Court. Line purchased Autair International Airways Ltd for E215,000 cash. 
This company had built up a network of UK scheduled and international charter 
services. The company's name was changed to Court Line Aviation Ltd and 
maintained its operation as an airline on the charter principle. 
Court Line became increasingly identified with Clarksons Holidays. 
The prospects of tour industry and encouragement of Clarksons Holidays 
entered Court Line into options to obtain Lockheed Tristar aircraft. In 
January 1972 Lockheed submitted proposals for the Tristar, which was then 
under development stage. The evaluation group of Court Line recommended 
to the board that two Tristars be ordered for delivery in Spring 1972 and 
to purchase further three later. The two aircraft were built subject to 
considerable modifications to suit the Aviation and to carry 400 passengers. 
The price quoted per aircraft was US $15,410,274. On lst February 1971 a 
report was submitted to the b oard detailing the position of the Tristar 
project including significant increases in both capital and operating costs. 
On 4th February 1971, Rolls Royce was placed into the hands of the 
receiver and the development of the RB211 engine which was to be used in 
the Tristar aircraft, became increasingly uncertain. On 28th February 1973 
after nearly two years the Tristar with the same engine continued and 
the first aircraft was delivered with the sale price of US $19,857,050. 
By 26th July 1974 the Tristar was considered as "inflexible, unsuitable 
and unreliable". The total costs involved in the Tristar projects, 
excluding the interest costs was approximately E23M. 
To secure their position Court Line Aviation obtained a five-year 
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contract from Clarksons Holidays without any underlying guarantee from it 
parent company shipping industrial holdings Ltd (SIH). In April 1973 
Clarksons Holidays was in danger of collapse as a result of substantial 
losses, and Court Line were put under pressure to take it over. 
Court Line found themselves in a difficult position if they refused 
to take over Clarksons, SIH indicated that Clarksons might be put into 
liquidation, Court Line would then have been left without much experience 
and great problems. They'also knew that Clarksons organisation and 
management recirds were in a'chaotic condition. Nevertheless they acquired 
85% of Clarksons and the injection of E6.2M by SIH as working capital to 
finance Clarksons losses. 
In 1973 Clarksons was unable to retain its share of the falling market 
and when Horizon, which was trading in the 'up market' was in danger of 
folding up Court Line acquired the passengers but not the company and at 
the same time acquired 58% interest in a related company - Horizon Midlands 
Ltd. 
In 1971, as part of a developing interest in the Caribbean, Court Line 
acquired the local airline LIAT which was to face some problems and 
difficult political situation. Also, for extending the packa: ge holiday 
business from the UK and North America to the Caribbean and to market the 
hotels, Court Line set up a company in Toronto and acquired 51% of a New 
York Agency company. The whole Caribbean project was under the control of 
John Young, with no formal management structure. 
5.18.3. '2 Causes of Failure 
For the identification of the causes of the Aviation and Leisure Group 
failure one has to t ake into account the factors related both to this 
division of the group and the whole group. Having considered this importance 
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the major contributory factors were: 
1. Lack of clear strategy (inability to realise that their business'was 
a charterer and not an operator). 
2. Purchase of Tristar aircraft. 
3. Poor appraisal of other alternatives or available aircraft and failure 
to give any chance to other proposals e. g. Douglas. 
4. Failure to anticipate the problems of sole operator Of a new 400-seat- 
-gLircraft 6n this side of the Atlantic. 
5. Collapse of Rolls Royce and the RB211 project. 
6. Lockheed's financial problems 
Escalating costs and prices 
8. Technical pýoblems in introductory stage 
9. Unreliability and inflexibility of Tristar which cause d considerable 
losses. 
10. Multiplicity roles to use the aircraft (this was a symptom of 
inflexibility of the business). 
11. Poor market assessmeni and feasibility studies 
12. Lack of demand due to falling market t, 
13. External factors such as the oil crisi s in early 1974,3-day week, 
economiE. climate. of UK aild overseas. 
14. Lack of appreciation of Clarksons Holidays ever-present problems in 
its highly competitive, highly sensitive industry. 
15. Administration problems of Clarksons 
16. Chaotic records and accofints 
17. Lack of up-to-date information 
18. Investment in the Caribbean hotels 
19. Lack of control of capital and'expenditure 
20. Poor marketing 
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21. Accounting maniPulation and trading losses 
22. Lack of management structure 
23. Mr Young's personal control and involvement 
24. False Chairman reports. 
5.18.3.3 Clarksons Holidays 
The major problems of Clarksons Holidays were: 
1. Weak basic administration and management structure 
2. Over-optimistic budgeting 
3. Lack of adequate concentration on profitability and turnover 
4. Lack of control over overheads 
5. Ineffective top and middle management- due'to failure of administrative 
system;: ': I 
6. Problems in achieving its budgeted programmes due to inflation and 
floating of the pound. 
7. Lack of management-accounting system 
5.18.3.4 Conclusion 
Although thqre was no single reason for the collapse of Court Line, 
but generally most of the problems started from the top where there was not 
a proper responsible body to decide on crucial situations such as investment, 
expansion, acquisition and diversification. Once this was done, there was 
not adequate arrangements, flows and control, and with all these setbacks 
the last mistake was the false'and too optimistic forecasts, reportd, and 
statements based on manipulated and window-dressed accounts and balance sheets. 
Court Line, as the inspectors quote, "is a case of humbld beginnings, s. 
rapid diversification over a wide field, ambitious acquisitions, very heavy 
borrowings, over-optimism, an expansion and disastrous--incursion into the 
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Caribbean, inadequate overall management and a share of ill-luck and, :-, 
finally, a leading personality - the managing director; " 
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_5.19 
Causes and Symptoms of'Large Companies Failure 
The relationship between cause afid effect in business failure is of 
considerable importance and too often is forgotten or neglected. Each 
successive effect becomes the next cause in a series of causes and effects. 
It is illusory to search for an ultimate cause for the collapse of a company. 
Since many factors combine to guarantee the survival and success of companies, 
a variety of forces will have to combine to cause failure or to correct the 
problems (turnaround and rescue operation). Analysis of failed companies 
evidences the inability of management to perceive danger signs before they 
become issues of great public concern. 
The range of causes and symptoms of failure for each individual company 
appear in the body of cases, therefore it would be useful if the most common 
causes of failure emerging from the analysis bf large failed companies are 
identified. 
The list of causes and symptoms of failure may, with hindsight, seem 
obvious and elementary; however it is in the nature of human behaviour to 
admit unpalatable though 6ften obvious truths. In the cases etudied this 
is clearly demonstrated by the chairman's statements and other reports which 
present a picture of their companies which no objective analysis would 
possibly substantiate. These are just demonstrations of the difficulty in 
recognising unpalatable truth. The need to distinguish between causes and 
symptoms is obvious; if one wishes to reduce the chances of failure one 
might do so by adopting a warning system and removing the uriderlying causes. 
Otherwise there is a danger of treating symptoms and effects rather than 
the basic causes. If the root cause of the difficulty which often contains 
an unpleasant truth is not correctly diagnosed the application of short 
t 
term remedies will do no more than postpone or temporarily alleviate the 
trouble which will appear when control is relaxed. 
0 
308. 
5.19.1 Causes of Failure 
The author believes that a significant cause of failure is the ignorance 
and lack of understanding of management with regard to the fact that many. 
of their problems are rooted in 'time'.. In particular, not enough attention 
is given to considering how problems will develop in the future. Further- 
more correct and control actions are often taken too late which result in 
aggravating the problems and accelerating the failure. 
often failure of a company is attributed to the shortcomings of a single 
individual; i. e. the chairman, managing director or chief executive. This 
is too simplistic an explanation; at certain times in the development of a 
company one strong man who can control the company is beneficial whilst 
at other times collective participation would be desirable Therefore time 
is an important factor which must be taken into consideration in analysis 
of company survival and failure. 
In failed companies management often fails tb understand the basic 
principles under which they operate and to ask iundamental questions such 
as "what business they are in or should and will be in", and to ensure 
that the questions are carefully studied and correctly answered. The 
example of this type of weakness, which is often relevant to the strategy 
of the company, can be seen when the companies studied found themselves 
in positions where they were expanding. or extending their activities, e. g. 
Handley Page "Diversification into the oil-filled radiator and brewery 
equipment", Roadship Ltd "reckless and ill-thought programmes of expansion", 
The Vehicle and General "Acquisition of Pioneer without enough experience 
and too much commitment", John Willment Automobile Ltd "All acquisitions in 
1965 without proper, regard to its objectives, ability and financing them" 
Court Line "the acquisition of Clarkson Holidayg, group's investment'. in 
the Lock, etc ". Aviation and Leisure Division of Court Line "Acquisition of 
ýA 
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Horizon and Horizon Midland- Lt! d without consIdering that their business 
was a charter and not an operator". 
The failed companies gave evidences of ignorance and inability in 
very classic questions. They often diversifidd into products, markets, 
processes and services without asking a simple question; why, and finding 
. an 
important answer: how to expand ? 
The list of causes of company failure presented below is dirý_-ctly 
deriveýd from examination.. of historie. 9 of- companies in- ýhis.. chapter based on 
published reports-of official inspectors appointed by the Department of 
Trade to investigate the affairs of these companies, also in some cases 
interview with actual liquidators and Official* Receivers, and reports of 
experts. The items congtituting -this list 'are giveTv. in an order, by the 
author, which can provide a pattern of failure or represent the process of 
company failure as follows: 
1. Unnoticed residual risks and difficulties during a growth phase 
2. Inadequate appraisal of change 
2.1 Recognition and identification of needs and requirements 
2.2 Planning for change 
2.3 Implementation of change 
2.3.1 Resistance to-Change 
2.3. -2 Low and inadequate response (partial response) 
. 
2.3., 3 Wrong response 
2.3.4 Ignorance 
2.4 Control of change 
2.4.1 Monitoring 
2.4.2 Review 
2.4.3 Feedback 
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Development of weak organisational structure and systems 
3.1 Information, communication and control system 
3.2 Value system 
3.3 Weak top management team (board of directors and chief executive)- 
3.3.1 One-man idea (domination and rule) 
3.3.2 Unbalanced skills 
I 3.3.3 Non-participant team 
3.3.4 Management gap 
3.3.5 Lack of proper risk awareness and assessment 
3.3.6 Unjustified investment and expansion decisions 
3.3.7 Big and too ambitious projects 
4. Financial crisis 
5. Creative accounting 
6. Accumulated internal problems and unidentified risk areas 
7. Unpredicted external factors 
7.1 Economical 
7.2 Technological- 
7.3 rolitical 
7.4 social , 
7.5 Others 
8. False statements, reports and accounts 
9. Too optimistic profit forecasts 
10. Rights issues to provide more money for dying projects 
11. Rash decisions for tooý-late rescue operations 
12. Sharp declining of share price 
13. Collapse of confidence in financial circles and business community 
14. Late publication of accounts 
15. Cancellation of orders by customers, rush of creditors and refusal of 
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suppliers to provide the oompany's requirement and lack of support by 
banks, finance houses or government. 
It should be noted that the order of items. in importance is not the 
same for each company. The significance of these factors vary from company 
to company accovding to type of industry, complexity of orga'nisation, type 
of market and others. 
All the failed companies in the present study showed these weaknesses 
causing a wide range of problems and sub-causes, resulting in the collapse 
of corporations with millions in resources, with images of national 
institutions, with the power to hire the very best management and technical 
talent in the world. 
5.19.2 Symptoms of Failure i 
Peter Drucker defines symptomatic diagnosis as the method used by 
managers based on experience rather than upon analysis which is only 
permissible where the symptoms are dependable, so that it can be assumed 
that certain visible surface phenomena pertain to cettain definite diseases. 
He suggests that "the manager must assume that symptoms do lie, knowing 
that every different business problems prdduce'the same set of symptoms 
and that the same problem manifests itself in an infinite variety of ways, 
the manager must'analyse the problem rather than diagnose it.,, 
(57). 
However the symptoms of business failure can be generally divided into 
financial and-non-financial ones. The emphasis of this chapter is on 
those non-financial signs which are visible more or less in failing companies. 
These signs can'be seen by outsiders during a company visit, or. tour of 
premises. It can be seen by customers, with occasional cutting of prices 
to improve flagging sales, stippliers may see the weakness sign when 
they see delayed payment, workers will feel the danger when the company cannot 
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give them their wages on time, middle management can observe it when the 
stocks are rising, certain decisions have been postponed, products are 
outdated, cash is short, repairs have not been carried out, customers are 
complaining; bankers are able to see it through the accounts. The 
investment analysts, auditors and creditors might see different signs. 
Policy clashes at the board, one man rule, too much paper work, low morale, 
poor communication, late and wrong reports, creative accounting, high 
labour turnover, and resignations are among the signs that top management 
fail to see or occasionally conceal these7ýymptoms from themselves, as 
K Cork states "their motive for doing this is very seldom evil and almost 
never fraudulent; it is done simply to keep going, until 'better times' 
come. " However what appears at first sight to be the elements of problems 
rarely are the relevant or really important elements; they are at bes!: 
symptoms. There is no doubt that "if there is an awareness of the risk, 
a large number of creep areas can be monitored and protected by routine 
reporting. " The importance of non-financial symptoms is that they can be 
seen by experienced businessmen and experts either inside or outside the 
company and the signs that management often do not conceal them. Manage- 
ment of a company in trouble often. manipulates the accounts and presents 
a window-dressed balance sheet to cover the financial signs of company 
weakness, but rarely can conceal the low morale of employees. 
I 
The author is of the opinion that the monitoring of financial and 
non-financial symptoms can provide an important guide to recognise the 
disease and theIntegration of symptomatic diagnoses and causal analysis 
can present a valuable tool for the health appraisal of companies. 
Although it is possible to list the non-financial symptoms for failed 
and ailing companies, it is particularly useful to classify them in a form 
which can give a better explanation than a list. The classification made by 
F 
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the author is based on areas of activity in the company and the symptoms 
are those which have been exhibited by the companies studied. Exhibit 
gives a general picture of the non-financial symptoms of failed companies. 
It should be noted that some of these signs might be displayed by non-failed 
companies, although these companies would not-be particularly highly 
successful ones. It should also be noted that some of these symptoms 
can be considered as secondary or sub-causes in the process of company 
f ailure. 
AREA OF ACTIVITY SYMPTOMS 
FINANCE Too voluminous financial reports to hide 
the facts 
Guesswork pricin g and costs 
Chronic shortage of working capital 
Delays in payment to suppliers 
Delays in payment of wages 
Different accounting procedures in 
various divisions 
Indequate financial staff 
Inconsistent financial data 
Delay in yearly publication of accounts 
RESEARCH AND Different design changes 
DEVELOPMENT Poor innovation 
Out-dated product design 
Over-weighted prototype product 
ORGANISATION Low morale among staff 
Gaps and overlaps in responsibility 
Too much resistance to change 
Obscure lines of authority'and respondibility 
PERSONNEL High labour turnover 
Frequent management resignations, dismissals 
pr appointments 
Absenteeism 
Overmanning 
Inadequate successions 
'Age mix and skill among different departments 
unrelated to business needs 
ADMINISTRATION Lack of co-ordination of activities 
Poor communication between departments and 
within them 
Too much paper work 
Lack of attention to different projects 
and products. 
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AREA OF ACTIVITY SYMPTOMS 
PRODUCTION Many technical problems 
Reworking of products 
over-running in cost and time in the 
production stage 
Over-weighted products 
Products unrelated to market specifications 
Poor factory layout and production flow 
Too much dependence on a big project 
'Out-dated manufacturing methods 
MARKETING. Late delivery and shipment 
Losing market share 
Poor distribution of products 
Ineffective services 
Frequent customer complaints 
Loss of confirmed and unconfirmed orders 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS Domination of one man - 
AND Policy clashes at t4e board level 
TOP MANAGEMENT Informal board meetings 
STRUCTURE Composition of the board 
Idle members - 'Yes Sir' type men 
Too many meetings 
Unwillingness to get advice 
Breach of duties 
Lack of attention to reports 
Hostility and disputes 
Too many acquisition in short period 
Rash and unjustified decisions based on 
enthusiasm of members 
It can be observed from the table of non-financial symptoms that 
I 
some of these signs have been given as causes of failure, which need a 
brief explanaýion. 
As was already stated'in the chapter, the-relationship between cause 
and effect in business failure is very important when each successive 
effect becomes the next cause in a series of causes and effects, e. g. 
creative accounting is the symptom of an underlying cause which is in 
general called bad management. This is the effect or the sign of a primary 
cause which becomes a secondary cause when by its application managemcnt 
provides misleading reports, optimistic profit forecasts etc to raise more 
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money from shareholders and creditors and pour into dying projects of a 
company which is bleeding 
ýo 
death. Another example is an unbalanced board, 
which, the author believes, is the effect of a poor value system applied in 
the selection of the board's members, but this becomes an important sub- 
cause or a significant secondary cause which develops many weaknesses and 
problems. Therefore an objectivd-look at the symptoms can provide a 
substantial guide on how to identify the underlying causes. 
Having considered the non-financial symptoms for various functional 
areas, now it is the management responsibility to interpret them adequately 
and properly, because the danger is that sometimes the most visible symptoms 
are the least revealing ones. Management may. see, Peter Drucker quotes, 
"a clash of personalities, the real problem may well be poor organisation. 
Management may see a problem of manufacturing costs and st art a cost 
reduction drive; the real problem may well be poor engineering design or 
poor sales planning. Management may see an organisation problem; the 
real problem may well be lack of clear objectives. " Therefore the symptoms 
and symptomatic diagnosis cannot be considered as solutions, but they should 
be integrated with other tools to provide simplicity for the main task: 
problem solving. 
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5.20 Process. of'Failure'(Dynamics of'failure) 
As companies grow and expand with their old systems, they are 
confronted by difficulties which require 'change'. The study of large 
failed companies evidenced that the company in general and top management 
in particular fail in a proper assessment and appraisal of change. The 
need for change is not recognised, the areas of change and the strength 
and weaknesses are not identified, even if these have been carried out 
there is no planning for change and the response to it might-be a total 
resistance, poor and inadequate response br ignorance. It is amazing that 
some major companies who have properfy responded to change, fail to contuol 
it through. an efficient monitoring and review of the process. These 
all develop weak organisational structure and systems of which the existing 
'value system' applied in the selection of the board's members, becomes 
inadequate, unflexible and obsolete. A poor value system means careless 
selection of a Board of Directors with the familiar signs and defects such 
as one-man rule, unbalanced skills, non-participant and yes-sir type of 
members and lack of management depth. This board elects the chief 
executives. Sometimes the responsibilities of chairman and chief executive 
are given to one person, which is unncNisible. Chief exectitives and the 
board-become the origin of most causes of failure. They are responsible 
for all top decision making, top decision approval and review of major 
policies and strategies. They do not carry out tfieir functions and duties 
properly, the reports are not dealt with, the breach of duties becomes 
popular. The problems and weaknesses are not identified ar wr6ngly 
identified which gives rise to more weaknesses. The communication and 
information system become practI. Cally inefficient or idle. Unjustified 
decisions in launching a new prodCtct, a big project or diversification 
into a new market and process or reckless and ill-thought programmes of 
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5.21 Change Apprair; al 
____ 
It is said that "The powerful cause change, the foresighted anticipate 
it, the clever profit by it, and the inadequate are engulfed by it. 11( 
3 
Changes due to internal and external causes are inevitable and the 
way in which they are handled is vitally important. The problems of change 
must be fully considered by management, who must accept responsibility 
for the introduction of changes. Handling of change cannot be solved 
without the pepple concerned. It is no"secret to anyone that change breeds 
and multiplies new changes in its wake, as the rate of change accelerates, 
the need to master its impacts becomes increasingly crucial. As RE Levison. -- 
states(99 
) "In the past decade alone we have seen so much disorientation 
and stress triggered by change that the tem 'Future Shock' is passe. What 
was once future shock is now present shock and present shock. is the panic 
of change. " 
To dig out the impact of change on failed companies and the survival 
of existing organisations one needs to clarify the scopeand types of 
change. One of the weaknesses of previous authors who have referred to 
'change'. as a factor or cause of business failure is that they confined 
the whole problým only to the lack of response to change , while as the 
author understands this could be one element of change. The author has 
classified the change appraisal of companies into the following categories 
and items where each category must be faced with familiar questions-, "What, 
Why, When, -Where, How, Who" at any time. 
0 
5.21.1 Recognition and identification of change 
Many companies fail to recognise the need for change. They fail to 
explain why the change, should be implemented, companies ignore the 
important factor of 'time to change,, or the 'areýalvhere change is needed. 
WHAT WHY WHERE WHEN HOW WHO 
Finance 
F-f Organisation 
z Research & Development 
tý -4 Marketing 
z 
P4 Administration 
L 
-4 Production 
,Z , r4 Personnel 
Board of Directors 
I TO TAL r 
Proper Responsei Resistance 
(Adoption) 
CHANGE 
Economic 
Technological 
Social 
lcological 
Political 
RECOGNITION 
AND 
DENTIFICATION 
'F PARTIAL 
PLANNING 
IMPLEMENTATION 
PARTIAL 
M 
Wrong Inadequate 
sp onse 0s spons 
_Response 
Re 
CONTROL 
MONITORING, 
-reedback-------4 MEASUREMENT 
REVIEW 
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They do not find the proper answers for methods and procedures for 
carrying out the change, and even if they are prepared for change, the 
failure is inevitable once the responsible person for this important 
job has not been thought of. In the identification stage, one needs to ask: 
What are'the objectives of the change (short and long term) 
What needd to be changed ' 
What kind of change is required 
What are the requirements for implementation of change 
What are the problems,. risks, threats, weaknesses and strengths 
What are the human problems 
What are the effects of change on organisation and pe6ple 
How dhould we approach the change 
How to. reduce the panic of change 
How to manage and control the change 
How to overcome the problems and resistance 
How to introduce'and imp'lement 
How fast should the change be implemented 
where is the area of change 
Where should the majur changes take place 
Where is the best market to go into 
Why are we changing the present things 
Why do we need to change 
Why'sbould the company invest, diversify, go abroad 
When is the right time to introduce change 
When is the best time to expand the business 
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When is the appropriate time for starting any section of product/market 
matrix 
Who is in charge of monitoring and control of change 
Who is responsible for appraisal of change 
Who is in charge of planning and control 
The role of'departmental manager, engineers, accountants, 
5.21.2 Planning of change 
Having answered all aspects of questions concerning the internal and 
external environment of the company, recognition of the needs, identification 
of requirements and possible problems of change, management can draw 
conclusions based on the-positive, negative factor and the questions for 
which there were not answers. The next step is the planning of change 
where it should be cariied out with the intention to benefit the company 
and people involved. It will help to decide what actions to be taken in 
introducing the change for optimum. reaction at the right time and cost. There 
should be some norm'or criteria for measuring the implementation of change. 
. 0. .1 
5.21.3 Implementation-of Change 
The implementation of change can be divided into partial and total, 
depending on how effectively management has been able to recognise and 
identify the change. A total implementation means either to a proper 
response to change and adaptation or a total resistance to it, which means 
the tendencY to proteci the past and sometimes the traditions. Partial 
implementation of change is broken into three possible responses: 
a) Inadequate response due to a partial identification and recognition 
of change, 
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b) Wrong response due to lack of clarity of needs 
C) Ignorance, which represents the irresponsibility of management. 
5.21.4 Control of change 
Having implied the change, there should be a control system to monitor, 
review, measure and feed back the results for re-appraisal of the change 
with all its aspects. - 
It should be noted that control does-not mean to resist change, but 
to harness the change. It is necessary for a company to objectively look 
at the direction in which it is actually. going and compare this with the 
direction it should be going. It is the author's view that the "change 
appraisal" chart can be used. also in identification of risk and causes of 
failure. It is noteworthy to consider allaspect questions in each 
stage and co-ordinate them in a proper form with a clear line of authority 
and responsibility. The author believes that appraisal of change, risk 
and company in general must be carried out-by all dividional managers, as 
well as top management. 
5.21.5 Types of change 
It is said, that "while change may be grist to the mill of the opportunist 
or a signal for the founding of a new business, it may also foreshadow 
the collapse of institutions. It is not only the object but the swirl,, of 
changing circumstances that can create or destroy relevance and value. " 
3 
Companies rarely fail because of one cause, since inadequate management 
usually makes more than one error. There are many typical occasions where 
inadequate apprAisal of change and poor monitoring and control of change 
have been major factors in failure of big companies. It is believed by 
the authors 
( 22) 
that "there are 'two types of change which can be described 
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as 'reactive change' and 'initiated change'. Reactive change occurs when 
events are allowed to overtake the activities concerned and changes must 
be made to deal with these events. Such changes normally caused by events 
such as take-over, unplanned moves in business, changes in senior management, 
introduction of computers and system failures. Initiated change is totally 
different and is much easier to handle. The very nature of initiated changes, 
i. e. changes developed to improve existing situations or to meet future 
needs, is such that careful planning and control of the changes avoids many 
, (22 ) of the associated problems. The author is of the 6pinion that 
although each type 'affects the other one, the failure of the companies 
studied was mainly due to 'reactive change' with many examples of changes 
caused by acquisition, diversification and expansion of companies. Rolls 
Royce, Handley Paget Mitchell Construction, Court Line and other grodpd 
and companies failed because they did not recognise the needs and requirements 
of change, and lacked an accurate and fast response to it. In the majority 
of cases lack of proper appraisal of 'change developed a situation in which 
the value system applied in the selection of the board's members became 
obsolete. 
5.22 Poor, Value System 
-It 
is said that "the bottleneck is at the head of the bottle. -No 
business is-likely to be better, than . its top managemerit. 1,67 
) 
In large 
companies, the Board composed of executive management men is considered 
as the functioning organ, -)of the enterprise, but it. cannot and must not 
be the governing organ. It is "an organ of review,, of appraisai, of appeal-; 
and only in a crisis it becomes an organ of action in oider to remove 
existing executives that have failed, or to replace executives who have 
resigned, retired or died. Once these have been made, the Board again 
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becomes an organ of review. " 
(57 ) 
However, to obtain real benefit from 
the Board its memnership must be carefully selected. The selection of the 
Board's members is based on the value system applied in companies. The 
author believes that this value sygtem constructs the root causes of 
failure in many large companies examined. C. Robinson(123) who heads 
one of the largest management consultancy groups, comments "the Board and 
its membership is the key to the industrial success and survival not 
merely of individual companies but of British industry itself. " He also 
refers to the possibility of training and developing the directors and 
concludes "the problem has more to do with the value system applied to a 
board appointment. A seat on the board as a reward for line or flinctional 
management skills and endeavour may not be the best way to produce 
directors for the company. It is too often the British way. " 
The value system is a system ýiithin iwhich the decision has to be made. 
The values may be morale, cultural, company goals or accepted principles 
of company structure. The promotion of people, especially in large 
organisations, must be studied carefully and carried out properly. A poor 
value system might stimulate the management to promote or recruit those 
who conform to their own prejudices. I: his may also cause management to 
ignore the fact that "Your staff reinforce you in your error*. " 
There is evidence for companies without a flexible and adequate 
value system with a board consisting 6f devil's advocates who make policies 
and take decisionswithout even elementary understanding what business is. 
A poor value system means, as Cohen quotes, "employing a few people 
with whom you lack empathy for the sake of achieving a more balanced 
(44) 
management team". 
Lack of a proper value system means careless selection of a board of 
directors with all the familiar defects such as: one-man rule, unparticipant 
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management and board, unbalanced top team and lack of management depth. 
One can easily understand that for the origin'of most causes of failure 
and roots of problems, it is necessary to look at the value system applied. 
promotion decisions are what Peter Drucker calls "Life and Death" decisions. 
He. believes "the promotion system should bring about full utilisation of 
the managerial resources; it should not be entirely from within, the bigger 
the company, the more desirable is the outsider. The system must ensire 
that everybody who is eligible is considered and not just the most highly 
visible pe ople. Nothing does more harm that the too common practice of 
57) 
promoting a poor man to get rid of him. C. Handy, Professor of 
Management Development at the London Graduate Business School, believes 
that "In Britain we tend to promote and reward the traditional line managers 
appointing them ultimately to the board. They are in the maifi:.. 'energy men' 
too often with a narrow functional or operational base. Some make superb 
directors but the conventional board system ascribes little value and 
affords little opportunity for progress to the thinkers within an organisatiol 
ý 73) 
the 'wisdom men'. " The analysis of the big company crashes by the author 
provided evidence of the problems and difficulties experienced by these 
companies due to the existence and application of inappropriate and poor 
I 
value system. The effects and symptoms of this underlying cause were 
classified by the-author into the following-headings: 
1. Unbalanced team 
2. Non-participant board 
3. Lack of management de pth 
4. One-man idea 
Poor Board of Directors 
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5.23 Weak Top Management Team (Board of Directors and Chief Executive) 
An inadequate change appraisal develops a poor value system which 
selects a board. composed of incompetent members with the existence of or 
tendency towards unbalanced skills, non-participant members, lack of 
management depth and finally a dominant and sometimes brilliant man whose 
idea is never opposed by the board's, 'Yes, Sir' men. This board of 
directors was the origin of most causes of 'failure in companies studied. 
A review of the duties of the board can explain clearly how important 
and crucial their jobs and decisions were in'the collapse of well-known 
corporitions. These duties can be summarised as follows: 
1. The approval of-the decisions "what the company's business is" and 
"what it should be". 
2. Approval of measurements to judge the progress towards these objectives. 
3. Approval and examination of major strategies and p6licies. 
4. Appointment and dismissal of-chi&f executive. 
5. Delegation of authority to chief executive for managing the company's 
affairs. 
Decisions concerning capital investment policy and its managed 
expenditure budgets. 
7. Profit planning 
8. Responsible for organisational problems and spirit as a supreme court 
9. Promotion and reward to managers 
10. Management of crisis and risk 
11. Requiring financial and operational information 
12. Auditing and control of crisis and problems, and decisions taken 
13. Succession of executives 
14. To control the chief e'xecutive (considering that delegation does not 
mean abdication) 
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One may conclude from these items that the main functions of the 
board of directors are: 
Top decision making 
Top decision approving 
Top decision reviewing 
The analysis of failed companies revealed that failure started from 
the top where management failed to d6 its job properly. Having put the 
emphasis on top management as the main cause of failure, one must be 
cl ear about what is 'top', 'senior' or -'middle' management. J. Kerr 
(95 
in a comment on different levels of management states "Inevitably such 
terms cannot have an absolute-meaning - what constitutes a senior management 
job in a small firm could be a middle management job in a large organisation. 
In generaf, top management refers to the people at the very top of an 
organisation, whose primary concern is with the long, -: term future, e. g. 
'where is the company going in the 1980s' type of question. Senior 
management is responsible-for formulating policy within the guid&lines 
of top management and have overall responsibility for implementing it, 
one key feature of senior manag*ement therefore is the policy making role 
with a fairly long time horizon. " He also refers to middle management 
and junior management and quotes "middle management is mainly to implement 
policy b6t he also shapes the way the policy is implemented and becomes 
the subsidiary policy maker which affects many people at ground floor level. 
Junior manýgement have got a supervisory vole and their views should be 
fed back to the policy maker. "( 
95) 
Having clarified the distinction between differen t levels 6f 
management, the author maintains his previous view that failure in large 
companies starts from the top where the board of directors and chief 
executive are responsible for top decision making and approval such as 
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investment decisions and major strategic changes. It is the author's 
view that one can divide the management activities and responsibilities 
into three broad headings as follows: 
a) strategic (top management) 
b) managerial (senior management) 
c) operational (middle and junior management) 
considering these classifications, the failure mainly stems from strategic 
(top management) and sometimes. -from managerial (senior management) level. 
It is rarely due to the third level. 
5.24 Investment Strategy 
Investment strategy, which is used in this study in a broad context, 
means the decisions and policies for extension and expansion of company 
activities, market share and growth. Different ways of increasing business 
brings problems for management, its support staff and company's survival. 
Choice of strategic focus depends primarily on market growth potential, 
market structure and company's available resources; cash, management ability, 
etc. The success or failure at this stage depends on the ability of 
management "to know the companyvs strengths, to adapt to strategic and 
structural change and to screen all new ideas before making major 
commitments. ,(6) It should be noted that strategic change means "a shift 
in the product or service mix produced by the firm and/or the markets to 
which it is offered. A key step in the shift is the discovery of a product- 
market idea. ,(7) The problems of extending business activities is 
concerned as much with the direction to take as with the way to d6 it., 
Figure 5.6 indicates the broad alternatives as: 
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5.24.1 market penetration (expansion) 
This is the approach which seeks to sell more of the existing product 
line to the same market and denotes a growth direction through the increase 
of market share. for the present product. The problems which arise are 
mainly concerned with promotion, distribution and pricing of products. 
This might be the cause of failure in young and small businesses. 
5.24.2 Market development 
_(exploration) 
I 
In this stage'the company is seeking new mission (needs for existing 
product) for its pvoduct or one can explain briefly as "seeking new 
markets for present products. " 
The example of failure in market development can be seeA in Court 
Line, Mitchell Construction, Vehicle and General. The main cause of failure 
is lack of, texperience and familiaritY with overseas markets. 
5.24.3 Product development (innovation) 
I 
This can be explained by creation of new products to replace current 
ones or "developing new products for existing markets. " There is evidence 
in the analysis of failed companies silch as Blanes Ltd., Rolls Royce, 
Handley Page, Court Line, V&hicle and General, John Willament where they 
failed to overcome their weaknesses in marketingg research and development 
and production and ignored a proper study of their products life cycle on 
time. 
5.24.4 Diversification and acquisition 
This approach represents developing new products for new markets and 
can be explained as "a combined approach of innovation and exploration 
with all the problems of each and*a few extra ones of its own. ". 
(23 ) 
The 
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risks are substantial and the rewards can be large. The main problem 
for the companies examined was not whether to diversify, but how to do 
it successfully. This is the author's view, that in large companies 
diversification decision can be considered as 'life and death' decisions. 
Nearly all the companies studied were struck by the shock of their failure- 
in entering into new products, new markets, new process and new service. 
RB211 a new product for a new marker in America, Jetstream of Handley Page, 
Kariba power station in Zaire of Mitchell Construction, Court Line 
acquisitions in different parts of the world without any experience, 
Vehicle and General acquisitions such as Pioneer. Marina and Havant Quay 
projects of J. Willament, merger with J&H and acquisition of companies 
from British Oxygen Co. Ltd of Roadship Ltd and many other examples maintain 
the approval of significance of diversification in causing company failure. 
This approach requires an accurate blenýd*of company's competitive strength, 
finaficial, marketing, technical, service, management abilitý, and a proper. 
analysis of market potential. The major cause of failure in this stage 
stems from a total lack of understandin&their strengthý and weaknesses 
in every aspect especially of the product and market they are intending 
to diversify. They forgot that any attempt to diversify with existing 
inexperienced resources is doomed to failure. Diversificqtion is sometimes 
achieved through take-overs or mergers where companies in related fields 
come together. 
Having considered different approaches in extension of businesses 
and giving examples of failure, it is important to note "that before any 
idea becomes a part of the firm's product-markelt portfolio several steps 
must be taken: enough information must be developed to convince management 
of the profitability of the idea, organisational competence must be 
developed for manufacturing, distHbuting and marketing the product., '(6 
) 
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The failed companies lacked an adequate information system with a poor 
communication and control which caused unjustifiable acquisition, expansion 
and extension based on guesswork estimates and assessments. 
However, investment strategy decisions are taken and approved ýy 
the board of directors and it is an overriding issue in marketing which 
must be carefully studied. It is a usual cause of failure among companies 
favoured with the exceptional capacity to borrow money. - 
5.25 The Late Symptoms 
One striking factor about the companies studied is that until'they 
actually face with the final collapse, everybody goes about exuding 
confidence without giving any hint that a crisis is developing. This 
is represented by too optimistic reports and comments by the chairman, 
managing director and other members of the board and even by pouring 
more and more money into ailing coropanies.. They pretend to be confident 
about--the health of the company while in reality the main reason is to 
avoid the announcement of difficulties and to prevent the impact of 
losing confidence in business community. Obviously, there is sense in 
that, *but "too often there is a sneaking suspicion that the management 
does not want to face up to its own responsibility for allowing a crisis 
to develop. So a dangerous situation is allowed to drift into a worse 
oneq which positive action might have averted. Even more disturbing, 
perhaps, is the growing evidence that senior executives often fail to 
recognise crisis symptoms which, with hindsight, seem almost absurdly 
. 
,(3 obiious . 
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5.26 Conclusions 
Having analysed the large company crashes in recent years, one has 
to come to conclusions by asking the ultimate question which arises, 
namely: "why the companies fail The short answer is that there is 
no single reason for the collapse. It is caused by a number of contributory 
factors during a gradual process and relatively long period, depending on 
the size of the company and type of industry and its ability to borrow 
money from the public, shareholders and government. Although the causes 
are numerous, they fall readily into two broad cliasses: (1) internal: those 
which represent the quality of the management, and (2) external; those 
which come from outside the individual business. The total collapse of 
an organisation is invariably caused by fundamental'errors in managem ent 
and rarely to mischance or unexpected events, in other words the causes of 
failure in large companies are more internal rather than external factors. 
In the majority of cases the process of failure starts because of a 
misconceived attempt to cause change without a proper recognition of 
needs and identification of risks, inadequate planning for change and 
response to it and most important failure to monitor and control the change. 
For the origin 9f most causes, however, one must look at the board of 
directors where crucial decisions relating to major policies and strategies 
of the firm are taken, approved and reviewed. In the analysis of company 
failure, the board can be considered as the reservoir of problems and 
the most important area of risk. It is said that the strength of any 
organisation depends on the souildness of its foundations and the correctness 
of its basic structure. Yet the present study found that the companies 
are often built on foundations so shaky that there are crashes and 
disasters which threaten the business community and the national economy. 
It is noteworthy that corporate planners can benefit from an awareness of 
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the causes and symptoms of 
ýompany failure because they are often called 
to advise their company on acquisition candidates and one reason for 
offering a company for acquisition is that it is. failing. Management 
should be alert for signs of failure. Creditors should not be ignorant 
of some non-financial symptoms. The'lessons of. failure are as important 
as the recipes of success. 
The conclusions drawn from this chapter can be listed as follows: 
1. Company failure is a gradual process which takes many years. -- The 
period depends on the severity of problems, the size of the company, 
management ability in'raising money from the public or government and 
some unexpected external factors. - 
2. The major causes of failure come from internal environment of the 
company. (All the companies studied). 
3. The board of directors is the main risk area where most of the problems 
are shaped. This was also a common factor in all the cases studied. 
4. Financial problems are mainly the symptoms of underlying managerial- 
weakness. Some of these symptoms become secondary causes in later stages. 
5. There was a gap between production and marketing organisation of 
failed. -, companies. e. g. Rolls Royce, Handley Page. 
6. Inflation, recession and economic climate of recent years have 
accelerated the failure, but not a major causal factor. eg. (Court'Linet V& G) 
Lack of a proper change appraisal is a major cause of company failure. 
8. one-man rule, unbalanced team, unparticipative board and even 
management gap are the signs of a weak board of directors. This itself 
is the'effect of a poor value system in the company. (Most of the companies) 
9. Poor communicatiori was a common weakness in almost all the companies 
studied. e. g. John Willament, Court Line, Vehicle & General. 
10. Another common feature of failure of companies is too optimistic 
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profit, forecasts, misleading and unjustified chairman's statements and 
manipulated accounts when the companywas in trouble. (All companies) 
11. The large companies do not fail because of a complex system, but from 
a total lack of understanding and knowledge of the very basic prinAples. 
12. The type of industry and business does. not seem to be an important 
factor, although the risks ass; ciated with manufacturing industries 
are greater than others. e. g.. Handley Page. and Rolls Royce. 
13. Considering the three levels of management responsibility (strategic, 
managerial and operational), the failure often stems from the first level, 
strategic and in some cases it is accompanied by managerial level. 
14. The causes and symptoms of failure for old and public companies are 
often different from the young and small businesses. There may be some 
common contributing factors in both cases.. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECO101ENDATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is: 
a) To surnmarise the main conclusions that have been inferred during 
the course of the present study 
b) To 'suggest areas and topics for further research. 
6.1 Conclusions 
The summary of the study-, d. ata.. 'and-maiir- conclusi-orts are as follows: - 
1. During the period 1970-1977, a total number of 390,985 new companies 
were registered and 310,489 companies; were dissolved, struck off and 
notified in liquidation. 
2. On average, one-fourth of all liquidations notified during the period 
of study were manufacturing companies. A peak level was reached in 1976 
when 1319 coinpanies failed. Of these, 419 companies were in . metals and- 
engineering group, representing the highest number of failure, as defined 
- -by the Standaid Industrial Classification.. 
3. On average, approximately 50% of all notified liquidýtions were 
members' voluntary liquidations, 30% creditors' voluntary and 20% compulsory 
liquidations. 
4. The empirical results obtained in the course of this study supported 
the conclusions reached by previous researchers, that the longer a company 
survives; generally other things being equal, the smaller becomes the 
probability of failure. 
5.28% of the companies that fail, fail in the first three years', 47% in 
the first five'years and nearly two-thirds in the first ten years; with 
339. 
only one-third of companies surviving beyond ten years. 
6. 'Electrical Engineering corporations have the highest infant mortality, 
while textiles companies possess the highest late failure rate and have 
the longest lives. 
7. Considering the failure statistics of companies according to the year 
of failure (1970 to 1977), the period 1973 to 1975 gives the highest 
early-age failure indicating that the economic climate of this period 
which was characteiised by inflation, three-day week, oil crisis, etc., 
had signiý, icant impact on young and small businesses. 
8. The mixed-Weibull disttibution was found to be a particularly appro- 
priate mod&l'for describing the different stages of failure in a company 
life cycle. 
9. Log-normal, Gamma and Weibull distributions whilst'also adequate to 
dýscribed the failure behaviour of companies, are marginally worse than 
the mixed-Weibull distribution. 
10. The values of the parameters of distributions describing company 
failure, indicate a common failure behaviour of those companies for the 
period studied. 
11. Simple Weibull scale paraiabter of 125.6 months indicates that 63.3% 
of companies fiýil before achieving an age of 10 years. 
The following conclusions, derived from qualitatiVe, data, relating 
to large companies indicate: 
12. There is no single reason for the collapse of companies. Failure 
is caused by a number of contributory factors during a gradual process 
over a relatively long period. 
13. The majority of significant causes are internal and arise from 
fundamental errors in management, and rarely to mischance or external 
factors. 
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14. Consideiing the levels of management activities and responsibility, 
the failure often starts from the top where strategic decisions are, or 
should be, taken. 
15. With regard to different areas of activity, the board of directors is 
the main source of problems and mistakes. 
16. The unstable'economic conditions of recent years have, in the cases 
studied, only accelerated the failure process but have not been a major 
causal factor. 
17. As non-financial symptoms are rarely concealed, these can readily 
provide important information regarding the 'health' of the company. 
18. Financial difficulties are the symptoms of underlying weaknesses 
which can become significant secondary causes during the process of 
f ailure. I 
19. Awareness of causes and symptoms of failure can provide significant 
guidance for corporate planners And policy makers. 
20. More attention should be given to the 'value system' of companies 
and selection of the board of directors. 
21. Appropriate change appraisal systems can avoid many problems and 
failures. 
22. Companies do not fail because of complex structure, but because they 
ignore the basic principles of good management. 
6.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
1. Further analysis of the finaficial symptoms of company failure using 
ratio and trend analysis to identify the financial patterns of failure. 
2. Development of diagnostic models based on financial and non-financial 
symptoms. 
3. An investigation of 'success' factors of companies and evaluation of 
success and failure causes using statistical methods, e. g. factor analysis. 
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4. Application of the results of the present study to the development 
of possibly more accurate Z models. 
5. Investigation of the impacts and consequences of company failure 
based on classifications given in the present study. 
6. Study of business reorganisation as a possible remedy for present 
high failure rate. This to include development of rescue and turnaround 
strategies. 
7. An integration of prediction models, causal and symptom diagnosis 
to develop an efficient tool for management and other interested groups 
for 'health' auditing of the company. 
8. Assessment of existing financial and non-financial prediction models, 
to identify their strengths-and weaknesses. 
9. Development-of some preyentive models in order to reduce the number 
of failures and the consequences of collapse. 
I 
k 
APPENDIX A 
DATA BANk 
342. 
A-1 Classification Used 
The classification used in collection of data is based on the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC). SIC is based on industries and not on 
occupations and without regard to who owns or operates. The classification 
is arranged in a list of industry headings which are called Minimum List 
Headings (ICS). The headings of related industries are grouped into orders. 
For the purpose of this classification the unit taken is the 
'establishment'. An establishment is the smallest unit which-can provide 
the information normally required for an economic census, for example, 
employment, capital formation, turnover etc. Usually the principal activities 
carried on in an establishment fall within a single heading of the classifi- 
cation (evg. steel making or sugar refining). Frequently, distinct activities 
characteristic of different industries are carried on at one address, e. g. 
cotton weaving and making up of household textiles, but normally these are 
not classified separately and the whole establishment is classified according 
to the main activity., 
Some special points should be mentioned namely: 
a. Repair work 
Most kinds of repair work are associated with activities which are 
classified. either. to manufacturing or to distribution and in these cases 
the underlying principle of classification is that where 'the bulk of the 
repair work on goods of any particular type is carried out by manufacturers, 
any estabiishment specialising in the repair of these joods are classified 
to manufacturing. Where, 'howeveri most of the repairs are carried out at 
establishments whose main business is'distribution, the specialist repair 
establishments are also classified to distribution. Thus, establishments 
repairing radio and television sets, watches and clocks, furniture, etc. 
are classified to. the distributive trades. Establishments engaged in the 
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repair of ships, locomotives, aircraft and most kinds of plant and machinery 
are cladsified to manufacturing industry. The repair works such as motor, 
boot and shoe repairing are treated as Miscellaneous Services. 
b. Installation work 
The installation of machinery, equipment etc. is an activity'which is 
normally carried out by an establishment having a different major activity 
which decides its industrial classification. Where, however, installation 
is the only, or major, activity of a separate establishment, it should be 
classified to an appropriate heading, as 
Construction: installation of integral parts of the building, e. g. heating 
and ventilating system. 
Distribution: domestic washing machines 
Manufacturing: the installation of plant and machinery e. g. a computer, 
a telephone exchange system. 
The Standard Industrial Classification for the manufacturing industries 
consists of 119 Minimum List Headings which are distinguished by Arabic 
numerals. These Minimum List Headings have been grouped into 16 orders 
which are distinguished by alphabetical characters (A to U). A brief 
description of the main industries is given below the title of each heading. 
Gaps in the sequences of numbering the headings with each ord er have been 
left to permit additions to the Minimum List which may be necessary at a 
later date. A summary of orders and Minimum List Headings in Manufacturing 
IndustHes with the number of failed companies in the Data Bank is given in 
the Tables corresponding to each group. 
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GROUP A- FOOD, DRINK AND TOBACCO 
Minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
211 Grain milling 
212 Bread and flour confectionery 
213 Biscuits 2 
214 Bacon curing, meat and fish products 9 
215 Milk and, milk products 1 
216 Sugar - 
217 Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 11 
218 Fruit and vegetable products 1 
219 Animal and poultry foods 5 
221 Food industries not d1sewhere specified 10 
231 Brewing and malting 3 
232 Soft drinks 4 
239 Other drink industries 
240 Tobacco 1 
Total number or failures - 47 
Sources: 1. Standard Industrial Classification 
2. Data Bank deýeloped in the present study 
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GROUP B- COAL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
I 
minimum No. of 
List Type of Business Failed 
Heading Companies 
261 Coke ovens and manufactured fuel 
262 Mineral oil refining 
263 Lilbricating oils and greases 
Total number of failures -1 
GROUP C- CHEMICALS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES 
Minimum 
List 
Headings 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies__ 
271 Ceneral chemicals 6 
272 Pharmaceutical chemicals and preparations 4 
273 Toilet preparations 5 
274 Paint 5 
275 Soap and detergents 9 
276 Synthetic resins and plastics materials 2 
and synthetic rubber 
277 Dyestuffs and pigments 8 
278 Fertilisers 
279 other chemical industries 5 
Total number of failures - 44 
Sources: 1. Standard Industrial Classification 
2. Data Bank developed in the present study 
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GROUP D- METAL MANUFACTURE 
Minimum 
List '-*. ' -- 
Heading 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
panies 
311 Iron and steel (general) 16 
312 Steel tubes 3 
313 Iron castings, etc. 1 
321 Aluminium and aluminium alloys 11 
322 Copper, brass and other alloys 2 
323 other base metals 2 
Total number of failures = 35 1 
Sources: 1. Standard Indtistrial Classification 
2. Data Bank developed in the present study 
i 
It should be noted that this order includes smelting, refining 
and alloying (including steel melting); rolling and drawing, and the 
production of castings, forgings and other basis forms of ferrous 
and non-ferrous metals. Drop forging of iron and steel, wire drawing 
and further processing and fabrication are excluded. The production 
of precious metýls is classified in group L (Metal Goods). 
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GROUP E- MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 
minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
331 Agricultural machinery (excluding .9 
tractors) 
332 Metal-working machine tools 9 
333 Pumps, valves and compressors 1 
334. Industrial engines - 
335 Textile machinery and accessories 1 
336 Construction and earth moving equipment 3 
337 Mechanical handling equipment 10 
338 Office machinery 4 
339 Other machinery 43 
341 Industrial (excluding proces s), plant 54 
and steelwork 
342 ordnance and small arms 1 
349 other mechanical engineering not 143 
elsewhere specified 
Total number of failures - 278 
Sources: 1. Standard Ind6strial Classification 
2. bata Bank developed in the present study 
Note: Establishments specialising in the production of parts of a 
particular type of machinery included in this group are classified 
to the same heading as manufacturers of such machinery unless 
such parts are specifically classified elsewhere 
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GROUP F- INSTPJJNENT ENGINEERING 
Minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
. 
351 Photographic and document copying 1 
equipment 
352 Watches and clocks 2 
353 Surgical instruments and appliances 4 
354 Scientific and industrial instruments 11 
and systems 
Total number of failures 18 
GROUP G- ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 
minimum. 
List 
Headings 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
361 Electrical machinery 10 
362 Insulated wires and cables 3 
363 Telegraph and telephone apparatus 2., 
and equipment 
364 Radio and electronic components 19 
365 Broadcast receiving and sound 25 
reproducing equipment 
366 Electronic computers 2 
367 Radio, radar and electronic dapital 12 
goods 
368 Electric appliances primarily for 21 
domestic use 
369 other electrical goods 20 
Total number of failures - 114 
Source: 1. Standard Industrial Classification 
2. Data Bank developed in the present study 
349. 
GROUP H- SHIPBUILDING AND MARINE ENGINEERING 
minimum No. of 
List Type of Business Failed 
Heading Companies 
370-1 Shipbuilding and shiprepairing 
44 
370-2 Marine engineering 
Total number of failures - 44 
GROUP K- VEHICLES 
Minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of B6siness 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
380 Wheeled tractor manufacturing 1 
38 1 Motor vehicle manufacturing 26 
382 Motor cycle, tricycle and pedal 9 
cycle manufacturing 
383 Aerospace equipment manufatturing 1 
and repairing 
384 Locomotives and railway track - 
equipment 
385 Railway carriages and wagons and trams 5 
Total number of failures = 42 
Source: 1. Standard Industrial Classification 
2. Data Bank developed in present study 
. 35o. 
GROUP L- METAL GOODS NOT ELSEWHERE SPECIFIED 
Minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
390 Engineers' small tools and gauges 15 
391 Hand tools and implements 13 
392 Cutlery, spoons, forks and plated tableware 3 
393 Bolts, nuts, screws, rivets 3 
394 Wire and wire manufacturers 3 
395 Cans and metal boxes 2 
396 Jewellery and precious metals 21 
399 Metal industries not elsewhere specified 90 
Total number of failures = 150 
Sources: 1. Standard Industrial Classification 
2. Data Bank developed in the present study 
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GROUP M- TEXTILES 
minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
411 Production of man-made fibres 3 
412 Spinning and doubling on the cotton 9 
and flax systems 
413 Weaving of cotton, linen and man-made 2 
fibres 
414 Woollens and Worsted 20 
415 Jute 
416 Rope, twine and net 1 
417 Hosiery and other knitted goods 16 
418 Lace 5 
419 Carpets 8 
421 Narrow fabrics 5 
422 Made-up textiles 12 
423 Textile finishing 3 
429 Other textile industries 4 
Total number of failures - 88 
GROUP N- LEATHER, LEATHER GOODS AND FUR 
Minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
431 Leather (tanning and dressing) and 4 
fellmongering 
432' Leather goods 28 
433 Fur 3 
-j: otai nUmber ot lailures = ja 
Source: 1. Standard Industrial Classification 
2. Data Bank developed in present study 
ý352. 
mmup P -rr. nTtITMr- AMn PnnTtJPAR .. 
Minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
441 Weatherproof outerwear 1 
442 men's and Boys' tailored outerwear 12 
443 Women's and girls' tailored outerwear 69 
444 Overalls and men's shirts, underwear 6 
445 Dresses, lingeiies, infants' wear 12 
446 Hats, caps and millinery 6 
449 Dress industries not elsewhere specified 160 
450 Footwear 11 
total number of failures - 277 
r-PnTTP P- RPTf'Vq- POTTERY- CLASS AND CEMENT 
Minimum 
List 
HdIding 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
461 Bricks, fireclay and refractory goods 14 
462 Pottery 3 
463 Glass 21 
464 Cement - 
469 
f 
Abrasives and building materials 17 
Total number of failures = 55 
GROUP S- TIMBER AND FURNITURE 
Minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
471 Timber 22 
472 Furniture and upholstery 104 
473 Bedding 5 
474 Shop and office fitting 70 
475 Wooden containerd and baskets 12 
479 MisciManeous wood and cork manufacture 26 
Total number of failures - 239 
Source: 1. Standard Industrial Classification 
2. Data Bank developed in present study 
353. 
f'73^'Frn IP - 13AIDVD DDTWY'rTX'Ifl AWTr% 73TTnT TCUT'Kltý 
Minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of Business 
........ 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
481 Paper and board 2 
482 Packaging products 6f paper, board and 6 
associated materials 
483 Manufactured stationery 6 
484 Manufacturers of paper and board not 
elsewhere specified - 
485 Printing, publishing of newspapers 4. 
486 Printing, publishing of periodicals 22 
489 Other printing, publishing, bookbinding 199 
and engraving 
--4 
Total number of failures = 239 
GROUP U- OTRER MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
Minimum 
List 
Heading 
Type of Business 
No. of 
Failed 
Companies 
491 Rubber 2 
492 Linoleum, plastics floor covering, 2 
leathercloth 
493 Brushes and brooms 1 
494 Toys, games, childrent-s carriages and 30 
sports equipment 
495 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 5 
496 Plastics products not elsewhere specified 35 
499 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 3 
Total number of failures = 78 
Source: 1. Standard Industrial Classification 
2. Data Bank developed in the. present study 
APPENDIX B 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
. 354. 
B. 1 Properties of Distributions 
B. 1.1 The distribution function 
When a performance parameter, t, of a system is subject to random 
variations the actual value of t at any precise point is not known. However 
such a variate t may be more likely to take on some values rather than others 
so that the pattern of its occurrence may be expressed in probabilistic 
terms. The function which describes the pattern or distribution of the 
values of t is known as the distribution function. 
B. 1.2 Probability density function 
When a variate is continuous the distribution function of basic interest 
is the probability density function (pdf). If f(t) is a pdf of a continuous 
variate t, then f(t)A(t) is defined as the probability that values of the 
variate t fall between (t - lAt) and (t + lAt)., In other words, f(t)A(t) 
is the limiting ratio of the number of all values of t in the range 
(t - lAt) to (t + lAt) to the total number of all possible values of t. 
The area under the pdf curve, therefore, represents probability. Hence 
the probability that t1 ies in some finite range from a to b is 
b 
P(a<t<b) J* f (t) d (t) M 
a 
where a and b represent the extreme limits of all possible values of t, 
then it is obvious that 
Co 
f Mdt - 1. 
-co 
(II) 
The normal pdf is an example of a function which has extreme limits of - and 
co. The following are aome typical pdf for continuous random variates. 
k 
355. 
Normal: 
f(u) exp 
(t-u) 2 
for --<t<- 2 
a/(27r) 2a 
where u is the mean of the distribution and 
a is the Standard Deviation 
Log-Normal: 
f(u) exp - 
(lop: t-u) 
2 
for O<t<- 
taA27r) 2a 
2 
Weibull: 
f(u) t 
B-1 
exp -(t for t>O 
0>0 
X>O 
Gamma: 
I 
t exp f or t>O 
x0r b) A 
ExPonential: 
f(u) --p for t>O 
Many of these distribution functions are related to each other. The 
log-normal is the normal function with the variate expressed logarithmically 
and the exponential function is a particular case of the Weibull or 
the Gamma functions. 
B. 1'. 3 Cumulative'distributibn functions 
Frequently one is interested in the probability of a fAilure occurring 
before some specified time, say t. This probability can be obtained from 
the relevant probability density function as follows: 
t 
Probability of failure before time t f(t)d(t) 
356. 
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The integral f(t)d(t) is denoted by F(t) and is termed cumulative 
distribution function. As t tends to infinity, F(t) tends to unity. The 
cumulative distribution function of the normal pdf is-not capable 6f 
simple analytical expression and tables are usually used for its evaluation. 
Many other pdf's do lead to relatively simple analytical expressions for 
their corresponding cumulative functions. For instance, in the case of 
the Weibdll distiibution 
at a-l 'a 
e- 
(t P. ). 
t (ý) dt 
Xý7 
-t 
or 
F(t) 
The cumulative distribution function expresses the probability of the value 
of a variate lying in the range from the lower limit of the variate to some 
specific value of the variate. 
B. 2 Maximum Likelihood Method 
one of the most commonly used methods of estimating procedure is 
the Maximum Likelihood Method. This is derived from the fact that the 
probability of obtaining the given sample values should be a maximum if 
the estimat6r-equals the population value. 
Suppose than tV t2l ***" tn are A independent random variables, i. e. 
. 357. 
with time to failure probability function f(t). We can define 
t n) 
f(tn*-t) 
or 
n 
L= II f 
where 
L is called the joint probability. density function of t's but it 
is called the likelihood function when considered as a function of 0 for 
a given t,, t,. ***t n* 
0 is the estimator of a population parameter. 
To maximise the likelihood function L, the classical maxima and minima 
are used. In order to find the value of 0, to maximise the likelihood 
function, the following procedure is used: 
3L 
t-o 
<0 gives maximum L Do iek 
Equation (I) is called the likelihood equation and has to be solved by 
iteration procedure in order to evalfiate the parameters. 
This method is most efficient for large N (N>30). The application and 
estimation procedure for different distributions are discussed by Lipow, 
Tia, Kamath and Isfahani. 
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B. 3 KolmO5torov-Smirnov Test for Goodness of Fit 
This test concentrates on the deviation between the observed cumulative 
histogram and the hypothesised cumulative distribution function F(t). 
S(t )=i i N+l 
where 
tI is the ith largest observed value in the random sample of size N 
The test statistic D max is given 
by 
D 
max = 
SUP IS(ti) - F(t di 
or 
D= Maxi 
i- 
F(t )I 
max N+l i 
-Co< t <- 
D is the largest of the absolute values of the N differences between the 
hypothesised cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the observed 
cumulative histogram evaluated at observed value in sample. 
B. 4 Failure and Hazard Rate 
To understand the failure and hazard raye "one has tc; consider a test 
where a large number of identical components are put into operation and the 
time to failure of each is noted. The failure rate of equipment at time t 
is the probability that the equipment will fail in the next interval of t6me 
given that it is good at the start of the interval; it is a conditional 
probability"( 
) 
with the usual notation as: 
P(A/B) = Probability of event A occurring once it is known that B 
has occurred - Q(t) 
where A is the event "failure occurs in interval A(t)" 
B is the event "no failure has occurred up to time t" 
359. 
and P(A/B) - 
P(A and B) 
P (B) 
t+At 
P(A and B)' = f(t)dt 
t 
Co 
P(B) f f(t)dt 
t 
t+At 
ff (Odt 
t F(t+At)-F(t) 
Ca 1-F(t) 
f(t)dE- 
N6w, if this equation is divided by At and At approaches zero, one obtains 
f 
f (t) 
1-F (t) I 
where h(t) is called the force of mortality, hazard rate or instantaneous 
failure rate. 
The term failure rate is often used when, strictly speaking, 
instantaneous failure rate should be used. 
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APPENDIX C 
COMPUTER PROGRAMS 
414. 
The computer programs were originally developed in the Postgraduate ' 
School of Industrial Technology, University of Bradford, by ARR Kamath and 
M. Esfahani. These were modified by the author for the analysis of company 
failure data. Acknowledgement s are due to my colleagues, 14 ABUSHABAN, 
A HAMADANI, J MULONDO and A RAISSI who were most helpful in their contribution. 
C. 1 "BAYS" 
1. Function 
To fit a five parameter mixed Weibull distribution using the method 
of weighted maximum likelihood. 
2. Programming Language-; 
FORTRAN-IV 
3. Subroutines Used 
DATAREAD 
BUBBLESORT 
PROBABILITY 
FUNCT 
DEVTN 
PARA 
RESULT 
4. Description 
This program estimates the parameters of Bimodal Weibull distribution 
using the weighted likelihood method. 
Subroutine DATAREAD reads the input data in a format-compatible to the 
other subroutines. Initial calculations which are common to the rest of 
the subroutines are also performed in this subroutine. 
Subroutine BUBBLESORT rearranges the failure times in an ascending 
order. 
4 
Subroutine PROBABILITY calculates the Bayesian probabilities, given 
the time of failure and the Weibull parameters for late and early distri- 
butions. The proportion of early failures is also calculated as 
1 
415. 
an output- 
Subroutine FUNCT calculates the value of the log likelihood function 
given a set of Bimodal Weibull parameters and the data-points. 
Subroutine DEVTN cAlculates the maximum abs6lute deviation of the 
sample CDF and the Bimodal Weibull (hypothesised) CDF. 
Subroutine PARA calculates new values for the parameters of Bimodal 
Weibull distributions using the weighted maximum likelihood method. 
Subroutine RESULT monitors the iteration. 
5. Parameters 
NSAMP - An INTEGER quantity describing the total number in 
the sample. 
NFAIL - An INTEGER quantity describing the total number failed 
TIHE -A one-dimensional REAL ARRAY of at least NSAHP elements 
containing the values, of the failure times (and censored 
times) 
SHAPE1 A REAL variable representing early failure Weibull 
shape parameter 
SHAPE2 A REAL variable representing late failure Weibull 
shape parameter 
SCAM A REAL variable representing the early failure Weibull 
scale parameters 
SCALE2 A REAL variable representing the late failure Weibull 
scale parameter 
TOM A REAL variable representing the reciprocal of the early 
Weibull scale raised to the power of early shape. 
TOE2 A REAL variable representing the reciprocal of the 
late Weibull scale raised to the power of late shape 
GRADBI A REAL variable, representing the gradient of the log 
likelihood function with respect to the current early shape 
parameter 
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a 
. GRADB2 -A REAL-variable representing the gradient of the log 
likelihood ftfnction with respect to the late shape parameter 
GRADT1 -A REAL variable representing the gradient of the log 
likelihood function with respect to the current TOM 
GRADT2 -A REAL variable representing the gradient of the log 
likelihood function with respect. to the current TOE2 
VALUEl -A REAL variable representing the current log likelihood 
value of early failure Weibull distribution parametbrs 
vALuE2 -A REAL variable representing the current log likelihood 
value-of the current late failure Weibull distribution 
parameters 
DMAX -A REAL variable representing the maximum absblute deviation 
of the fitted and the hypothesised (Bimodal Weibull) 
cumulative distribution functions 
TM -A REAL variable representing the time at which the 
maximum absolute deviation DMAX occurs. 
PROPI -A REAL variable representing the current estimate of 
proportion of early failures 
PROP2 -A REAL variable representing the current estimate of 
proportion of late failures 
PROB -A REAL array of DIIENSION at. tleast NSAMP; contains the 
early failure probabilities of the failure times using 
the current Bimodal Weibull parameters. 
The above variables are declared in COMMON 
DATAREAD - SUBROUTINE, reads the input data and assigns values 
to the variables defined in COMMON 
BUBBLESORT - SUBROUTINE, rearranges the first NFAIL-elements in the 
array ME in an ascending order 
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pROBABILITY - SUBROUTINE, calculates the Bayesian coefficients of 
the current set of Bimodal Weibull parameters 
PROBABILITY(BI, Al, B2, A2, AJ3, AJ4) 
BI - REAL 
On entry, Bl represents early failure Weibull 
shape parameter 
Al - ]REAL 
on entry, Al represents early failure Weibull 
scale parameter 
B2 - REAL 
On entry, B2. represents late failure Weibull 
shape parameter 
A2 - REAL 
On entry, A2 represents late failure Weibull 
shape parameter 
AJ3 - REAL 
On'exit, AJ3 represents the estimate of proportion 
of early failures 
AJ4 - REAL 
On exit, AA represents the estimate of proportion 
of late failures 
FUNCT SUBROUTINE, calculates the value of the log likelihood 
function for the current set of Weibull distribution 
parameters 
SUBROUTINE FUNCT(B, TOE, IBETA, VALUE) 
B- REAL 
On entry, B represents the Weibull shape parameter 
TOE - REAL 
On entry, TOE represents the reciprocal of the 
418. 
Weibull scale raised to the power of B 
IBETA - INTE GER 
on entry, IBETA represents the type of distribution: 
1- if early failure distribution, other if late 
failure distribution 
VALUE - REAL 
On exit, VALUE represents the weighted maximum 
likelihood of the Weibull distribution parameters 
DEVTN SUBROUTINE, calculates the maximum absolute deviation of 
the theoretical and the sample cumulative distribution 
functions (CDF). 
SUBROUTINE DEVTN(BI, Al, B2, A2, T, D Dl) 
DINENSION G(NFAIL), IF(NFAIL), RANK(NFAIL) 
BI - REAL 
on entry, Bl represents the early failure Weibull 
shape parameter 
Al- REAL 
on entry, Al represents the early failure Weibull' 
scale parameter 
B2 - REAL 
On entry, B2 represents the late failure Weibull 
shape parameter 
A2 - REAL 
on entry, A2 represents the late failure Weibull 
scale parameter 
T -REAL 
On entry, T represents the proportion of early 
failures 
419. 
D- REAL 
On exit, D represents the maximum absolute deviation 
of the hypothesised and sample CDF 
Dl - REAL 
on exit, Dl represents the upper limit of the observed 
time interval at which maximum deviation of the fitted 
OF occurs. 
10 
.G- REAVARRAY OF DIMNSION (NFAIL) 
On exit, the elements of G contain the upper limit 
of the class intervals of the failure times 
IF - INTEGER array of maximum DIMENSION (NFAIL) 
On exit, this array would contain the frequency 
in each class interval. 
RANK - INTEGER array of maximum DIMENSION (NFAIL) 
on exit, this array would contain the sample 
cumulative distribution of the data. 
PARA - SUBROUTINE, ' calculates new values for the parometers of 
Bimodal Weibull distribution using Newton Raphson iterative 
procedure. 
SUBROUTINE PARA(SHAPE, SCALE, IBETA, GRADI, GRAD2, ITER, TOE) 
SHAPE - REAL variable 
On entry, representing the shape parameter of Weibull 
distribution 
SCALE - REAL variable 
On entry, representing the scale parameter of Weibull 
distribution. 
IBETA - INTEGER variAble 
on entry, specifýing whether an early failure 
420 
distribution of late failure distribution 
1- for early failure distribution 
other - for late failur e distribution 
GRADI - REAL variable 
On exit, representing the gradient of the log 
likelihood function with respect to SHAPE 
GRAD2 - REAL variable 
On exit, representing the gradient of the log 
likelihood function with respect to the reciprocal 
of the SCALE raised to the power of SHAPE 
ITER - INTEGER variable 
representing a counter to check the number of 
iterations required for the convergence. 
TOE REAL variable 
representing the reciprocal of the SCALE raised. 
to the power of SIWE 
BIMOD - FUNMON, calculates the cumulative distribution 
function of Bimodal Weibull distribution, given 
the parameters 
FUNCTION BIMOD(Xl, Bl, Al, B2, ý2, T) 
Xl REAL variable representing the time of failure 
BI REAL variable representing the early Weibull 
distribution shape parameter 
Al. - REAL variable representing the early Weibull 
distribution scale parameter 
B2 - REAL variable representing the late Weibull 
distiibution shape parameter 
A2 - REAL variable representing the late Weibull 
distribution scale parameter 
421. 
T- REAL variable representing the proportion of. early 
failures 
RESULT SUBROUTINE, prints out the current values of the output 
parameters 
SUBROUTINE (N) 
N- INTEGER 
On entry, specifies whether a print out of the Bayesian 
probabilities'is required in every iteration. 
6. Input'Data 
The user must supply the following input data: 
1. TITLE - 1OA8 FORMAT <reads the title up to 80 characters) 
2. NSAMP, NFAIL - 210 FORMAT (reads total number in the sample and 
the number of failure) 
3. TIME - 250FO. O FORMAT (reads the times of failure) 
4. ' CENSOR - FO. 0 FORMAT (reads the censored time only if 
NFAIL<NSAMP) 
5. SHAPE1, SCALE1, SHAPE2, SCALE2 
4FO. O FORMAT (reads the initial values of early and 
late failure Weibull distribution parameters) 
7. Output 
The output includes 
1. The number of the current iteration 
2. current parameters of the early and late failure Weibull distribution 
3. gradients of the maximum likelihood function with respect to the 
Weibull distribution parameters 
422. 
4. estimated proportion of early and late failure distributions 
5. convergence values (i. e. the absolute difference between the 
current and the previous sets of parameters) 
6. Bayesian probabilities of early and late failure distributions 
7. Maximum core used: * = 10K wordd 
8. Time required: time required depends on the initial vlaues of the 
parameter supplied. 
9. References: See Chapter 4. 
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PROGRAM(BAYS) 
I=1=CRO 
OUTPUT2=LPO 
TRACE2 
END 
MASTER KAMNTH 
COINON SHAPF, 1, SHAPE2: SCALEljSCALE2,, TOE1, TOE2, PROPlpPROP2jTIME(250) 
1)PROB(250))NFAIL, NSAMP)GRADBlIGRADB2, GRADT1., GPAX2., VALUElj, VALUE2 
2, DMAX., TNE 
C NSAMP- NO IN THE SAMPLE) NFAIL - NO FAILED 
C SHAPE1 EARLY SHAPE, SCALE2 EARLY SCALE 
C THIS PROGRAM CALCULATES THE PARAMETERS OF BIMODAL WEIBULL 
C DISTRIBUTION USING THE WEIGHTED LIKELIHOOD METHOD 
CALL DATAREAD 
CALL BUBBLESORT 
CALL PROBABILITY(SHAPE1., SCAT-Fl., SWE2.. SCALE2, PPOP1)PROP2) 
CALL FUNCT(SHAPE1,9)El, l)VALUEl) 
CALL FUNCT( SHAP42)TOE2)2)VALUE2) 
GRADB1=0.0 
GRADB2=0.0 
GPADT1=0.0 
GRADT2=0.0 
CALL Dr-, VTN(SHAPE1, SCALE1)SHAPE2, SCALE2jPROPl)DMAXpTYiE) 
WRITE(2,100) 
100 FORMAT(lX, IITERATION OIH) i CAU RESULT(l) 
Al=SCAI. Pl 
A2=SCALE2 
Bl=SHAPE1 
B2=SHAPE2 
DO 10 I1=1,50 
CAIL PARA (SHAPE1, SCALE1,1, GRADB1, GRADT1, ITER)TOFl) 
WRITE(2,200) 
200 FORMAT(' --------------------------------------------------- 
------------ m --- 
WRITE(2,300)Il 
300 FORMAT(lX, tITEPATION NOI, 5XI5//) 
CALL PARA (SHAPE2, SCALE2,2, GMB2, GRADT2, ITERTOE2) 
A3=SCALEI 
B3--SHAPE1 
A4--SCALE2 
B4= SHAPE2 
CONV1=ABS(Al-A3) 
CONV2=ABS(Bl-B3) 
CONV3--ABS(A2-A4) 
CONV4=ABS(B2-B4) 
IF(( CONV2. LT. O. 00005). An. (CONV4. LT. O. 00005 ))GOTO 20 
GOTO 50 
20 IF ((CONVI. LT-0-0005). AND. (CONV3. LT-0-0005)) GOTO 30 
50 CONTINUE 
Al=A3 
A2=A4 
Bl=B3 
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B2=B4 
CALL PROBABILITY(SHAPE1, SCALE1., SHAPE2)SCALE2pPROPI)PROP2) 
CALL FUNCT(SHAPE1)TOE1,1, VALUEl) 
CALL FUNCT(SHAPE2, TOE2,2)VALUE2) 
CALL DEVTN(SHAPE1, SCALE1, SHAPE2,, SCALE2pPROP1)DMAXpTME) 
CALL RESULT(l) 
WRITE(2, L*0) 
400 FOPMAT(lX, //t CONVERGENCE VALUESIH/) 
WFITE(2,500) 
500 FORMAT(lX, 35X, IEARLYI, 21X)IIATEI///) 
WRITE(2,6oo)CONV2, CONV4 
6oo FORMAT(lX, 18X, ISHAPEt, BX, F12.6,12X, F12.6/) 
WRITE(2,700)CONV1, CONV2 
700 FORMAT(lX, 18X, ISCALEI, BX, F12.6,12X, F12.6//) 
WRITE(2,200) 
10 CONTINUE 
WRITE(2,800) 
800 FORMAT(lX, IITERATIONS EXCEEDED 501/1 FINAL RESULTS ARE: -'//) 
30 CONTINUE 
WRITE(2,900)1-1 
900 FORMAT(lX, IAFTERI, I5, tITERATIONS, FINAL VALUES ARE: -IH) 
40 CALL RESULT(l) 
STOP 
END 
SUBROUTINE PROBABILITY(Bl)AI)B2)A2, AJ3, AJ4) 
INDEX OF EXPONENTIAL TESTED IN ORDER TO AVOID UNDER/OVER FLOW 
COMMON SHAPE1, SHAPE2, SCALE1, SCALE2, TOE1, TOE2, PROP1, PPOP2, TIME(250) 
1, PROB(250), NFAIL, NSAMP, GRADB1, GRADB2, GRADT1, GRADT2, VALUE1)VALUE2 
2, DMAX, TNE 
C THIS SUBROUTINE. CALCULATES THE BAYESIAN COEFFICIENTS GIVEN 
C THE EARLY AND THE LATE FAILUPE PARAMETERS. 
c AJ3 AND AA ARE THE PROPORTION OF EARLY AND LATE FAILURES 
C RESPECTIVELY. 
AJ3-- 0.0 
AJ4=0.0 
DO 10 I=1, NSAMP 
X=(TIME(I)/Al)**Bl-(TINE(I)/A2)**B2 
IF (I. GE. (NFAILi-1)) GOTO 20 
AJ1=(B2/Bl)*(TIýM(I)**(B2-Bl))*((Al**Bl) (A2**B2)) 
IF(A]3S((TIME(I)/Al)**Bl-(TIME(I)/A2)**B2ý. LT. 100.0) GOTO 30 
IF ((( TIME(I)/Al)**Bl-(TIýIE(I)/A2)**B2). GT. 100.0) GOTO 40 
PROB(I)=1.0 
GOTO 50 
4o CONTINUE 
PROB(I)=O. O 
GOTO 50 
30 CONTINUE 
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AJ1=AJ1*EXP((TIME(I)/Al)**Bl-(TIME(I)/A2)**B2) 
PPOB(I)=1.0/(1.0+AJ1) 
50 CONTINUE 
AJ3=AJ3+PROB(I) 
. 
AJ4=AJ4+1. O-PROB(I) 
GOTO 10 
20 CONTINUE 
IF(ABS( (TIME( I) /Al) **Bl -(TIME( I) /A2 B2). LT. 100.0) Gom 6o 
IF ((( TDlE(I)/Al)** Bl-(TIME(I)/A2)**B2). GT. 100.0) GOTO 70 
PROB(I)=1.0 
GOTO 10 
70 CONTINUE 
PPOB(I)=O. 0 
GOTO 10 
6o CONTINUE 
PROB(I)=1.0/(EXP((TIME(I)/Al)**Bl-(TIME(I)/A2)**B2)+1.0) 
10 CONTINUE 
AJ3=AJ3/FLOAT(NSAMP) 
Aj4=Aj4/FLOAT(NSANP) 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE FUNCT (B, TOEIBETAVALUE) 
COMMON SHAPEI, SHAPE2, SCALE1, SCALE2, TOE1, TOE2, PROP1, PROP2, TIME(250) 
1, PROB(250), NFAIL, NSANP, GP, ADB1, GPADB2, GPAX1, GRADT2, VALUE1, VALUE2 
2, DMAX, TME 
C THIS SUBROUTINE CALCULATES THE VALUE OF LOG LIKELIHOOD OF 
C WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION GIVEN THE SHAPE(B) AND SCALE(TOE). 
C IBETA IS A COUNTER TO CHECKEARLY OR LATE FAILURES. 
C AND THIS IS USED TO ASSIGN RESPECTIVE BAYESIAN PROBABILITIES 
c AT ANY FAILURE TIME 
Pl= 0.0 
P2= 0.0 
P3=0.0 
DO 10 I= 1,, NSAMP 
. IF(I. GE. (NFAIL+1)) GOTO 20 
IF(IBETA. EQ. 1) GOTO 30 
PI=Pl+1.0- PROB(I') 
P2=P2+(1.0-PPOB(I))*ALOG(TINE(I)) 
P3r-- P3+(1.0-PROB(I))*TIME(I)**B 
GOTO 20 
30 CONTINUE 
Pi=Pl+PROB(I) 
P2=P2+PROB(I)*ALOG(TIME(I)) 
P_3=P3+PROB(I)*TIME(I)**B 
20 CONTINUE 
IF(IBETA. EQ. 1) GoTo 40 
P3--P3+(1.0-PROB(I))*TIME(I)**B 
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GOTO 10 
4o P3--P3+PROB(I)*TIME(I)**B 
10 CONTINUE 
VALUE--Pl*ALOG(B)+Pl*ALOG(TOE)+(B-1.0)*P2-P3*TOE 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE-DEVTN(Bl, Al., B2, A2)TpDjDl) 
COMMON SHAPE1, SHAPE2ýSCAT. 'F, 1, SCALE2, TOE1)TOE2, PROP1, PROP2,, TIME(250) 
1, PROB(250), NFAIL)NSAMPsGRADBlIGRADB2)GRADT1), GRADT2pVALUE10VALUE2 
2, DMAX, TME 
DIMENSION G(250), IF(250), RANK(250) 
THIS SUBROUTINE CALCULATES THE MAXIMUM ABSOLUTE DEVIATION 
OF THE SAMPLE CDF AND THE BIMODAL WEIBULL(HYPOTHSISED) CDF. 
T IS THE PROPORTION OF EARLY FAILURES. 
RANK IIN IS USED AN ESTIMATE OF THE SAMPLE CDF. 
ARRAY G(250) CONTAINS THE UPPER LIMIT OF CLASS INTERVAL. 
ARRAY IF(250) CONTAINS THE FREQUENCIES AT ANY CLASS INTERVAL. 
ARRAY RANK(250) CONTAINS THE RANK OF THE SAMPLE DATA( CDF). 
C 
NOTE: - FUNCTION BIMOD IS USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS SUBROUTINE 
TO CALCULATE THE FITTED (HYPOTHESISED) CDF. 
ALSO, THE TIMES OF FAILURE T(250) HAS TO BE ARPENGED IN AN 
ASCENDING ORDER. 
TO FORM THE CLASS INTERVAL AND FREQUENCY. 
Il=l 
IF(Il)=O 
G(Il)=TIME(l) 
DO 10 I=lp NFAIL 
30 IF (TIME(I). NE. G(Il)) GOTO 20 
IF(Il)=IF(Il)+l 
GOTO 10 
20 Il=Il+l 
IF(Il)=O 
G(Il)=TIME(I) 
GOTO 30 
10 CONTINUE 
TO CALCULATE AND STORE THE MEAN RANK IN THE 
13=0 
Do 4o i=iji 
I3=I3+IF(I) 
IF( IF(I). EQ. 1) GOTO 60 
is-_o 
DO 50 J=(13-IF(I)+l), I3 
50 Is--, S+ý 
PANK(I)=FLOAT(IS)/FLOAT(IF(I))/FLOAT(NSAmp) 
c; o To 4o 
60 PMjK(I)=FLOAT(I3)/FLOAT(NSAMP) 
ARRAY RANK. 
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4o CONTINUE 
C TO CALCULATE KOU40GIROVE SMIRINOV TEST STATISTIC. 
C DMAX DENOTES THE TEST STATISTC( D) 
T2=G(l) 
Tl=O. O 
D=0.0 
DO 70 I=1,, Il 
DIST2=BIMOD(G(I)$Bl., AI, B2,, A2., T) 
IF(I. NE. 1) GOTO 80 
Dl=DIST2 
GOTO 90 
80 Dl=ABS(DIST2-PANK(I-1)) 
90 D2=ABS(DIST2-RANK(I)) 
D3=Dl 
IF(D3. GE. D2) GOTO 100 
D3--D2 
100 IF (D3. LE. D) GOTO 70 
D=D3 
IF( I. EQ. 1) GOTO 110 
Tl=G(I-1) 
110 T2=G(. I) 
70 CONTINUE 
Dl=T2 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE RESULT(N) 
c THIS SUBROUTINE PRINTS OUT RESULTS 
COMMON SHAPEI,, SHAPE2,, SCALE1, SCALB2pTOEljTOE2)PIROPljPROP2)TIbE(250) 
1, PROB(250), NFAIL, NSAMP, GRADBljGRADB2, GRADT1, GPAW2, VALUE1., VALUE2 
2, DMAX, TME 
WRITE(2,100) 
100 FORMAT(lX, 35X, IEARLYI, 21XILATE', /) 
W'RITE(2,200) 
200 FORMAT(lX, 28Xl ------------------------------------------------- 1) 
WRITE(2,300)SHAPE1, SHAPE2 
300 FORMAT(lX, 18X, ISHAPE', BX, F12.8,12X)Fl2.8/) 
WRITE(2,4oo)scALE1, SCALE2 
400 FORMAT(lX, 18X, tSCALEI, 4XF20.5)4x, F20.5/) 
WRITE(2,50O)TOE1, TOE2 
500 FORMAT(lX, 21XITOEI, 4X, F20.15,4X, F20.15/) 
WRITE(2,6oo)GRADB1, GRADB2 
600 FOPMAT(lX)6XIGRADIENT OF SHAPE', 4X, F20.1O, 4XjF2O. 10/) 
WRITE(2,70O)G'PADT1, GRADT2 
700 FORMAT(lX, 6XlGRADIENT OF TOE, 14x, F20.10,4X)F20.10/) 
WRITE(2)800)PROP1, PROP2 
800 FORMAT(lX, 13X, IPROPORTIONI, 8XF12.7,12XF12-7/) 
WRIT2(2,102O)VALUE1, VALUE2 
1020 FORMAT(lx, 7XjlLIKILIHOOD VALUEI, 8X, F12.6,12XF12.6/) 
WRITE(2,200) 
WP. ITE(2,900)NSAMP, NFAIL 
900 FOTWiAT(lX, INO IN SAMPLF--', 15,5X, lN0 FAIIZDII5/) 
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-WRITE(2,1030)DMAX, THE 
1030 FORMAT(lXpIDMAX=I)FlO. 6., 5X.. IAT TIMEI., Fl5.3//) 
IF(N. NE. 1) GOTO 20 
WRITE(2,1000) 
1000 FORMAT(lX)5X,, ITIMEI, 10X, IPROBABILITYI., /) 
DO 10 I=1, NFAIL 
X=l. O-PROB( I) 
WRITE(2,1010)I, TIME(I)IPROB(I)pX 
1010 FORMAT(lXpI3, ')', Fl3.2,5XoFl2.8)5XjFl2.8 
10 CONTINUE 
20 CONTINUE 
R-0MN 
END 
SUBROUTINE DATAREAD 
C SUBROUTINE TO READ DATA 
- COMMON SHAPE1, SHAPE2, SCALE1)SCALE2,, TOE1., TOE2, PROP1, PROP2, TIME(250) 
1, PROB(250)pNFAIL, NSAMP, GMBIjGRADB2, GRADT1)GRADT2pVALUE11VALUE2 
2, DMAX, TME 
DIMENSION TITLE(10) 
READ(1,16o)(TITLE(I), I=1,10) 
100 FORMAT(8OAl) 
READ(1,200)NSAMP, NFAIL 
200 FORMAT(2IO) 
READ(1,300)(TIME(I), I=1, NFAIL) 
300 FORMAT(250FO. 0) 
IF (NFAIL. EQ. NSAMP) GOTO 10 
READ(1,400)CENSOR 
400 FORNAT(F0.0) 
DO 20 I=(NFAIL+l) NSAMP 
TIME(I)=CENSOR 
20 CONTINUE 
16 CONTINUE 
READ(1,500)SHAPE1, SCAIM)SHAPE2, SCALE2 
500 FORMAT(4F0.0) 
TOEI=1.0/(SCALE1**SHAPEl) 
TOE2=1.0/(SCALE2-Y*SHAPE2) 
WRITE(2,6oo)(TITLE(I), I=1,10) 
6oo FORMAT(lX, //-, 80AI., //) 
WRITE(2,700)NSAMP, NFAIL 
700 FOR14AT(lX, 'NO IN THE SAMPLE--', 15,5X, 'N0 FAILED-', I5HI FAILURE TIM 
1ESI) 
WPITE-(2,800)(TIME(I), I=1, NFAIL) 
600 FORMAT(lX, 200(F15.2/ )//) 
WRITE(2,900)SHAPE1, SCALE1, SHAPE2)SCALE2 
900 FO'RMAT(lX, 'EARLY SHAPE-1, Flo. 6,5XIEARLY SCALE-I)Fl5.3//' LATE SHA 
UPE-1, Flo. 6,5X, ILATE SCALE-1, Fl5.3///) 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE BUBBLESORT 
C THIS SUBROUTINE REARRENGES THE ARRAY IN AN ASCENDING ORDER 
429 
COMMON SHAPE1,, SHAPE2, SCAT-Fl., SCALE2,, TIOELpTOE2, PROP1, PROP2jTIIME(250) 
1, PROB(250), NFAIL)NSAMP,, GRADB1)GRADB2)GRADT1)GRADT2jVALUE1, VALUE2 
2, DMAX, TME 
DO 10 J=1, (NFAIL-1) 
Jl=NFAIL-J 
DO 20 I= 1)Jl 
I6=I+l 
IF( TIME(I6). GT. TIME(I)) GOTO 20 
x6=TIME(I6) 
TIME(I6)=TIME(I) 
TIME(I)=X6 
20 CONTINUE 
10 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE PARA(SHAPE., SCALEIBETA., GRAD1)GPAD2)ITER.. TOE) 
CON40N SHAPE1, SHAPE2, SCALE1)SCALE2, TOE1)TOE2,, PROP1., PROP2jTIME(250) 
1, PROB(250), NFAIL, NSAMP, GRADB1)GRADB2, GPADT1, GRADT2, VALUE1, VALUE2 
2, DMAX, TME 
C THIS SUBPOUTINE CALCULATES NEW VALUES FOR THE PARAMETERS 
c OF BIMODAL WEIBULL USING WEIGHTED ýZE: NEWTON-RAPHSONS NETHOD 
C IS USED FOR THE ITERATION. 
C IBETA IS A COUNTER TO CHECK LATE. EARLY FAILURES. 
wo 
B--SHAPE 
AK3=0.0 
Pl=O. O 
DO 10 I=1, NFAIL 
IF(IBETA. EQ. 1) GOTO 
, 
20 
Pl=Pl+(1.0-PROB(I))*ALOG(TINE(I)) 
AK3--AK3+(I. O-PROB(I)) 
GOTO 10 
20 CONTINUE 
Pl=PI+PROB(I)*ALOG(TIME(I)) 
AK3=AK3+PROB(f) 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 30 J=1,100 
90 P2=0.0 
P3=0-0 
P4--o. o 
Do 40 I= 1, NSAMP 
IF(IBETA. EQ. 1) GOTO 50 
P2=P2+(1.0-PROB(I))*(TIME(I)**B)*ALOG(TIKE(I)) 
P3---P3+(1.0-PF, OB(I))*(TIME(I)**B) 
P4--p4+(l. o-pRoB(i))*(TIME(I)**B)*(ALOG(TIME(I)))**2 
GOTO 40 
50 CONTINUE 
P2=P2+PROB(I)*(TINE(I)**B)*ALOG(TIME(I)) 
P3=P3+PROB(I)*(TIME(I)**B) 
430. 
P4=p4+PROB(I)*(TIýE(I)**B)*(ALOG(TIME(I)))**2 
4o CONTINUE 
IF(M. EQ. 1) GOTO 100 
B7=AK3/B+Pl-(AK3/P3) 
B7=AK3/P3*P2 
B8=(AK3/B)+Pl-B7 
B7=(P4/P3)-(P2/P3)*(P2/P3) 
B9=-AK3/(B*B)-AK3*B7 
B7=B-(BB/B9) 
IF(ABS(BB). LT-0-00005) GOTO 60 
B--B7 
30 CONTINUE 
60 b--B7 
SHAPE--B 
GOTO 90 
100 CONTINUE 
TOE--AK3/P3 
SCALE--(P3/AK3)**(I. O/B) 
ITER=J 
GRAD1=(AK3/B)+Pl-(AK3/P3)*P2 
GM2=(AK3/TOE)-P3 
C END OF THE SUBROUTINE 
RETURN 
END- 
FUNCTION BIMOD(Xl, Bl, Al, B2)A2)T) 
C THIS FUNCTION CALCULATES BIMODAL WEIBULL CDF AT TIME XI 
C GIVEN THE PARAMETERS BlpA3. )B2, A2, T. 
CT BEING PROPORTION OF EARLY FAILURES. 
C TO CHECK INDEX OF THE EXPONENTIAL. 
IF(((Xl/Al)**Bl). LT. (100.0)) GOTO 10 
X2=1.0 
GOTO 20 
10 X2=1. O-EXP(- (()a/Al)**M)) 
20 IF (((XI/A2)**B2). LT. (100.0)) GOTO 30 
X3--l-O 
GOTO 40 
30 X3--l. 0-EXP(-((Xl/A2)**B2)) 
40 BIMOD=T*X2+(1.0-T)*X3 
RETURN 
END 
FINISH 
**** 
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C. 2 Distributions 
1. Description: 
The programme gives the best distribution function for a given set of 
data, based on the maximum likelihood estimation and the Kolmorogov-Smirnov 
test. The statistical distribution functions used in this program are: 
Weibull 
Normal 
Gamma 
Exponential 
Lognormal 
Erlang 
The program uses the Newton-Raphson method to solve the nonlinear equation. 
This program also tests the given data for randomness. 
2. Programming Language 
FORTRAN -" 
3. References 
The methods used in this program are described in the following 
references 
4. Subroutine used 
WEILEST, WEILTEST, NORMAL, GAMMA, LOGNORM, EXPON, ERLANG, ORD, RUNTEST 
5. InRut Data 
The user. must supply the following input cards: 
NF, INT, MOPT, BEGIN, FORMAT (314,2F8.2) 
W FORMAT (10 FO. O) 
6. Parameters 
w-A one dimensional REAL ARRAY containing the failure observation 
data. 
NF - An INTECER quantity describing the number of failure data points 
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Cx -A one dimensional REAL ARRAY containing the values of the 
cumulative distribution function 
FE -A one dimensional REAL ARRAY containing the values of 
histograms 
MOPT - An INTEGER QUANTITY, if it is equal to zevo, the data are 
not ordered, otherwise it is. 
BEGIN -A REAL quantity containing the first failure observation 
END -A REAL quantity contiining the last value of failure data 
F-A one dimensional REAL ARRAY containing the values of 
observed frequency function 
7. Outp 
The output includes, for each distribution function the listing of all 
the input, the theoretical and empirical distribution-and the best 
I 
estimators of the parameters and also the best distribution function is 
printed. 
t 
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PROGRAM (DISTRIBUTIONS) 
INPUT 1 CRO 
OUTPUT 2 LPO 
TRACE 2 
END 
MAsTER (moJAHED) 
DIMENSION W(999), CX(999))FE(999))TITLE(10) 
'READ(1,22) (TITLE(I), I=1)10) 
22 FORMAT (10AB) 
WRITE(2,23)(TITLE(I)oI=1,1O) 
23 FORMAT (1111X, 10AB, IH) 
1 READ(1,20)NF, M0Pr, BEGINEND 
NT--NF 
20 FOF14AT(2IO, 2FO. 0) 
IF(NT-999)2)3,3 
2 READ(1119)(W(I), I=1, NT) 
19 FORMAT (999FO. 0) 
IF(MOPT) 5,5,6 
5 CALL RUNTEST(W, NF) 
CALL ORD(W, NF) 
6 WRITE(2,2OO)(W(I), I=1, NT) 
200 FORMAT(1O(2X, F8-3)) 
INT=12 
CALL WEILEST(W, NTNFBETA, ALFAXLANDA) 
CALL WEILTEST(W, NTNFBETAALFA) 
CALL NORMIAL(W, NF) 
CALL EXPON(W, NF) 
CALL LOGNORM(W, NF) 
CALL GAMMA (W, NT) 
WRITE(2,4) 
4 FORMAT(////) 
GO TO 1 
3 STOP 
END 
SUBROUTINE RUNTEST(X, NF) 
DIME, NSION R(999), X(999) 
AA=NF 
AB--NT 
WRITE(2,300) 
WRITE(2,100) 
100 FORMAT(12X, IRUN TESTI) 
WRITE(2,200) 
200 FORMAT(l RUNS ABOVE AND BELOW THE MEADIANI) 
XR=l. 
DO 1 I=1, NF 
1 R(I)=x(i) 
CALL ORD(R, NF) 
J=NF12 
IF(NF-2*J)2,3,2 
2 XMED=R(J+l) 
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GO To 4 
3 XMEDý=(R(J)+R(J+1))/2 
4 DO 7 I=1, NF 
IF(X(I)-)GAED)5., 5,6 
5 R(I)=l 
GO TO 7 
6 R(I)=2 
7 CONTINUE 
DO 9 I=2)NF 
IF(R(I)-B(I-1))8)9,8 
8 XB=XR+l 
9 CONTINUE 
EXR=(AA+2)/2.0 
VARR=(AA*(AA-2))/(4*(AA-1)) 
Z--(XP-EXR)AVARR**0.5) 
Y=ABS(Z) 
IF(Y-2.58)10,10,12 
10 WRITE(2,11) 
11 FORMAT(I AT. 01 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL SAMPLE IS A 
GO TO 14 
12 WRITE(2,13) 
13 FORMAT(' AT. 01 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL DATA IS NOT 
300 FORMAT(//H) 
14 RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE ORD(WNT) 
DIMENSION W(999) 
DO 2 J=1, NT-1 
L--J+l 
DO 2 I=L, NT 
IF(W(J)-W(I))2j2,3 
3 Wl=W(J) 
w(i)=w(i) 
W(I)=Wl 
2 CONTINUE 
PZaMN 
END 
SUBROUTIRE HIST(XKINT, MOPTBEGIN, ENDpCXFE) 
DIMENSION CX(999), FE(12), X(999) 
WRITE(2,300) 
300 FOP'AAT(HHI) 
DATA NSTAR/1*1/ 
IF(MOPT)1,1,2 
1 A=X(l) 
Z=X(K) 
J=l 
GO TO 8 
2 A=BEGIN 
Z--END 
Do 4 J=l, K 
IF(X(J)-A)4,7,7 
4 CONTINUE 
PANDOM SAMPI-EI) 
A RANDOM SAMPLEt) 
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5 WRITE(2,6) 
6 FORMAT(50H OTHERE ARE NO OBSERVATIONS IN THE SPECIFIED RANGE) 
RETURN 
7 IF(X(J)-Z)8)8,5 
8 WRITE(2,9) 
9 FORMAT(/37H NO. P(X) F(X) HISTOGRAMP 
AK=K 
CUM=O. 
Cu--O. 
AINT--INT 
WIDTH= (Z-A)/AINT 
CENTER= A+WIbTH/2 
REP--A+WIDTH 
DO 18 I=1, INT 
NOB---l 
J=J-l 
10 NOB--NOB+l 
J=J+l 
IF(K-J+1)12,12,11 
11 IF(REP+. 00005-X(J))12,10,10 
12 C=CENTER+. 00001 
IF(NOB)15,15,13 
13 ANOB=NOB 
PROB--ANOB/AK 
CUM, =CUM+PROB 
P=PROB+. 00005 
CU=CUM+- - 00005 WRITE(2,14)NOB, P, CU, C, (NSTAR, IK=1, NOB) 
14 FORMAT(I7, F9.4, FB. 4, Flo. 4,2X, 75Al) 
GO TO 17 
15 WRITE(2,16)cu, c 
16 FORMAT(16li 0 . 0000, F8.4, Flo. 
4) 
17 CENTER=CENTER+WIDTli 
REP--REP+WIDTH 
FE(I)=P 
cx(i)=c 
18 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE WEILEST(WNTNFBETA, ALFAXLANDA) 
DIMENSION W(999) 
AB--NT 
AA=NF 
WRITE(2,300), 
300 FORMAT(///H) 
XZ=W(l) DO 20 I=1, NT 
20 W(I)=W(I)/m 
EPS=1. OE-6 
BETA=1.0 
1 Sl=O 
S2=0 
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S3--O 
s4=o 
DO 2 I=lyNT 
Sl=Si+W(I)**BETA 
S2=S24-(W(I)**BETA)*ALOG(W(I)) 
2 S3=s3+(W(I)**BETA)*((ALOG(W(I)))**2) 
DO 3 I=1., NF 
3 s4=S4+ALOG(W(I)) 
FB=(-AA/Sl)*S2+AA/BETA+S4 
FDIFBý--AA*(S2**2)/(Sl**2)-(I. A/Sl)*S3-AA/(BETA**2) 
IF(ABS(FB/FDIFB)-EPS)200., 200ilOO 
100 BETA=BETA-FB/FDIFB 
GO TO 1 
ioO WRITE(2., 10)BETA 
10 FORMAT(2X, 'SHAPE PARAMETER BETA=I, F5.3) 
AM=-1.0/BETA, 
S=Sl*(XZ**BETA) 
ALFA=(AA/S)**AM 
WRITE(2111)ALFA 
11 FORMAT(2XjlSCALE PARAMETER ALFA=IyF5.3) 
XLANDA=AA/S 
Do 4 i=l, NT 
4 W(I)=W(I)*XZ 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE WEILTEST(W., NTjNF., BETA., ALFA) 
DIMENSION W(999) 
DIMENSION FEM(999), F(999), D(999), N(999), Z(999) 
WRITE(2,300) 
SD=O. 
SUM=O. 
ST--O. 
WRITE(2,90)- 
go FoRmAT(8x, lGOODNESS OF FIT TESV) 
WRITE(2,91) 
91 FORlvlAT(8X, lBY KOLMOGROV-SMIRNOV TESV) 
WRITE(2,93) 
WRITE(2,300) 
93 FoRmAT(8x, lFOR WEIBULL DIST. ') 
WRITE(2,300) 
WRITE(2,100) 
100 FORMAT(l N(I) FEM(I) F(I) D(I)l) 
Do 63 I=1, NF 
N(I)=I 
XK=I 
FEM(I)=XK (NT+l) / 
(-(W( F(I)=l-EXP I)/MYA)**BETA) 
63 D(I)=. A. BS(FEM(I)-F(I)) 
WRIT'E(2,99)(N(I), FEM(I), F(I), D(I), I=1, NT) 
99 FORMAT(2X, I3,4x, 3FlO. 4) 
DMAX=XMAX(D, NT) 
14RITrl, (2)101)DMAX, NT 
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101 FORMAT(2XIDKAX=I, F5.3,4x, 'NO. =I, I3) 
C CRITICAL STATISTIC FOR K-S TEST Is 1.36/Km*1/2 AT 0.05 
IF(NT-40)70,70,21 
21 IF(DMAX-1- 361(Nu* *0.5))633) 633) 635 
633 WRITE(2)634) 
634 FOR14AT(2XIAT ALFA=-05 THE DATA ARE DIST. AS A WEIBULLI) 
GO TO 70 
635 WRITE(2,636) 
636 FORMAT(2X, tAT ALFA=-05 THE DATA ARE NOT DIST. AS A WIBUIV) 
20 WRITE( 2,300) 
300 FORMAT(/////) 
70 RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE NORMAL(X, NT) 
DIMENSION Z(999), FEM(999), F(999), D(999), N(999), X(999) 
WRITE(2,300) 
WRITE(2,71) 
71 FORMAT(8X, I FOR NORMAL DIST. 
WRITE(2,200) 
200 FORMAT(l N(I) FEM(I) 'F(I) D(I)I) 
Zl=XMEAN(X, NT) 
Z2=SD(X, NT) 
DO 88 I=1-, NT 
88 Z(I)=(X(I)-Zl)/Z2 
FS--O 
xj=-4. o 
Sl=O-39895*(EXP(-O-5*(XJ**2))) 
DO 1 I=1)NT 
2 XJ=XJ+0.01 
S2=0.39895*(EXP(-0.5*(XJ**2))) 
FS=FS+((S2+Sl)/2)*0.01 
Sl=S2 
IF(XJ-Z(I))2., 3,3 
3 F(I)=FS 
XY=i 
FEM(I)=XY/(NT+l) 
N(I)=I 
1 D(I)=ABS(FEM(I)-F(I)) 
WRITE(2,99)(N(I), FEM(I), F(i), D(I), I=1)NT) 
99 FORMAT(2X, I3,4x, 3FlO. 4) 
DMAX=XMAX(D, NT) 
WRITE(2,15)DMAX, NT 
15 FORMAT(2X, tDMAX=IF6.3,4x, 'NO. =lI4) 
WRITE(2,300) 
WRITE(2,31)ZI 
WRITE(2,32)Z2 
31 FORMAT(2X, lMEAN=lF6-3) 
32 FORMAT(2X , ISD=t , F6-3) 300 FORMAT(///) 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE GAMMA(X, NT) 
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DIMENSION FEM(999),, F(999), D(999))N(999))X(999) 
WRITE(2,300) 
WRITE(2,100) 
100 FORMAT(8X, I FOR GAN14A DIST. 
Z=X(l) 
DO 1 I=1.! PNT 
1 X(I)=X(I)/z 
Zl=)Q4EAN(X, NT) 
Z2=SD(X)NT) 
B=(Z2**2)/Zl 
C=(Zl/U)**2 
GAM=Sl4AAF(C, O) 
XJ=0.01 
Sl= ((XJ/P)**(C-1))*(EXP(-XJ/B))/(B*GAM) 
FS=((Sl/2)*0.01) 
DO 5 I=1, NT 
3 XJ=XJ+0.01 
S2=((XJ/B)**(C-1))*(EXP(-XJ/B))/(B*GAM) 
FS=FS+((Sl+S2)/2)*0.01 
Sl=S2 
IF(XJ-X(i))3,4,4 
4 F(I)=FS 
N(I)=I 
XI=I 
FEM(I)=XI/(NT+I) 
5 D(I)=ABS(F(I)-FEM(I)) 
DMAX=XMAX(D, NT) 
WRITE(2,200) 
200 FORMATP N(I) FEM(I) F(I) D(I)l) 
WRITE(2,99)(N(I), FEM(I), F(I), D(I), I=1, NT) 
99 FORMAT(2XI3,4X, 3FlO. 4) 
WRITE(2,15)DMAX, NT ,, 
15 FOPMAT(2X)IDMAX=', F6.3,4x, INO. =', I3) 
B=B*Z 
WRITE-(2., 101)C 
101 FORMAT(2X, 'SHAPE PARP1,2rER=lF8.3) 
WRITE(2,102)B 
102 FORMAT(2X)ISCALE PARAMETER=I, F8.3) 
300 FOPMT(///) 
DO 2 I=1, NT 
2 X(I)=X(I)*Z 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE ERLANG(NT, X) 
DIMENSION X(999), FEM(999), F(999), D(999), N(999) 
REAL KIX 
WRITE(2)300) 
WRITE(2)200) 
200 FORMAT(8x, 'ERLANG DISTRIBUTIONI) 
WRITE(2,100) 
100 FORMAT( I N(I) FEM(I) F(I) D(I)l) 
ST--o 
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SUMýo 
Z--X(li 
DO 5 I=l, NT 
5 X(I)=X(I)/z 
Zl=XWY, Ali(X., NT) 
Z2=SD(X, NT) 
C=(Zl/Z2)**2 
B--(Z2**2)/Zl 
IC=C+0.5 
I Yl- Ic-1 
DO 2 I=1, NT 
SU4--l+X(I)/B 
DO 1 J=2., IM 
K=J 
IX=i 
3 IX=IX-l 
K=K*IX 
IF(IX-1)1,1,3 
1 SUIJ: = SUM+ ( (X( I) /B) **J) IK 
F(I)=l-(EXP(-X(I)/B))*SUM 
ZI=I 
FFIA(I)=ZI/(NT+l) 
N(I)=I 
2 D(I)=ABS(F(I)-FEM(I)) 
WRITE ( 2,99) (N( I), FEM(I) ) F( I), D( I), I=l, NT) 
99 FORMAT(2X, I3,4x, 3FlO. 4) 
Dll, 4AX=XMAX(D, NT) 
WRITE(2,101)DMAX, NT 
101 FOR!, /iAT(2X, I D. LLIAX= F6.3,4x, NO. 13) 
WRITE(2,300) 
C=C*(Z**2) 
B--B/Z 
IC=C+0.5 
WRITE(2,10)IC 
10 FORMAT(2X, ISHAPE PARAMETER--', I8) 
WRITE(2,11)B 
11 FORMAT(2X, 'SCALE PARAMETER =IF6.3) 
300 FORMAT(//h 
Do 4 I=1, NT 
4 X(I)=X(I)*Z 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE EXPON(XNT) 
DIMENSION IEM(999), F(999), D(999), N(999), X(999) 
W'RITE(2,300) 
WRITE(2,200) 
200 FORMAT(8X, 'EXPONANTIAL DISTRIBU`rIONI) 
WRITE(2,100) 
100 FORMAT(l NO. FEM(I) F(I) D(I)') 
B=XMEAN(X, NT) 
DO 2 I=1, NT 
N(I)=I 
F(I)=l-EXP(-X(I)/B) 
Z=I 
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FEM(I)=Z/(NT+l) ' 
2 D(I)=ABS(FEM(I)-F(I)) 
WRITE(2,3)(N(I), FEM(I), F(I), D(I), I=1, NT) 
3 FOP14AT(2X, I3,4x, 3FlO. 4) 
DMAX=XViAX(D, NT) 
WRITE(2,4)DMAX, NT 
4 FORýIAT(2X, 'DYIAX=', F6.4,4X, INO=. ', I3) 
WRITE(2,5)B 
5 FORMAT(2X, ISCALE PARAMETER--', F8.4) 
300 ' FOr-, MAT(////) 
PLTURN 
END 
SUBROUrINE LOGNORM(XjNT) 
DINENSION t-EM(999), F(999), N(999)., D(999))X(999) 
WRITE(2,300) 
WRITE(2,200) 
200 FORMAT(8X., ILOGNOP14AL DISTRIBUTIONI) 
WRITE(2,100) - 
100 FORMAT(I NO. FEM(I) F(I) D(I)I) 
SUL%1=0. I 
S T-- 0. 
ZN=X(l) 
DO 1 I=1, NT 
1 X(I)=X(I)/ZN 
DO 2 I=1, NT 
2 SUYi--SUM+ALOG(X(I)) 
XYiEAN=SUM/NT 
Xý%EXP(MEAN) 
DO 3 I=1, NT 
3 ST=ST+(ALOG(X(I))-)aEAN)**2 
SD--(ST/(NT-1))**0.5 
XI=0.01 
XA=(-(ALOG(XI/XM))**2)/(2*(SD**2)) 
Sl=(0.39885/(XI*SD))*EXP(XA) 
FS=(Sl/2)*0.01 
DO 8 I=1, NT 
6 XI=XI+0.01 
XA=(-(ALOG(XI/XM))**2)/(2*(SD**2)) 
S2=(0.39885/(XI*SD))*EXP(XA) 
FS=FS+((S2+Sl)/2)*O. Cl 
Sl=S2 
IF(XI-X(I))6,7,7 
7 F(I)=FS 
Zl=I 
FEM(I)=Zl/(NT+l) 
N(I)=I 
8 D(I)=ABS(FEM(I)-F(I)) 
WRITEý(2,9)(N(I), FEM(I), F(I), D(I), I=lpNT) 
9 FOr-1, M(2X, 13. ý 4x, 3F10 -4) ET) 
10)DMAY., NT 
10 POFILt,! P(2Y, II, F6.3., 4X., I 1, T-- 13) 
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WRITE(2,300) 
XMEAN=XMEAN+ALOG(ZN) 
XM=EXP(XMEAN) 
WRITE(2,11)XM, SD 
11 FORMAT(2X, tSCALE PARAMETER=I)F6.3,4XISHAPE PARAMETER=', F6.3) 
300 FORMAT(///) 
Do 4 i=l, NT 
4 X(I)=X(I)*ZN 
RETURN 
END 
FUNCTION )(MFM(XNT) 
DIMENSION X(999) 
SLZl:: o 
DO 1 I=1, NT 
1 SUY17-SUM+X(j) 
XMEAN=SUM/NT 
RETURN 
END 
FUNCTION SD(X, NT) 
DIMENSION X(999) 
Zl=XYiEAN(X, NT) 
ST=O. 
DO 1 I=1, NT 
1 ST--ST+(X(I)-Zl)**2 
SD=(ST/(NT-1))**0.5 
RETURN 
END 
FUNCTION XMAX(D, NT) 
DIMENSION D(999) 
Xl= -*D. (l) 
DU 1 I: = 2, NT 
TF (XMX-D(I))201,1 
2 SUB--XMAX 
XMAX=D(I) 
D(I)=SUB 
1 -CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
FINISH 
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